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The purpose of this research was to investigate the dynamics surrounding 
campus policy making related to diversity issues and new academic programs.  This 
study was anchored in conceptual ideas that liken university policy making to political 
processes. The study sought to answer the over arching research question:  How does 
Baldridge’s (1971) political model of university policy making apply to one campus 
policy process addressing diversity issues?  The research employed a qualitative case 
method as a means to answer the research question.  Specifically, the study examined 
the creation and enactment of the Asian American Studies Program (AASP) at the 
University of Maryland, College Park (UMCP).  Data collection drew from an 
informant interview process and was supported by document review.  Data were 
systematically analyzed against the conceptual framework, presented in a case narrative, 
discussed in light of related literature, and assessed in terms of their relevance to theory.
The study generated analytic conclusions about the political nature of one 
campus’s policy and programmatic decisions to support Asian American Studies.  This 
research also generated new data regarding decision making around diversity issues and 
the role of students of color on campus, which are salient issues on college campuses 
today.  
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Over the past two decades, college student demographics have changed 
significantly.  College student populations are now older and increasingly represent 
students from different racial and ethnic backgrounds (Advisory Committee on Student 
Financial Assistance, 2001). Campuses across the country have attempted to address the 
concerns of these new student populations through various responses which have 
included both academic and administrative policy changes.  Institutional diversity 
policies, required academic courses in non-Western thought, and ethnic and gender 
studies programs are examples of these new policy constructs (Altbach, Lomotey, & 
Kyle, 1999; Wilson, 1999). 
In most instances, these policies are the result of complex, yet interrelated 
debates regarding the meaning and value of campus diversity and encompassing: (a) the
equitable distribution of organizational resources; (b) the philosophical debate within 
the academy regarding what constitutes research and curriculum; and (c) the impact and 
response to challenging public rhetoric, major court rulings overturning affirmative 
action policies, race-based scholarship programs, and federal assistance programs for 
low-income students (Cole, 1994; Prewitt, 1994). In addition, these new policies and 
programs represent the outcomes of struggles by historically underrepresented student 
populations to be seen and heard in campus and academic life (Altbach,1997; Rhoads, 
1998; Sidel,1994). The policy context, then, is one that is often contentious, especially 
for those traditionally underrepresented student populations, as they seek better 
2
representation and academic programs, and for administrators, as they attempt to 
provide an equitable learning environment for all students. 
This policy climate presents a wide range of opportunities for higher education 
researchers. For example, current research into diversity policies, ethnic studies 
programs, and the like have focused on student learning outcomes on a diverse campus 
(Bowen & Bok, 1998; Chang, 1999; Chang, Witt, Jones, & Hakuta, 2001; Hurtado, 
Milem, Clayton-Pedersen, & Allen, 1999). These studies hold both practical and 
empirical significance in higher education policy research.  They are important because
the conclusions reached provide strong support for maintaining policies like affirmative 
action as well as policies and curricular innovations that reflect the experiences of 
students of color.  In addition, the findings from such studies contribute to a growing 
body of theoretical work on the cognitive affects of diverse learning environments.
Little attention, however, has been paid to understanding how and why such 
policies and programs are enacted unless they are instituted as the response to external 
legal or governing body mandates (Coleman, 2000; Greeve, 1999; Pusser, 2003; 
SHEEO).  Answers to such questions are critical if institutions wish to examine and 
assess their ability to provide an equitable distribution of organizational resources as 
well as to measure the extent to which they are fulfilling their educational missions. 
Furthermore, McClendon and Hearn (2003) argue that the larger field of higher 
education policy research may “remain in a state of perpetual infancy” if scholars do not 
invigorate this important stream of research (p. 3).  This condition presented an equally 
compelling reason to conduct the study outlined in this chapter.   
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Study Purpose and Significance
This research contributes to both the conceptual and empirical literature on 
policy making in higher education by examining the degree to which theoretical ideas 
regarding the politics of campus decision making hold relevance for policy making 
around diversity issues.  In doing so, the research used data collected through 
descriptive, exploratory questions to generate preliminary theoretical propositions about 
the political nature of one campus’s policy and programmatic decisions to support
Asian American students, a historically underrepresented group on college campuses
and at UMCP
This research also generated new data regarding the dynamics of campus 
decision making around diversity issues and the role of students of color on campus, 
which are salient issues on college campuses today.  Increasing knowledge about 
institutional decision-making processes holds significant implications for understanding 
how and why policies and programs that seek to include previously underrepresented 
student populations are created. Perhaps if these processes are researched, 
administrators and students may be able to learn from others and better understand the 
organizational context, the interests of organizational members, and the purposes and 
goals of a diverse learning community. Moreover, this type of policy research may help 
other institutions understand the process by which an organization might moves from 
rhetorical efforts of inclusion to actual implementation of equitable practices.
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Conceptual Framework
This study examined one institution’s decision-making processes around the 
establishment of an Asian American Studies program.  This case study explored and 
analyzed these decision dynamics utilizing a conceptual vantage point that was largely 
absent in higher education research on diversity policies and programs. In the broadest 
sense, the overarching research question was:  
How does Baldridge’s (1971) political model of university policy making apply 
to one campus policy process addressing diversity issues?
This conceptualization of research into campus diversity programs and policies 
rests on the cardinal assumption proposed by Baldridge (1971) that higher education 
policy may be viewed as the result of the political dynamics at work in an organization. 
Baldridge (1971) posited that policy making in colleges and universities may be likened 
to and explained by the political processes found in government. Central to this model 
is the idea that the university is comprised of individuals and groups—including 
students—with competing values and interests, and that conflict occurs when these 
elements clash. This political lens required the researcher to investigate the policy 
context, to identify the actors involved in the process, to explain the goals and resources
maintained by these actors, and to analyze how these actors attempted to influence the 
policy outcome. These categories are the conceptual benchmarks for uncovering and 
understanding how and why conflict occurs, and how conflict is resolved through the 
enactment of institutional policies and programs.  
Baldridge’s model also draws from major works in political science (Gamson, 
1968) to enhance these components of his framework model.  These authors and more 
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recent works were reviewed to bolster the conceptual framework guiding the data 
collection and analysis phase (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Dahl, 1984;
Easton, 1979; Fischer, 1990; Kingdon, 1995; Mazzoni, 1991;  Pfeffer, 1981).
Case Identification and Terms
The University of Maryland, College Park (UMCP) is an example of an 
institution that has created programs to support its diverse student body. Specifically, 
this case study examined the processes by which UMCP developed and enacted an 
academic curriculum in the emerging interdisciplinary field of Asian American studies.  
The research was limited to this particular case site and bound by a time frame 
beginning in 1995 (the first administrative decision about the program), and culminating 
in May 2000 with the official establishment of the Asian American Studies program
(AAS).
The curricular decisions made at this institution were well-suited for this case 
study for a number of reasons.  First, they reflected a set of interrelated and complex
decisions made about diversity-related policies and programs at an institution that has a 
historical legacy of discrimination and yet in the past two decades, has embraced 
diversity as a part of its organizational mission and purpose. Second, they represented
decisions made in an organizational setting (a large, public research university) and 
issue set (diversity matters) that have yet to be explored using Baldridge’s theories 
about the politics of campus decision making. 
Clearly defined terms provide both structure to the case study research design 
and a common language so the reader can interpret the narrative presented by the 
researcher (Hernandez, 1996).   Conceptual terms relevant to the case are outlined in 
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chapter three. The following are definitions of terms relevant to the individual case 
itself:
Diversity policy is used interchangeably with program or initiative in this study. 
This term refers to a campus’s academic, student support, and/or administrative 
decisions regarding all student populations, especially students of color or 
traditionally underrepresented populations.  In this particular case, the object of 
study is the AAS at UMCP. 
Public research university refers to the institutional type of the case study site.  
Characteristics of public research universities typically include some form of 
statutorily mandated state subsidy, the adherence to a legal charter granted by 
the state, and the multiple missions of teaching, service, and research (Carnegie 
Classification of Universities and Colleges, 2001).  
College student leader only refers to those students who hold formal positions of 
authority with campus undergraduate or graduate student organizations.
Senior administrator may include any campus administrator at the director level 
or above, including the campus president, members of the cabinet, deans, and 
directors at the case site
Faculty leader refers to those faculty members who either hold official positions 
of authority within the university governance structures or are faculty whom 
other administrators consider to be de facto leaders by the very nature of their 
tenure, department, or status. 
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Research Method
Stam and Baldridge (1971) and Baldridge (1971), and later Pfeffer (1974, 1978),
Pfeffer and Salancik (1981), Hernandez (1996), and Pusser (2003) used the political 
model and case method to study contentious policy issues at a number of higher 
education institutions. These studies revealed how students, administrators, and other 
campus members came to influence the policy process through the exertion of power 
and influence, to resolve conflicts and to reach a policy outcome. According to 
Baldridge (1971), the case method is the proper tool for examining contested policy 
making because it allows the researcher to “assemble a holistic picture of the institution, 
particularly those dynamics which can only be revealed through multiple data sources 
such as documents and interviews with policy actors” (p. 32).
The purpose of this study was to analyze to what extent an existing theory about 
campus decision making held true for a different set of issues. This research study was
exploratory in nature, and in this respect, its conclusions did not render predictive 
propositions about campus diversity issues and policy dynamics.  Following 
Baldridge’s research method, this research project relied on a qualitative case study 
design to examine the decision making processes that gave way to the creation and 
adoption of the AAS at UMCP.  Data sources for the study included:  secondary sources 
such as periodicals; primary documents from official campus policy statements and 
administrative correspondence; and interviews with central policy actors involved in the 
various phases of the decision-making processes. Data were systematically analyzed 
against the conceptual framework.  Data findings were written in a case narrative, 
discussed in light of related literature, and assessed in terms of their relevance to theory.
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Organization of the Study
The case study is organized into six chapters. This chapter serves as an 
introduction to the case, its significance and conceptual lens, and the research methods 
to be used.  Chapter Two provides a review of the relevant literature and describes the 
conceptual framework that guided the study.  Chapter Three is a description of the case 
study method, the study’s purpose, the research design, the data sources, and data 
collection and analysis procedures. Chapter Four arrays case findings relative to the 
policy context.  Chapter Five is a case narrative of the findings of the decision-making
processes at UMCP in light of the analytic framework. Chapter six summarizes the 
study findings, offers conclusions and preliminary theoretical propositions that resulted
from this case study research. 
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND DESCRIPTION OF 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and assess the literature that guided
this case study research. This review encompasses the literature in two central areas: (1)
the issue phenomenon—campus decision making around diversity policies and 
programs; and (2) the theoretical framework—the political dynamics of university 
decision making. 
Issue Literature Review
This section reviews the issue-related literature and delineates the strengths and 
weaknesses of the limited research on the topic.  This literature area includes three 
subsections:  (a) literature on how diversity-related policy decisions are characterized 
and documented, which provides a contextual perspective; (b) literature on the 
development of Asian American Studies programs, which provides program-specific 
background for the unit of analysis in this case; and (c) literature on student 
involvement in diversity-related policy decisions, which captures a range of 
perspectives on a single group experience in the organizational decision-making 
process. 
Literature on Diversity as a Contested Campus Issue
With the climate of conservative national politics and anti-immigrant sentiments 
providing the contextual antecedents, the origins of many present-day local campus 
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debates around diversity matters may be traced to ideological exchanges during the 
1980s.  Political pundits and elected officials argued for the return to traditional liberal 
curriculums in education settings including K-12 and college campuses (Kimball, 1989; 
Searle, 1990; Sykes, 1988). In the late 1980s, U.S. Secretary of Education William 
Bennett and National Endowment for the Humanities Chair Lynn Cheney often used
their positions to promote curriculum grounded in understanding western civilization
(Bok, 1990; Bromwich, 1992). At the same time, these individuals used their positions 
to publicly drive the ideological debate around multicultural education issues and 
discredit this movement (Cornbelth & Waugh, 1995; Gless, 1992; Pratt, 1992; Taylor, 
1992; Wilson, 1999). 
College campuses were insulated from these debates.  State and federal policy 
changes as well as what Prewitt (1994) calls demands from “new constituencies” such 
as industrial leaders, public officials, and “consumer” student bodies have contributed 
to the contentious environment for discussions around the topic of “diversity.” Campus 
dialogues of the late 1980s and 1990s centered around challenges to curriculum, 
admissions criteria and speech codes and charges of “political correctness” by those 
seeking to sustain traditional canons of thought and culture on campus (Altbach, 
Lomotey, & Kyle, 1999; Levine & Cureton, 1998; Wilson, 1999; Smelser, 1993).
These debates encapsulating diversity all possess one key component:  they are 
disputes grounded in what Sharp (1999) contends are morally rooted contests.  That is, 
groups are involved in extraordinarily “passionate and strident” contests over what they 
ultimately believe to be morally right and value laden decisions about equity (p. 3).  
Furthermore, Smelser (1994) posits that these debates have generated a “historically 
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new set of components” not yet seen on college campuses.  These new attributes 
include:  (1) a challenge from an unprecedented number of racial and ethnic minorities; 
and (2) a challenge not only to gain access to the “dominant culture of the 
university…but also to question the legitimacy of, and perhaps unseat that culture…and 
to challenge traditional curriculum” (p.43).  Smelser remarks that these debates present 
a distinctive problem for ethnic groups like Asian Americans as they battle perceived 
stereotypes of “making it within the context of a meritocracy” and engaging in political 
claims for “true representation and space” within the academy (1994, p. 42). 
Literature that addresses these debates around diversity and multiculturalism in 
the academy may generally be categorized as chronological and descriptive.  One noted 
political scientist and university president hypothesized that the absence of theoretical 
inquiry about these debates is in part due to the proximity of the conflict because 
“discussions and examinations of these [multicultural debates] and issues generally 
generate more heat than light” (Keohane, 1994, p. 177).  
Prewitt (1994) describes one niche area (that criticizes the academy for “failing 
on all fronts”) as anecdotal, “confessional literature” written by those within the 
academy who align themselves with “traditional disciplines and conservative theories” 
(1994, p. 206).  Perhaps the most famous and controversial discussion around diversity 
emerged with the publication of Dinesh D’Souza’s (1991) book, Illiberal Education.  In 
his conservative treatise, D’Souza uses six case vignettes from various elite research 
universities across the country.  These cases, however, are not grounded in a central 
conceptual or theoretical framework.  Instead, the author utilizes secondary documents 
and occasional student interviews to formulate retrospective summaries of conflict 
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around a range of diversity issues including admissions policies, core curriculum 
changes, and student support services.  The apparent end goal of D’Zouza’s book is not 
a contribution to an understanding about the complexities of diversity issues, but rather 
the articulation of an assumption that campus conflicts around diversity matters actually 
contribute to more racial conflict and division. 
Other accounts of these conflicts reflect a similar, retrospective, but still 
atheoretical approach. Like D’Souza, Pratt (1992) details the multicultural course 
requirement debate at Stanford.  Pratt discloses her biases at the onset of the case 
narrative, which allows her to tell the story as a faculty member and an insider to the 
political dynamics that occurred. Unlike D’Souza, Pratt organizes her case account by 
describing the three stages of the debate process, including faculty senate debates, 
student protests, and final legislative resolution.  Pratt also utilizes primary documents 
such as faculty senate transcripts and university documents to assemble the account.  In 
this regard, her assessment appears more credible then the narrative presented by 
D’Souza but falls short of being a theoretically-rooted analysis of the process.
Wilson (1999) and Altbach, Lomotey, and Kyle (1999) also attempt to 
characterize the broader context for these debates around diversity across American 
campuses.  Wilson focuses his assessment on the multicultural course requirement 
debates at Georgetown University and the University of Texas.  He provides a 
contextual background for understanding these debates, which include the larger, 
national ideological debates alluded to earlier.  Lastly, Wilson describes a number of 
factors that foster these ongoing campus debates around multicultural issues. These 
contextual factors include campuses having multiple constituencies with varied interests 
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and values that contribute to ongoing and unresolved contests over curriculum (p. 443). 
Altbach, Lomotey, and Kyle (1999) also employ the familiar approach of summarizing 
the context for policy debates around diversity issues. Again, however, their accounts of 
changing demographics, campus responses and conflicts, lack theoretical grounding.
Pusser (2003), however, is the one notable exception to this lack of theoretically
grounded literature on campus diversity debates.  Pusser conducted a case study of the 
University of California System Board of Regents 1995 decision to overturn the thirty 
year old affirmative action policy.  This study utilized Baldridge’s (1971) original 
political model of campus policy processes as its orienting framework.  Pusser’s 
findings and conclusions are discussed in more detail as a component of the conceptual 
model grounding this study later on in this chapter.   
Literature on the Development of Asian American Studies Programs
These curriculum debates encompassed the emerging field of Asian American 
Studies and discussions over its place in the academy. This academic curriculum 
includes courses and structured academic programs that address the histories and 
cultures of Asian Americans, which will be the unit of interest for this case study.  
Asian American studies programs are inherently difficult to define for two central 
reasons.  First, this field of study embraces knowledge from many academic disciplines
that range from the sciences to the humanities.  Second, this field attempts to capture 
the wide ranging histories and the economic and social experiences of a multitude of 
ethnic nationalities against the grain of broad stereotypical narratives that homogenize 
the success and assimilation of all Asian Americans.  
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In spite of these differences, Shirley Hune, an Asian American professor in the 
field of education and past president of the Association for Asian American Studies,
offers this definition: 
It [Asian American studies] is the interpretation of the history, identity, social 
formation, contributions, and contemporary concerns of Asian and Pacific 
Americans and their communities.  Its activities of research, teaching, and 
curriculum development related to the experiences of Asian and Pacific peoples 
in America. While thoroughly academic in its approaches, Asian American 
studies is also strongly committed to a focus on community issues and social 
problems. (1999, p. 56). 
Both Monaghan (1999) and Sengupta (1999) assert that Asian American studies 
programs have emerged out of conflict between faculty and administrators, and pressure 
exerted by student groups. This section will review a small but important area of 
literature that traces the often conflict-ridden development of Asian American studies as 
an academic field and the dialogue of Asian American student issues on college 
campuses.
Omatsu (1994) employs the metaphor of a “prison” as the framework for 
analyzing the evolution of Asian American activism in the United States, and more 
specifically, on college campuses. Omatsu contends that the concept of the prison, 
which serves as a sociological reference point for understanding class and racial 
barriers, helps explain the context in which Asian Americans attempt to overcome such 
barriers.  To this end, he argues that a group or individual must possess a “revolutionary 
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ideology” in order to achieve “liberation” from the prison (p.19).  
Omatsu recounts student protests at San Francisco State in 1968 as his case 
example of Asian American liberation on college campuses.  The five month student 
strike was the longest in U.S. history and, according to Omatsu, was the first “campus 
uprising involving Asian Americans as a collective force and “the outcome was the 
creation of the first school of ethnic studies and Asian American studies program in the 
country (p. 25).  Omatsu claims that the occurrence of the strike “critically transformed 
the consciousness of its participants, who in turn, profoundly altered their community’s 
political landscape” (p. 26).  He contends that the key to this “liberation” came about 
through “a strategy of mass mobilization and militant, direct action” as a means to 
confront campus administrators (p. 26).  Omatsu relies solely on information obtained 
from secondary documents in order to reach this conclusion and to relate this case to the 
metaphor of sociological prisons.  Thus, while he crafts a compelling analogy, his 
writing does not contain original research data that may contribute to a body of work on 
the politics of campus decisions around the development of such programs. 
Like Omatsu, Hirabayahsi and Alquizola (1994) trace the creation of Asian 
American studies to the student protests at San Francisco State and the University of 
California at Berkeley. These authors characterize the programs as “original and radical, 
if not revolutionary, in practice” (p.354). Unlike Omatsu, these authors provide a 
chronological account of the student group organization and its stated goals for the 
student strike at San Francisco State.  Hirabayashi and Alquizola’s writing, however, 
stops short of providing any analysis or connection to theoretical literature. Their intent 
is to provide an historical overview of the development of Asian American studies, 
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which they construct by using secondary and primary documents from the campus and 
student groups as well as interviews with participants. 
In addition to these accounts, Wei (1993) recalls the evolution of programs at 
SFSU and Berkeley, including the implementation of Asian American studies programs.  
Wei’s account reaches beyond other narrative accounts because he relies not only on 
secondary documents, but also utilizes interviews with campus administrators, staff and 
students, and campus documents.  In doing so, Wei constructs an informative and 
detailed historical perspective with regard to the contested dynamics of the programs’ 
creation.  For example, he goes as far as to characterize the goals of the programs’ 
advocates on each campus, assess whether or not these goals were attained, and 
describe what type of contest occurred with campus staff and administrators. Wei 
attaches labels to each “case” such as “the Politics of Survival” (at SFSU) and “the 
Politics of Revolution” (at Berkeley).
Wei’s historical perspectives are important for a number of reasons.  First, these 
accounts provide a context in which to situate the dynamics encompassing the 
enactment of minority-related academic programs.  Second, the accounts array the 
specific issues under contest in the creation of these programs.  These issues include 
matters such as new and continuous budget allocations, faculty appointment processes, 
academic approval processes, as well as the evolving definition and boundaries of Asian 
American studies as an academic field.   Most importantly, Wei’s narrative, like the 
other accounts in this literature area, provides a sound justification for utilizing a 
conceptual lens that possesses the ability to: (1) generate empirical data about the policy 
process; (2) array the findings against a framework that illuminates the politics of the 
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policy process; and (3) begin to build theory about the dynamics of diversity issue 
decisions on campus.  
Literature on the Role of Students in Diversity Policy Making 
The fractious campus debates on diversity issues reveal a range of groups 
coexisting within the organizational structure with each group holding differing views 
of desired policy outcomes.  As noted earlier, higher education scholars have researched 
successfully the cognitive benefits students have attained during this tumultuous era of 
campus debates.  But few have analyzed diversity from an organizational perspective.
A notable exception to this gap is the small body of literature that examine s one 
group’s role in this larger organizational process.  This area looks at student
participation in diversity policy making processes.  One stream of this literature follows 
a familiar atheoretical route as it accounts for student involvement through descriptions 
of student activism around diversity issues.  Two other streams are anchored in social 
science perspectives, notably sociology and political science, as a means to explain 
student involvement in the domain of campus policy making. 
Students as Diversity Activists
Researchers have highlighted student involvement in diversity debates as a 
device to illustrate the policy making process surrounding these issues. Since the late 
1980s, student activism on college campuses has been issue-oriented. Student 
challenges to administrative rules and policies are more likely to be rooted in a specific 
issue that is germane to campus rather than to be tied to a broader ideological bent
(Levine & Cureton, 1998; Alvarado, 1999; DeGroot, 1998).  In their survey of 9,100 
undergraduates, Levine and Cureton (1998) found that multiculturalism and diversity 
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issues on campus were two of the top dominant matters that concerned student activists.  
Levine (1999) also found that student clashes with administrators rarely engaged an 
entire student body.  Instead, student activism reflects small factions.  As he wrote: 
“colleges and universities are more divided than ever before by race, ethnicity, religion, 
gender, country of origin, student interests…and at the same time, students are spending 
less time on campus” (p. A52).
Still, other authors detail student engagement in diversity issues via summary
case accounts much like the writings mentioned earlier.  For example, Sidel (1994) 
conducted interviews with college students across the country to explain how students 
of color struggle with conflict at both two-year and four-year institutions.  Similarly, 
Loeb (1994) visited over 200 institutions to collect interview data about new issues in 
student activism, including diversity policies and related programs.  Loeb revealed at 
the outset of his writing that his main purpose was to deconstruct the myth that today’s 
college student is not interested in social issues (Monaghan, 1994, p. 2). 
While sparse, this literature is important because it demonstrates that diversity 
issues on campus represent a complex social phenomenon.  These accounts illustrate the 
inherent conflicts found in campus discussions about diversity and show how these 
conflicts have the ability to spark heated debates among fractured campus 
constituencies holding a range of views and values on these matters.  This literature also 
points to the fact that diversity issues have consumed many institutional governance 
agendas for the past decade or so.
This body of literature, however, does not have the theoretical grounding that 
could ultimately enhance understanding of the policy process.  Without such a 
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conceptual anchor, research on diversity policies and programs continues to lack
sufficient data for analysis and theory building. To this end, diversity policies and 
related initiatives appear quite suitable for research in higher education because of the 
dual conditions of an environment of contentious campus policy deliberations and an 
absence of theoretically driven research on the phenomenon. 
Students as an Identity Collective
In many ways, the splintering on campus described by Levine (1999) merely 
reflects what Cigler and Loomis (1998) cite as a broader national trend away from 
ideological or partisan politics toward politics that are attached to compartmentalized 
causes of specific interest groups. Identity politics or the attempts to influence the 
political process through mobilization around issues of race, gender, and/or ethnicity 
reflect this trend. 
The concept of identity politics is borne out of critical sociological theories 
about multiculturalism. In particular, Giroux (2001) and Rick (1997) argue that in order 
to understand and achieve multiculturalism, resource allocation and power distribution 
must be analyzed from the perspective of spatial paradigms. That is, if one wants to 
understand the identities and perspectives of those who operate in “marginalized space,” 
one must first understand how these “third spaces” came into being from the 
perspectives of those individuals who occupy these spaces. 
Although identity politics is a relatively understudied phenomenon, some higher 
education researchers have employed it as a device to analyze student activism in the 
past decade.  Talburt (1996) utilized the concept as a means to understand how lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual students and faculty made sense of their protests and negotiations for 
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a separate services office at a large public research university.  Talburt found that 
students believed that their development of a gay identity provided them with the 
efficacy to negotiate for “space” and power (not only physical, but structural) within the 
institution. Thus, their formulation of a group-based gay identity may be viewed as the 
precursory condition for participating in a larger campus decision making processes. 
Rhoads (1998) undertook a multi-site case study of student activism on five U.S. 
college campuses.  Here, Rhoads used the lens of identity politics as a means to explain 
and analyze student protests and campus conflicts regarding diversity issues. These 
issues included the preservation of single gender status at an all female college, a 
Chicano studies movement, gay rights demonstrations, African American student 
resistance, and Native American student protests over financial aid policies. 
Rhoads (1998) employed an interpretive approach whereby he reviewed 
documents, collected interview data from students and other participants, and analyzed 
the data to determine what these participants believed their experiences to be about. 
Each case was presented in terms of a general description of the particular movement, 
how it was related to student identity concerns, what contributed to an escalated campus 
event, student responses to these events, and the organizational outcomes of the events 
(1998, p. ix).  Like Talburt, Rhoads concluded that a high level of collective identity 
among a particular student group was the central motivator for participating in the 
process.  
These identity politics studies are important for several reasons. First, they 
explore the understudied phenomenon of diversity policy-making on campuses because 
they provide real data about the student experience in higher education.  Second, they 
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seek to understand how students of different backgrounds make sense of this process.  
Most importantly, these studies seek to make empirical contributions to research 
regarding the psycho-social development of students of color as it relates to their
willingness to participate in campus decision-making processes.
Students as Political Actors
In addition to this psychosocial framework, researchers have employed political 
theory to explain student activism over the past decade.  Hernandez (1996) relied upon 
Baldridge’s (1971, 1977) theories about campus decision making as a driving 
framework for her case study of student activism around equity issues at a liberal arts 
college. Baldridge’s work hypothesizes that the decision making structure is a function 
of many interest groups seeking to influence policy outcomes.  These groups or “actors”
engage in a political process—much like that of a city or local government—in order to 
arrive at a policy outcome. Thus, Hernandez tailored her study to examine how and why
a particular set of actors, the students, engaged in the policy process around women’s 
safety and faculty hiring issues. She utilized Baldridge’s ideas about the conditions 
under which students mobilize in the policy process, including: (a) what types of 
resources are at their disposal; (b) what types of strategies students use to influence 
decision making authorities; and (c) how these variables intersect to influence the policy 
outcome. This research is important because it lends credence to the idea that campus 
decision making around contentious and current policy issues may be analyzed using 
existing theories, specifically Baldridge’s political framework.  In this regard, 
Hernandez’s research stands alone from literature on students as political actors 
reviewed because it utilizes political theory as a means to explain the student 
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experience in campus policy making.  
Finally, all of the above studies draw conceptual conclusions about student roles 
in the decision making process. But like the previous area of literature, these studies
have limits with regard to their application to research about diversity and higher 
education.  These studies employ a narrow approach because they do not conceptualize 
campus decision making as a function of the entire organization and its members. These 
studies do provide keen concepts for understanding student involvement in campus 
policy making, but given its student-specific focus, this body of literature does not 
illuminate the entire process by which these initiatives are crafted, which was the 
central purpose of this case study.  
Diversity Issues under a Different Lens:
Campus Decision Making as a Political Process
The review of the issue-focused literature demonstrates that in spite of the 
heightened attention, there remains a stark absence of theory- driven research about the 
organizational process through which diversity- related policies and programmatic 
decisions are made. This absence highlights both a gap and an opportunity for higher 
education scholars.  For example, classic works on university policy making remain 
untested in this issue domain and may serve as useful conceptual constructs for 
generating data and analyzing such decision making processes.  This next section 
reviews these prominent theories that characterize policy-making in higher education as 
a political process. This section includes a discussion of how different campus actors 
and groups, including students, may interact and attempt to influence policy processes.  
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The Political Model:  A Problem-appropriate Framework 
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, higher education scholars dedicated a large 
portion of their research to interpreting and analyzing campus policy as the outcome of 
organizational processes.  Scholars drew from the social sciences, including sociology
and political science, as a means to examine the various ways in which university 
decision making happens.  Early works (Stroup, 1966; Goodman, 1962) liken campus 
decision-making processes to a bureaucratic organization where structure and formality 
prevail and to a collegial organization where community values and professional 
deference dictate the process.   
Victor Baldridge one of the preeminent scholars on academic governance and 
decision making has traced the conceptual gaps in both of these frameworks.  Baldridge 
(1971) argued that while the bureaucratic frame may illustrate a picture of the 
organization “over time,” it fails to explain how the organization actually changes.  In 
addition, the bureaucratic model assumes that: (a) organizational structure is stagnant; 
(b) external environments exert little influence on institutions; and (c) decisions do not 
have an impact on the structure itself (p.36).  Summarily, Baldridge asserts that a 
bureaucratic lens may explain day-to-day operations, but the model does not:
...deal extensively with policy-formulation.  The paradigm explains how policies 
may be carried out in the most efficient fashion after they are set, but it says little 
about the process by which policy is established in the first place.  It does not deal 
with the [political issues], such as struggles of groups within the university who 
want to force the policy toward their special interests. (1971, p. 7)
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Baldridge (1977) also dismisses aspects of the collegial model as being too 
simplistic and quite “misleading” (p.7).  He contends that the model suffers from a 
“descriptive versus normative” confusion that prevents “us from actually understanding 
institutional processes” because it does not address how consensus is reached and 
sustained (p.7). Thus, like the bureaucratic model, the collegial frame does not deal with 
real conflict – the “dynamic of consensus” —or the fact that frequent interaction may 
actually produce the opposite effect of “liking someone more,”  which is an assumption 
of the collegial frame (1977, p.37).  For similar reasons, the features of these models do 
not appear to be adequate tools for studying the AAS at UMCP.   Rather, the dynamic 
and contested attributes of the phenomenon provide ample justification for employing a 
conceptual anchor that is able to capture the overt actions as well as the subtle nuances 
of organizational decision making, which occurred over a ten year period at UMCP.       
Wise (1960) was one of the first scholars to hypothesize that activities of college 
governance might appropriately be conceived as a political process. Wise attempted to 
characterize the political dimensions of a faculty senate and the limits of presidential 
influence at a private liberal arts college. This early study failed to generate broader 
theoretical propositions about campus politics. Instead, it is Baldridge’s (1971) hallmark 
research that offers the keenest insight for applying the political model to university 
decision making.  He reasoned that:
What is needed is a model that can include consensus factors and bureaucratic 
processes, and that can also grapple with power plays, conflict, and the rough and 
tumble of politics in a large university. (p. 8)
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Baldridge (1971) derived a political model from case study research of campus-
wide policy making at New York University (NYU), Portland State University, and 
Stanford University in the late 1960s.  Pfeffer (1974, 1978, 1981b) later tested 
Baldridge’s model by employing the conceptual components as a device to study 
university budgeting in large public universities. Both authors anchored their research in 
the two classic questions about social groups posed by political scientists:  (a) how are 
resources, legitimacy, and effort organized and directed to produce collective benefits 
or outputs? (Gamson, 1968); and (b) how are these benefits, or these outputs of 
collective effort, distributed? (Lasswell, 1936).  These questions represent two 
cornerstones of political thought. In combination, these political perspectives—the 
systems and behavioral—seek to uncover how “authorities” (those in positions to 
attempt to control and make decisions) and “partisans” (those attempting to influence 
the process) interact to produce policy outcomes (Gamson; 1971; Wirt & Kirst; 1972; 
Mazzoni, 1991). 
More recently, Pusser (2003) employed Baldridge’s (1971) model to ground his 
case study of affirmative action policy contests at the University of California (UC)
System.  This study examined the UC Board of Regents’ efforts to overturn the UC 
System’s thirty year old affirmative action policy. Overall, Pusser concluded that the 
findings from the study served to validate Baldridge’s original idea that a public 
university can be “seen as a political institution and that public university policies have 
great salience, visibility, and political value” and to extend this model (2003, p. 136). 
More specifically, Pusser’s study presented three main propositions that he 
argued were extensions of Baldridge’s (1971) original model:  (a) that public 
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universities hold value and utility for actors in the larger state and national political 
context; (b) that external entities possess the ability to structure decision making 
processes on campus; and (c) that higher education institutions may be conceptualized 
as sites of “contests over the redress of historical inequities” and that these contests may 
occur outside of the campus organization (pp. 133-135). 
Based on study findings, Pusser argues for the reconstitution of “authorities and 
partisans.” Pusser contends that these constructs must now reach actors “beyond the 
borders of the institution to include a broad array of leaders and interest groups in the 
democratic political system” (2003, p. 136).  Partisans, too, must be revised to include 
external constituencies including the media, elected officials, state governing bodies, 
public citizens, and issue interest groups.  
Central Assumptions of the Political Model
Applying these ideas from political theory, Baldridge demonstrated that it is 
plausible to characterize universities as political entities similar to a city or state (1971,
1977, 1983). Much of the activity on college campuses—curriculum adoption, faculty 
tenure, and budget allocation—reflects political struggles among organizational 
members. Baldridge contended that u niversities are political entities because power is 
dispersed throughout the organization and because groups coexist and align naturally 
based on similar interests.  Interests groups emerge with diverse policy preferences and 
priorities. But like public political processes, university policy processes do not involve 
every faculty, staff, or student in every policy decision. Those who are involved do not 
participate in every step of the decision making process due to time constraints or other 
priorities.
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For those who do persist, however, thee policy process is characterized by a clash in 
a competition for resources and influence over the policy content. In order to reach a 
decision, then, various interest groups must broker and negotiate at times, with each 
other and also with authorities, since they hold the power to make formal decisions 
(Baldridge, 1971, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981b).  The following table reflects Baldridge’s 
assumptions of the political model applied to universities (See Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Assumptions of the Political Model: Baldridge (1971)
Assumption Description
Inactivity prevails Not every organizational member is involved in the 
policy making process.  Most major decisions are made 
by “small groups of elites.”
Participation is fluid Organizational members move in and out of the policy 
making process.  Decisions are made by those “who 
persist” or those who invest the most time in the process.
Interest groups are 
fragmented
Colleges and universities are pluralistic organizations; 
power is distributed throughout the system and 
organizational members align according to their goals, 
values, and interests.  These groups clash over 
competition for resources and influence over policy 
outcomes.
Formal authority is limited Pressure from fragmented groups has the ability to limit 
the influence of formal authority.  Decisions result from 
negotiation and compromise.
External groups apply 
pressure
The organization operates in an “open system.” External 
groups connect to the institution and attempt to influence 
internal decision making processes.
Social scientists have long debated the assumption about the locus of power in 
organizations and public policy arenas.  As noted in Table 2.1, Baldridge’s model sits 
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squarely within Dahl’s (1984) and Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) pluralistic notion that 
power is dispersed throughout the organization, not just within the purview of elites or 
organizational authorities.  The dispersed power structure thereby sets the stage for 
differing groups to engage in a conflict and to attempt to influence decisions (Dahl, 
1984; Gamson, 1968; Pfeffer, 1981a).  
For the most part, Baldridge provides a sharp framework for unbundling the 
political dynamics save for the final assessment and characterization of power and 
influence.  For the purposes of this study, power will be viewed as the abstract yet 
central social phenomena, which embodies the political features of campus policy 
decision processes.  But power must be defined clearly in order to be a useful analytic 
tool.  Geary (1992) conducted a thorough review of the definitions of power and the 
inherent problems with constructing methods for measuring it.  Her review noted that 
political scientists have used the term power “interchangeably” with “derived” terms, 
such as influence, authority, and persuasion (p. 14). 
This study did not use these terms with such reciprocity.  Rather, this study 
relied on the interpretation that power is the potential to influence the decision outcome
(Geary, 1992; Fischer, 1990; Pfeffer, 1981a).  Thus, influence is seen as the 
actualization of such power or what Geary terms the “active expression of power” (p. 
16). Measurement and analysis of power and influence are central to understanding 
political dynamics.  In this study, such analysis was derived from three primary venues:  
examining the content of the policy decisions made in relation to an actor’s policy 
goals, examining the data with regard to attribution, and examining an actor’s overall 
attempts to shape the policy outcomes.  Taken together, these three indicators allowed
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the analyst to assess and assemble evidence on power and influence relationships in 
order to create a critical picture of the political dynamics that propelled the policy 
process (Gamson, 1968; Malen, 1985; Mazzoni, 1991a).  
Benchmarks of the Decision Making Process
In order to explain campus policies under a political lens, a study’s findings may
be assessed along certain phases of the decision-making process. Stam and Baldridge’s 
(1971) and Baldridge’s (1971) case studies of political dynamics were organized around 
the stages of decision making in order to better illustrate how and why conflict occurs, 
as well as to show how organizational members negotiate an agreement to resolve 
conflict. Baldridge (1971) constructed five discussion points that serve as boundaries to
frame the stages of conflict development. These analytical points include:  
1. Social Context factors—What are the social conditions which promote the 
formation of divergent values and interest groups?
2. Interest Articulation—How do interest groups bring pressure to bear?
3. Legislative Transformation—How are the multiple pressures translated into 
policy?
4. Policy Enactment—How does the policy reflect an official commitment to 
certain goals and values? and
5. Policy Implementation—How is the enacted policy executed? (pp. 22-24). 
These phases are merely orienting devices for situating case findings.  Like any 
social phenomenon, the stages of the political process are not static according to 
Baldridge; feedback occurs throughout the process and presents new opportunities for 
conflict (p. 24). Baldridge also utilized a number of key constructs to uncover, analyze 
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and explain the cycle of conflict, the use of power to regulate the conflict and influence 
the policy outcome. This classic theoretical model, bolstered by more recent  research in 
the area of political dynamics (where noted), are be the central means by which I 
uncovered and interpreted the political dynamics in the development of the AAS at 
UMCP.
A Political Primer:  Understanding the Decision Context
Baldridge (1971) termed the decision making process the “five stages of conflict 
development” in which the first phase requires the analyst to examine the social 
structure or setting of the decision (p.22). This process involved examining the roles 
organizational members play and the scope of their authority.  Baldridge also remarked 
that decision making purview may not always be clear with all issues (1971, p. 12).  
Thus, the analysis should focus on the decision-making “arena,” or where the issue is 
being played out.  A decision arena, however, is not permanent and may shift from the 
micro (small committee) to the macro (public audience) (Mazzoni, 1991a; Kingdon, 
1995). Among others, Easton (1979) conceives of the decision making context as one 
that is “open” to the influence and inclusive of the broader environment in which it is 
situated (pp. 57, 69).  This contextual “check” allows the analyst to connect and situate 
organizational dynamics with external factors or forces that may contribute to the 
decision making dynamics and policy outcomes.  
Assessing the decision-making traditions and cultural norms of the organization 
and its environment are also central to understanding the issue conflict setting.  This 
analysis includes examining organizational routines, established practices, “rules of the 
game,” and “habits and histories.” This contextual analysis of the decision-making 
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arena may help to illuminate how and why certain issues are brought to consideration, 
as well as to reveal the conditions under which they are decided. 
Identifying Political Actors
Under the political model, organizational “actors” align and form coalitions 
according to their goals and interests. In their studies of student protests at Stanford and 
New York University, Stam and Baldridge (1971) relied on the community power 
studies of Gamson (1968) as an aid in identifying these actors.  According to this 
research, actors fall into two main categories. Authorities are defined as “those people 
in the organization that make binding decisions for the group;” partisans are defined as 
those “in the organization that are significantly affected by the decisions.”  Authorities 
and partisans, however, are not exclusionary concepts. Partisans can function as a 
subset of an authority group, just as an authority group may be viewed as a partisan 
group when it attempts to influence other organizational members who hold the formal 
power to make a decision (Stam & Baldridge, 1971, p. 136). 
Recognizing that the distinctions between partisans and authorities may change 
with a given issue, Baldridge (1971) devised four archetypes of political groups.  First, 
“anomic” groups are likely to activate if they believe they have been excluded from the 
decision-making process.  Second, “partisan dominated cliques” are informally 
organized and led.  These groups also activate episodically, depending on the issue.  
Third, “authority dominated cliques” are loosely organized around organizational 
positions. Fourth and finally, “associated interest groups” are more formally organized 
around issues of importance to their members (pp. 141-145).
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Understanding and identifying the policy issue under consideration is central to 
answering the question about what types of partisan groups develop in a conflict.  This 
understanding may be closely tied to a clear picture of the issue context and 
organizational structure, culture, and past decision making dynamics around the 
particular issue or similar matters.  In addition, Pfeffer (1981) suggests that 
identification of partisan groups should be inclusive and policy actors should be 
“grouped homogeneously by preference or issue position where possible” (p. 93).
Cataloguing Actors’ Resources and the Potential to Influence Decisions
Actors—regardless of their issue stance or authority position—all possess some 
resources, or the means to actually affect a decision. Based on his studies of the power 
and influence of community organizations, Gamson (1968) defines resources as both 
tangible and intangible assets that if applied “in sufficient quantities” will alter the 
decision outcome (p. 94).  Most importantly, Dahl (1984) argues that in order to qualify 
as a political resource, the resource “must be controlled by the influencer” (p73). 
Over time, political scientists have attempted to develop a typology for 
classifying a political actor’s resources.  Gamson (1968) constructed three broad 
categories for resources—persuasion, inducement, and constraint.  Persuasion resources 
“involve some change in the minds of authorities” through communication by partisans 
(p. 79).  Inducement resources may include some promise of a reward or transfer of 
resources for a particular outcome (p. 75).  Constraint resources are those resources that 
seek to influence “through threat of deprivation” (p. 74).   
Like Gamson, higher education scholars have adopted ideas about political 
resources to fit university settings. Demerath, Stephens, and Taylor (1967) created a 
33
lengthy list based on their study of 45 major university and college presidents.  These 
resources included things such as “formal authority, enforcement authority, expertise, 
skill, special knowledge of processes, associative powers, public perceptions…” (p.76). 
Later, Pfeffer (1981a) developed more inclusive categories for political resources, 
which were drawn from studying the budgeting processes at large public research 
universities.  These categories include those currencies derived from formal authority, 
the control or access to “information channels,” and organizational “legitimacy” that 
may be derived from personal characteristics or credibility based on past actions 
regardless of hierarchical stature (p. 198).  According to Pfeffer, formal authority 
affords most actors tremendous latitude as a potential resource. Positional resources 
may include such things as access and control over budgets and information.  These 
authoritative resources combined with personal powers such as charisma and 
organizational credibility may bolster an actor’s resource arsenal over time (pp. 198-
203). 
Gauging an actor’s influence potential does not mean that resources are held at a 
constant and thus should not be analyzed as such.  Some resources—such as the 
ultimate decision making authority—may provide an actor with an overall 
organizational advantage. There are, however, resources that find weight only to the 
degree to which they hold relevance for the substance and context of the decision being 
made.  To this end, resources serve only as an identification device for understanding an 
actor or group’s potential capacity to exercise influence (Mazzoni, 1991). 
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Deploying Resources and Influence Tactics
Identifying political actors and their resources does not reveal the conditions 
under which actors will actually deploy resources in an attempt to influence a decision 
outcome.  Instead, Baldridge asserts that one must understand a group’s “trust 
orientations” toward authorities. Again, Baldridge (1971) applied Gamson’s (1968) 
categorization to his research in university settings. This trust orientation refers to a 
partisan group’s “perception of the necessity for influence” (p. 42).  Confident groups 
possess a high level of trust in authorities, and therefore, only attempt to influence when 
they perceive their goals are in jeopardy.  Neutral groups, although they neither share 
nor oppose authority goals, are not prevented from activity if they do differ with an 
authority’s issue stance.  Alienated groups have limited trust in authorities because their 
goals stand in direct conflict with the authorities (pp. 42-45).  
According to Baldridge (1971), the tactics a partisan group selects in its 
influence attempts will not only depend on its level of trust with authorities, but also on 
the level of internal group cohesion and access to these authorities. For example, if a 
group possesses a high level of trust, access, and cohesion, it is more likely that 
strategies it deploys will be persuasion, particularly if the group has ready access to 
formal channels of decision making. On the other hand, if the group does not possess 
such resources, the group is likely to use inducements or constraints to influence the 
decision outcome.  Groups using these types of influence tactics are also more likely to 
be excluded from formal decision channels.  Thus, pressure tactics such as riots, 
protests, and public appeals are likely to result when partisans are not proximate to 
formal decision making channels (Stam & Baldridge, 1971, p. 565; Baldridge, 1971, p. 
35
141).
Authority-Partisan Interactions and Decision Outcomes
Baldridge (1971) contends that an actor’s influence on a decision depends not 
only on the decision-making setting and a group’s resources, but also ultimately hinges 
on the response of those in positions of authority.  In the face of conflict, authorities 
confront two dilemmas. First, they must deal with the substantive content issues of the 
decision. Second, they must expend effort to control partisans (Gamson, 1968, p. 112).  
In order to broker a solution, authorities have numerous resources at their disposal. 
Baldridge (1971) defers to Gamson’s (1968) social control tactics to describe the 
strategies authorities might utilize in confronting partisan pressure or influence 
attempts.  First, authorities may limit or regulate the access of partisans to resources or 
their ability to deploy such resources to influence the process by restricting participation 
or asking those in authority positions to “exit” the process. Deciding what issues are 
subject to consideration or debate is another strategy for achieving control of the 
decision-making agenda. This tactic is more subtle than outright exclusion and may be 
difficult to change once established (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Kingdon, 1995). 
Like partisans, authorities use and rely on persuasion as a means to shape the 
decision outcomes. According to Gamson (1998), partisans may view authorities in 
such an “awe-inspiring” light that they may not challenge a decision even when it 
conflicts with their values or goals (p. 126).  Persuasion techniques also may include 
attempts to convince partisans that their demands are unreasonable, and that authorities 
are acting “reasonably” (Baldridge, 1971, p. 165).  
Co-optation is an example of another powerful, but risky control strategy 
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utilized by authorities in conflict situations. Often possessing a desire to minimize 
conflict by converting or silencing partisans, authorities may invite or include partisans 
in the decision-making structure. Selznick (1953) adeptly notes that partisans may be 
convinced that their participation will allow greater access and influence if they agree to 
become members of the decision-making structure (as cited in Gamson, 1968).  As a 
result, these co-opted members may “come to identify with the collectivity to such a 
degree that it will mute and subdue their original loyalty to an outside group” (Gamson, 
1968, p. 136).  Partisan converts, however, run the risk of being accused of “selling 
out,” and authorities run the risk of partisan betrayal. 
Conducting an inventory of these partisan interactions, then, is the fundamental 
goal of the political analysis. Such an inventory can assist in answering how and why 
various actors achieve policy “wins” over other actors on specific issues within a 
specific policy context. To perform such an assessment, the analyst must take a three-
prong approach that requires an examination of the final policy content, an analysis of 
the influence that is attributed to actors, and the actors’ attempts to influence policy 
outcomes.  Examining the final policy content illuminates which actors’ goals were 
achieved in relation to the level of compromise struck throughout the cycles of the 
policy-making process (Gamson, 1968).  This stream of information is then bolster by 
examining which actors were perceived to be influential in the policy process as 
reflected in study data. Lastly, the analyst must account for an actor’s attempts to 
influence the process in relation to data explaining actor goals, resources, and influence 
strategies. This last data indicator provides a check against the prior indicators.  It 
gauges whether or not the content of the policy outcome and the attributional data 
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regarding actor influence are plausible explanations (Gamson, 1968; Dahl, 1984, Malen, 
1985; Geary, 1992). 
Assessment of the Political Model
As is the case with any theoretical perspective, there are limits to using the 
political model to analyze the decision-making process in higher education 
organizations. Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker, & Riley (1977) outlined its shortcomings as: (1) 
underestimating “the impact of routine bureaucratic processes” and failing to 
distinguish among the types of activities that occur in institutions; (2) understating the 
role environmental factors play in the policy formulation process; and (3) focusing on 
singular acts while forsaking long-term decision-making processes (p. 41).  But these 
apparent weaknesses do not outweigh those previously identified in the lack of current 
theoretical research about campus decision making around diversity issues. The 
literature reviewed also outlines means by which the analyst can check for these 
absences by evaluating the decision context and policy environment as well as 
institutional decision making culture and habits.  
Thus, although imperfect, the political framework remains a keen tool for 
analyzing the creation of the AAS at UMCP because it contains the appropriate 
conceptual markers that allow the researcher to adeptly capture and analyze the 
dynamics that constitute the decision-making process.  The categories of the model not 
only allow the researcher to interpret the forces that shape the policy development and 
those actors involved, but also to illuminate conflict as repository for developing policy 
solutions on campus.
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A Conceptual Framework for Examining the AAS Program at UMCP
Current literature on diversity issues provides historical accounts of new policies 
and programs. Importantly, this issue literature review reveals that the dynamics of 
these policy processes are conflict laden and spark intense campus debates.  These
fundamental attributes beckon the use of a conceptual model that illuminat es and 
renders empirical conclusions regarding these dynamics. Given the study’s purpose and 
the characteristics of the phenomenon, a political model was selected as the conceptual 
anchor for this study. 
The conceptual framework guiding this exploratory case study rests on the 
classic assumptions laid out by Baldridge (1971) that campus policy processes may be 
viewed as political processes.  The central assumption of this framework is that power 
is dispersed throughout the organization. Thus, this pluralistic notion holds that both 
authorities (those actors in positions of authority) and partisans (those wishing to 
influence the decision outcome) possess the ability to do so. 
Baldridge relied on the works of Gamson (1968) to create the framework, which 
will be the cornerstone guiding and framing this study’s data collection and analysis 
process.  First and foremost to this process is the reliance on Baldridge’s five points of 
analysis or the “cycle of conflict development.”  This cycle requires the researcher to 
analyze the decision context, the interest articulation phase, the legislative 
transformation phase, the policy decision outcome, and policy implementation. A 
continuous policy feedback loop in this structure acknowledges that these policy stages 
are imprecise and sometimes overlapping, but otherwise serves as a sharp heuristic 
device for distilling and categorizing data. These benchmarks provide a rough structure 
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for sequencing decision making events, establishing a policy chronology, and situating 
intersecting micro-decision outcomes within the larger policy setting.  
Baldridge’s cycle of conflict development was employed as a broad conceptual 
umbrella for case study data.  Precise conceptual markers were adapted from 
Baldridge’s classic work and bolstered by more recent works by noted political theorists
(Figure 2:1).  These benchmarks were utilized as a means to understand and analyze 
how issues arose, how actors attempted to influence decisions, and how decisions 
outcomes were achieved.  These concepts helped explain what Allison and Zelikow 
(1999) call the “pulling and hauling” between political actors as they resolved conflict 




[INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES: CULTURE, HISTORY, TRADITIONS]
↕
Interest Articulation   Legislative Transformation  Policy Decision Outcome Policy Decision Implementation
↕ ↕ ↕ ↕
Actors Actor Alignment/Coalition Influence Attempts Actor Effectiveness in instituting new
Authorities- Influence Strategies & Authority-Partisan policy
Partisans Tactics Interactions and ability of 
Resources                                                                         actors to secure decision 
Goals      advantages    
Stances
CONTINUOUS FEEDBACK LOOPS
Figure 2.1:  Conceptual Framework 
Sources:  Baldridge (1971), Gamson (1968), Geary, (1992), Easton (1979), Mazzoni 
(1991a), Malen (1983).
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Specifically, the conceptual framework (Figure 2:1) for this study nests the
analysis of the policy conflict within a larger contextual setting. This analysis requires
an inventory of the cultural norms, values, traditions and habits of the organization as it 
relates to the broader environment and the issue under consideration. This inventory 
should be a fluid, continuous assessment because policy context is not static and 
organizational characteristics and conditions change. Next, the concept of actors—
encompassing Gamson’s (1968) ideas about authorities and partisans—draws analytical 
focus to gauging who participates, what organizational authority they may or may not 
possess, what their issue goals and positions are, and what types of resources they have.  
During the interest articulation and legislative transformation stage, actors 
attempt to influence the policy outcome by deploying their resources in a strategic 
manner.  According to Baldridge (1971), actors’ willingness to engage in the policy 
making process is often dependent upon their level of access to and trust of those who 
hold ultimate decision making purview. This willingness to engage is especially true for 
those actors’ without formal authority.  These conditions may portend the types of 
resources deployed and the influence tactics selected.  Actors may build interest 
coalitions or align themselves with like minded groups in order to enhance their chances 
of achieving their desired policy outcome (Geary, 1992, p. 51).
Conflict, then, occurs when actors’ policy goals clash and actors interact in an 
effort to advance their interests and achieve resolution of conflicts. Although 
Baldridge’s conceptual phases denote a sequential pattern, conflict is most likely to 
occur at in the legislative transformation phase.  Continuous feedback streams, 
however, can loop micro-level decisions made in an early phase, which serve as 
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political primers for macro policy discussions in later phases.  Thus, the cyclical and 
compounding nature of decision-making events requires an ongoing examination of 
actors, goals, resources, strategies, and tactics throughout the policy process.  Allison 
and Zelikow (1999) term this the “game” in which the analyst maps out the data as a 
means to answer “how are the players’ stands, influence, and moves combined to yield 
decisions and actions?” (p.15). 
As discussed earlier, power is the evasive, but central medium through which 
conflicts are ultimately reconciled (Morgan, 1986).  This study recognizes the
ambiguous and varying interpretations of its definition, locus, and measurement as well 
as the limits of Baldridge’s (1971) definition and application of the concept in his 
studies.  This study embraces the notion that power rests throughout the organization
and that actors’ power and relative influence may be judged in relation to actors’ goals,
the policy content, and attributional data of these relationships (Gamson, 1968; Geary, 
1992, p.51; Malen, 1985).  To this end, the analysis of an actors influence on the overall 
policy outcome in this study was substantiated by informant and document data.  
Conclusions regarding actors’ relative power and influence were made in accordance 
with the weight and significance of the strength and corroboration of the data.  
Definition of Key Concepts and Terms
This section includes definitions of terms relevant to the conceptual framework 
discussed in this chapter:
Policy Process encompasses all decision-making phases, including interest 
articulation, legislative transformation, policy decision outcome, and policy decision 
implementation.  The terms policy creation and development are used 
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interchangeably with policy process in this study.
Policy Decision Context is the setting in which the policy decision process occurs. 
This context encompasses the culture, traditions, habits and history of the 
organization as well as the broader environment in which it operates (Baldridge, 
1971; Easton, 1979).  Assessment of this context is limited to the extent it is 
perceived to relate to and affect the issue under discussion.
Actor refers to an individual or a group that is  involved in the policy decision 
process at the case site.  Gamson (1968) places actors into two categories, 
authorities and partisans, depending on their position and formal authority to render
binding.
Goal and Issue Stand embodies an actor’s policy interests, position on the policy, 
and desires for policy outcome.
Resource refers to the means an actor or group of actors possesses to actually affect 
a policy decision outcome.  Gamson (1968) classifies resources as tangible and 
intangible assets that can possibly alter the decision outcome.  
Influence Strategy and Tactic refers to the type of approach—ranging from 
inducements to constraints—an actor or groups of actors will undertake in order to 
influence a decision outcome.  Both Gamson (1968) and Baldridge (1971) contend 
that influence tactics are dependent on an actor’s resources and access to the 
decision making channels as well as their level of trust with authorities.
Issue Alignment or Interest Coalition refers to the shared values and policy goals 
among an actor or group of actors around a particular issue or set of issues. 
Interest Articulation is the phase classified by Baldridge (1971) as the point in the
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policy cycle when actors make their policy goals and stances known as well as 
initiate attempts to influence the policy content. 
Legislative Transformation is the point in the cycle when the conflicting views and 
preferences of authority-partisan interactions are translated into policy.
Policy Decision Outcome is the official policy resolution that is negotiated or 
compromised as a resolution to the cycle of conflict. The term outcome is used 
synonymously with the term enactment in this study.
Policy Decision Implementation refers to the post-outcome phase of the policy 
process.  Here, official policy moves to execution.  This case will not analyze this 
phase of the policy process except for the manner in which feedback regarding the 
operation of the AAS project affected the process through which the AAS program 
was enacted. 
Research Questions Derived from Conceptual Framework
No hypothetical propositions drove this research since its purpose was 
exploratory. This study was rooted in the rationale that given the anecdotal and 
historical accounts reviewed, diversity policies and initiatives like the AAS appear ripe 
for explanations derived from a political lens. To this end, the purpose of this research 
was to analyze and explain the policy making process that resulted in the development 
of the AAS at UMCP.  Descriptive data were used to address the overarching research 
question:
How does a theory about policy making, specifically Baldridge’s (1971)
classic model of political decision making in college and universities, 
apply to one campus’ diversity policy process?
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Supporting research questions as derived from the conceptual framework provided
the basis for addressing the overarching research question.  The following orienting 
questions provided the conceptual map for the development of interview 
instrumentation outlined in Chapter Three:
1. What is the policy context?
a. What are the organizational and decision making cultures around 
diversity issues, particularly those affecting Asian American students?
b. What are the organizational structures that oversee and facilitate the 
development of new academic programs?
c. What are the historical, external, or environmental factors affecting 
matters of diversity on campus? 
2. Who were the actors involved in the creation of the AAS at UMCP?
3. What were the goals and policy stances of the actors?
4. What were the resources of the various actors involved?
5. How did actors use their resources to influence policy makers? 
6. How did the contextual forces identified affect actors’ capacity to influence 
the policy decision outcome?
7. How did the contextual forces and human interactions converge to account 
for the policy outcome in this case?
Study Limitations and Contributions
This study was limited in a number of ways.  First, the political model and 
outlined conceptual framework reflects a specific view of how organizational policy is 
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crafted. Second, this research was exploratory. Although Pusser’s (2001, 2004) recent 
application of Baldridge’s (1971) conceptual framework confirms the overall durability 
of the model and its relevance as tool for researching the politics of diversity issues, it 
was not a test of the model on a single campus’s internal policy process.  In this respect, 
the framework has yet to be applied to the organizational conflicts found in campus-
based diversity policy decisions. Third, this study was not designed to determine 
causality or predictive variables in policy making. Rather, the purpose was interpretive 
because it generalized to theory, assessed the “fit” of existing theory, and generated
preliminary propositions about the politics of diversity on college campuses. 
Summary
This chapter presented two primary areas of literature that serve as an 
interpretive reference for understanding how diversity policy decisions are made in 
universities. The broad literature base that treats diversity as  a set of contested campus 
issues offers descriptive and anecdotal accounts of diversity policies in higher education
as they have evolved over the past two decades. This literature includes writings on the 
development of Asian American Studies programs. Yet another area of literature seeks 
to examine the student experience in diversity issues through a range of perspectives 
such as identity politics and student activism. With the one noted exception of Pusser 
(2003, 2004), this review revealed a lack of theory driven research on diversity policy 
making. It is this theoretical gap, then, that provides the rationale for to existing higher 
education research and conceptual lenses as the central means for analyzing the case at 
UMCP. 
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The purpose of this study was to explore the political dynamics of the 
organization decision making processes around the creation of the AAS at UMCP . The 
political framework serves as a sharp analytic tool for unraveling how and why 
authorities and partisans interacted in the process of creating the AAS, in addition to 
accounting for how these interactions resulted in the programmatic outcome.  Findings 
from this case were arrayed against the backdrop of Baldridge’s conceptual benchmarks 
for detecting: (1) the context for the decision; (2) the actors involved in the decision; (3) 
the actors’ resources for influencing the decision; (4) the actors’ strategic tactics and 
attempts to influence the decision; and (5) how these actors interacted in the given 




This research used case study methodology to add to the empirical literature on 
the dynamics of diversity-related policy making and programs, and to test the broader 
theoretical notions about the politics of campus decision making. The exploratory 
nature of this study and the emphasis on multifaceted social processes called for a 
qualitative method in order to: (a) generate data that reveal the complexities of the 
research questions; and (b) render conclusions regarding the theoretical relevance of 
this study.
This chapter outlines the research methods used. In the first section, I offer a 
justification for using a qualitative case study approach to answer the research 
questions. Next, I describe the case selection process and data sources that were utilized 
in the study.  The third portion of this chapter explains the data collection and analysis 
procedures. These sections are followed by an explanation of the validity of the study 
that includes a discussion of the controls for bias and error.  This chapter concludes with 
an explanation of the analyst’s ethical considerations in conducting the research. 
Qualitative Methods and Case Study Justification
Shulman (1988) contends that education researchers must select research 
methods adeptly based on the nature of the problem to be studied and the question to be 
answered.  These research methods may be either quantitative or qualitative in their 
approaches.  Quantitative studies often focus on the broad scope of a problem and rely 
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on statistical data to establish an explicit cause and effect relationship (Creswell, 1998, 
p. 17).  On the other hand, a qualitative study is not necessarily concerned with 
“frequencies or incidence,” but rather a qualitative inquiry explores the “how” and 
“why” of a complex social phenomenon (Yin, 1994, p. 6).
Miles (1983) asserts that qualitative methods are a bona fide area of scholarly 
research because they attempt to gather comprehensive and “rich” data from multiple 
sources. A qualitative study, then, might investigate a problem that is otherwise difficult 
to depict through numbers or survey data.  Creswell (1998) outlines a number of key 
reasons for selecting qualitative methods.  These rationales encompass studies about a
social phenomenon in which variables are not readily identifiable, theories are not fully
developed or tested, and “snapshot” views do not provide a sufficient means for 
explanation.  In addition, qualitative studies are especially adept methods for tracing a 
specific policy issue through various stages of the process in a given decision-making 
arena (Geary, 1992, p. 60).   
Qualitative studies may assume multiple forms or approaches. The case study is 
one type of qualitative method.  A number of authors have posited a “range” of 
definitions for case study research (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994).  A major 
area of disagreement among these authors lies within the use of theory as an anchoring 
device for the study.  Both Yin and Merriam contend that a case study must begin by 
examining relevant conceptual literature on the topic.  On the other hand, Stake 
advocates for a “progressive focusing,” whereby the researcher identifies and assesses 
applicable theories as the research process unfolds (1995, p.17).  Regardless of this 
disparity, all three authors concur that the broad purpose of a case study is to examine a 
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complex phenomenon within its social context.  This examination is done through a 
detailed data collection process that relies on multiple layers of evidence such as 
interviews, observations, and documents.  Resulting research findings are analyzed and 
presented in a narrative form, which is an outgrowth of the culling and assessment of 
this extensive database.  
Research on the process through which campus diversity issues get resolved was
a clear candidate for exploration though qualitative methods.  Campus decision-making 
processes inevitably unfold in cyclical phases of decision making—from idea to 
implementation and subsequent revision—and involve participants that move in and out 
of the process at these various stages.  Likewise, there are a several reasons why 
researching the creation of the AAS at UMCP was an unlikely candidate for explanation 
or analysis by employing survey data or statistics. First, there were multiple stages and 
events which led to policy and programmatic changes, multiple perspectives on its 
purpose, and on-going changes to its implementation. Given these complex and 
intertwined conditions, I selected a qualitative case study to explore the process that led 
to the program’s creation.  Second, utilizing a qualitative design rendered a more 
complete picture because it generated data from multiple sources, including documents 
and interviews, and it employed cross-calibrating validity techniques as a device for 
analyzing data regarding an organizational process. In sum, an interpretive method was
a good fit because it appreciates the lack of fixed variables and predictive nature of the 
phenomenon.
Three underlying reasons guided the specific selection of qualitative case 
method to examine the creation of an AAS expansion at UMCP.  First, and perhaps 
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most important, prior research documents the validity of using the case study method 
when analyzing university decision-making processes. Baldridge (1971) employed 
qualitative case study as his tool to examine contested institutional decision-making 
processes. The creation of the AAS at UMCP possessed this fundamental attribute.  The 
AAS was the cumulative outcome of almost a decade of committee decisions, campus-
wide academic policy changes, as well as both confrontations and negotiations 
involving students, staff, and administrators. In addition, Baldridge noted that a case 
study about politics on college campuses allows the researcher “to assemble a holistic 
picture of the institution and some of its dynamics” (p. 32).  In the case of the AAS at
UMCP, interviews with organizational members and a review of documents allowed for 
an in-depth investigation and understanding of the stages of the policy process. 
Second, the case study technique is appropriate for exploring a topic on which 
little empirical research exists. A case study of campus diversity issues may serve as a 
“critical case” for exploring Baldridge’s ideas about the politics of university decision 
making around an organizationally relevant and contentious set of issues.  Baldridge’s 
ideas have been applied to both public and private campuses and different sets of issues 
such as budget cutbacks and departmental eliminations.  Diversity issues, such as the 
creation of a new academic program to support the study and teaching of a new student 
population, represent a type of case that holds the potential to generate data about a set 
of issues rarely explored through Baldridge’s lens. Yin (1995) describes such a case as 
one that has “critical” attributes that make it a desirable condition for case study 
research because it possesses a potential to “confirm, challenge or extend a theory” as 
well as to contribute to, and enhance existing theories and concepts (pp. 39-40). 
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A third related reason to use the case approach arises when the case possesses 
unique characteristics. Yin posits that studying a single case with “revelatory” 
importance allows for exploring and enhancing existing theory (1994, p. 15). 
Hernandez’s (1996) prior research was limited to the analysis of students’ involvement 
in campus policy decisions. On the other hand, this case seeks to understand how 
multiple groups of actors—students, faculty, and administrators—shaped the creation of 
the AAS.  As a result, this case study has generated empirical data, presented the 
opportunity to build on existing theory, and crafted preliminary propositions about the 
politics of campus decision making and diversity issues (Merriam, 1998). 
As with any approach to research, there are limitations to a case study design. 
Case study research requires an extensive time commitment for data collection and 
analysis (Creswell, 1998). And, like other qualitative methods, a primary critique of 
case study research is that it cannot be generalized to a broader population or sample.   
Patton (1990) asserts, however, that generalization is not the end goal in qualitative 
inquiry.  Instead, Patton contends that the purpose of qualitative research is “to provide 
perspective” in a manner in which findings may be generalized back to a particular 
framework or conceptual orientation (p. 491). To this end, the case study was an 
appropriate method for understanding the complexities of the actions and dynamics of 
the creation of the AAS at UMCP. 
Case Selection Rationale
As noted in Chapter Two, organizational conflict that is centered on diversity 
policies and programs is a phenomenon that has emerged on college campuses during 
the past two decades.  The AAS at UMCP evolved during this era and over a specific 
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time period—official policy decisions documented from 1995 to 2000, with some 
antecedent contextual factors dating back to 1990.  
I selected this specific case for a number of reasons.  First, the dynamics at 
UMCP were bounded by a specific time frame and particular decision events. Second, 
the creation of the AAS was suitable for study because the policy process represented a 
new era of campus policymaking ripe for analysis under Baldridge’s model. In this 
respect, the AAS represented the first campus wide policy decision that addressed the 
needs of the APA community.  Moreover, creation of this new academic program 
presented two institutional challenges:  (a) to the disciplinary traditions of UMCP’s 
professorial culture and norms; and (b) to the newly embraced value placed on diversity 
as it related to overall campus mission. The AAS and A sian Pacific American (APA) 
student issues underwent extensive administrative scrutiny and press coverage for a 
variety of reasons. These factors include the involvement of a formal and vocal student 
movement that had grown on the campus (Asian American studies project documents, 
2000).  
Last, I selected the events at UMCP based on preliminary secondary and 
primary document reviews (Background documents, May 4, 2001; UMCP AAS
website, 2002).  These precursory steps provided insight into the structure and traditions 
of decision making that were the norm at UMCP. These cultural habits include an often 
dispersed, but strong faculty and student involvement in academic decision making.  As 
a result, these data help to confirm my understanding that the administrative decisions 
and campus events leading to the creation of the AAS were conflict-intensive processes
(see Case Chronology, Appendix C).
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Data Sources and Collection Strategy
Creswell (1998) contends that the data collection for a case study must be 
“deep” in that it should utilize a variety of sources so that the researcher is able to create 
a “rich description” of the context of the case and the dynamics of the social 
phenomenon under investigation.  Data for this study were collected from three
categories:  secondary documents, primary documents, and interviews. The following 
sections describe the general purposes of these data sources, their applications to, and 
their uses in this study.
Secondary Documents
Merriam (1998) remarks that the use of documents is a “particularly good source 
for qualitative case studies because they can ground an investigation in the context of 
the problem being investigated” (p.126).  Recognizing the value of document research, I 
examined articles on the events at UMCP in The Diamondback, an independent daily 
newspaper published by students, and the Chronicle of Higher Education, a weekly 
national newspaper. This body of literature served as a primer for the study proposal.  
This literature also assisted in:  (a) developing a working knowledge of the sequence of 
case events; (b) crafting a preliminary list of policy actors and their policy goals; (c) 
creating the case chronology; (4) creating the informant interview guide; and (5) 
providing data about the policy decision context.
Primary Documents
In addition to using secondary sources to assist in my understanding of the 
context for the case, I utilized official UMCP public documents as a source for 
attributional data regarding actors, goals, resources, influence tactics and policy 
54
interactions. These documents included the following:  (a) meeting minutes from the 
Faculty Senate and Academic Committees; (b) internal memos from the Office of the 
Dean for Undergraduate Studies; (c) meeting minutes and position papers of the Asian 
American Student Union and other student governing organizations; (d) official 
documents of the student group, Working for an Asian American Studies Program 
(WAASP); and (e) official UMCP press releases.
Primary documents also provided a filter for data verification. These documents 
served as an internal data analysis check on informant interview accounts. I obtained
these documents either via the UMCP web site or secured them on site from interview 
informants.  Conclusions reached as a result of data contained in these documents are 
clearly attributed in the case narrative and summary chapters.
Interviews
Murphy (1980) contends that interviews are the best qualitative data source 
when “you are interested in examining issues of a process—how decisions were 
made…” (p. 77).  According to Murphy, interview data may be used to determine how 
complex events occurred, who was involved, and what the program or policy “means to 
key participants and influentials.”  Furthermore, Allison and Zelikow (1999) suggest 
that informants occupy unique organizational positions that provide critical windows 
into decision making processes that might not otherwise be revealed through documents 
or survey research.  Informant interviews served as the cornerstone of the data 
collection process and were used to build the data base for the case study given their 
suggested value. 
Merriam (1998) describes the types of sampling used to construct interview 
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pools in qualitative studies. Snowball or network sampling is one of these procedures.  
Network sampling is a process through which additional informants are identified 
during interviews with other informants.  The goal of network sampling is to “discover, 
understand, and gain insight” and, as a result, the sample should represent a group 
“from which the most can be learned” about the case (pp. 62-63).  
In the case of UMCP, some informants were identified readily from background 
reading, and others were identified from site-based network sampling. Murphy (1980)
suggests that potential informants be classified into two categories:  “key informants,” 
who are reliable and central to the process; and “regular interviews” of informants, who 
may be secondary to the process and may be more informal in nature.  To this end, 
criteria for informant selection emphasize centrality to the policy process and 
knowledge of events without discounting Allison’s (1971) notion that interviews with 
those who occupy varying organizational positions adds depth and perspective to the 
case analysis.    
Thirty-five individuals were contacted to participate in the study. Twenty-eight 
individuals responded and participated.  These informants were identified and selected 
based on the above broad criteria, but also selected and screened based on their position 
within the university, their particular position on the issue (both for and against), their 
reputation for knowledge and candor, as well as their overall proximity to the process. 
This selection criteria offered more precision to building the informant pool without 
compromising or potentially omitting valuable data sources.  Former and current senior 
administrators, student leaders, faculty, staff, and individuals who are external to the 
campus but participated as actors in the process (e.g., individuals from other campuses 
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where Asian American studies programs already existed) comprised the study informant 
pool. All interviews were conducted in person with the exception of those individuals 
no longer affiliated with UMCP.  In these cases, interviews were conducted via 
telephone. 
As is the case with all research studies, informant participation ultimately should 
determined by access and willingness to participate.  Marshall and Rossman (1999) 
remark that not all policy actors avail themselves recognizing that “…the politics in a 
setting are so explosive…” (p. 89).  The authors advise that the researcher “move on,” 
but certainly acknowledge and account for these gaps in the data analysis and case 
report.  In this instance, 7 of the thirty-five individuals contacted did not respond to 
written and phone requests for participation.  Two of these potential informants were 
deemed to have been central actors to the policy process; the other five were secondary 
participants in the policy process. Overall, the informant pool comprised actors 
proximate and secondary to the policy process, representing different positions in the 
system, different stances on the issue and offered candid accounts of the policy 
developments. 
Construction of the Interview Guide
The development of the AAS unfolded over a decade  and some actors moved in 
and out of the decision making process (see Appendix C:  Case Chronology). There are 
many actors that were key participants and others that possess valuable, but what may 
be considered secondhand, knowledge of the process and specific decisions leading up 
to the adoption of the AAS in May 2000.  This range of involvement required a dual
approach to instrumentation and interview data collection procedures in order to capture 
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the most detail-rich and verifiable data from informants. 
Construction of the interview guide followed both Murphy’s (1980) and Geary‘s 
(1992) recommendations regarding informal and formal study participants. Interviews 
with informal policy actors were conducted in an open-ended manner. The purpose of 
open-ended interviews was to generate free-flowing data from the informant regarding 
the various categories of the framework.  The question areas were crafted broadly—
focusing on the key benchmarks outlined in the conceptual framework (see Appendix 
D:  Informal Interview Guide).  This open format recognized the varying experiences 
and proximity to the policy making process (Patton, 2002).  These data were limited in 
their usefulness in analysis of actor influence strategies, but were a solid source of 
information about the policy setting, policy actors, and alignments.  
More formal, semi-structured interviews were conducted with central policy 
actors.  This interview guide was used with actors who possess a firsthand knowledge 
of specific decision events leading up to the adoption of the AAS, as well as with actors 
who possess a firsthand knowledge of events throughout the policy making process. 
This central actor identification was substantiated through both document review and 
informal interview data. In accordance with Geary’s (1992) finding, firsthand accounts 
of the policy development process produced the “most useful” evidence and 
descriptions for the case study. 
The more formal, semi-structured interview protocol was derived from the 
overarching research question and subquestions outlined in Chapter Two (see Appendix 
E:  Semi-structured Interview Guide). This structure “increases the comprehensiveness 
of the data and makes data collection somewhat systematic for each respondent,” but 
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still maintains a conversational and situational style (Patton, 2002, p. 343). Both 
Merriam (1998) and Murphy (1980) recommend the construction of interview “probes” 
or questions or remarks that are meant to follow-up a prior question.  In this case study, 
interview probes were devised to elicit detailed answers from respondents as well as to 
provide a means for the researcher to facilitate a fluid and conversational manner in the 
interview (Patton, 2002, p 372).  
Murphy (1980) outlines a number of interview probes.  These include clarifying 
probes, which ask the informant to repeat or restate his or her comments.  These probes 
are similar to ones that require the informant to elaborate on his or her response such as 
asking for an example of his or her response.  In interviews, probes included
encouraging comments or signals from the researcher to continue with his or her
response. Finally, Murphy suggests that other nonverbal cues such as silence allow a 
study informant to collect his or her thoughts and continue with his or her comments 
(pp.97-98).  In general, these probes were not part of the written interview guide, but 
were added where appropriate through the data collection process as a means to 
encourage and elicit richer responses.  
Interview Data Collection Strategy
The first step in collecting interview data was a pilot test of both the informal 
interview guide and the semi-structured interview guide.  The purpose of the pilot test 
was to determine the quality of the instrument—Does it elicit detailed descriptive data? 
Do the format and sequencing of questions make sense? Are questions missing? Are 
questions worded and framed to “extract” good data? (Merriam, 1998; Bradburn & 
Sudman, 1980).  This field test was conducted with two informants identified through 
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secondary and primary document review and informal conversations with case site 
contacts.  The pilot interviews were successful because they:  (a) elicited and corrected 
data significant to the case chronology and sequence of policy development; (b) 
provided contacts for informant interviews; and (c) allowed the researcher to practice 
interview techniques with study informants.
Once the study commenced, a number of interview data collection “mechanics”
were enlisted as a means to build an internally sound data base.  Informant interviews 
were conducted in person, whenever possible. All interviews were tape recorded and 
later transcribed for review by the researcher. The researcher reviewed the written 
interview transcriptions, compared them with field notes, and in six instances, contacted 
informants to confirm the transcription for accuracy.  Researcher notes supplemented
interview transcription in all instances.  These notes were taken during the interview 
and reviewed and assessed after each interview.  
For all informant interviews, the data review process occurred within a week 
after data collection.  This timeliness was important because the “post-interview” period 
is described as a critical time for examining data, ensuring accuracy, and reflecting on 
information gathered (Patton, 2002, p. 384). Murphy (1980) suggests that this post 
interview period includes the comparison of data gathered with existing data collected. 
In this case study, this comparative process allowed the researcher to determine 
necessary next steps in the process, to identify additional informants and, to modify the 
interview guide based on substantiated preliminary findings. 
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Informant Confidentiality
Yin (1994) posits that there are two levels of anonymity when conducting case 
studies.  One level is the case itself.  According to Yin, sometimes case sites require 
anonymity because the topic is too sensitive or the case site is so typical that no 
identification is necessary. The case site for this study was revealed because a key part 
of the conceptual framework and case report requires an analysis of the decision setting. 
This analysis would be nearly impossible without revealing institution-specific 
characteristics and attributes.
The second level of anonymity is whether to reveal the identity of study
informants. Yin argues that informant anonymity is often necessary and justified “when 
the case study has been a controversial topic… or the final case report may affect 
subsequent actions of those who participated” (p.143).  Patton (2002) concurs with Yin 
that informant confidentiality and anonymity may protect the privacy of those involved.
As the anecdotal literature and background reading on the UMCP case suggest, policy 
making around diversity issues was hotly contested and this featured argued for 
informant anonymity. Likewise, both Murphy (1980) and Patton (2002) agree that 
informant anonymity allows the researcher to elicit stronger, more precise data, 
especially in cases where there may be risks for informant identification.
Informant identity was concealed in this particular case study.  Policy actor
identities, however, were a matter of public record.  Thus, actors are identified by name 
in the findings chapter and their actions in the policy process are described in 
documents and interviews.  However, names of informants remain anonymous. 
Quotations are referenced by numerical code, not by name, positions, or other 
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identifying traits. 
Researcher Role in Data Collection
The qualitative researcher plays a unique, central role in the interview process. 
The researcher must take meticulous steps when collecting interview data since she is 
the architect and administrator of the data elicited from informants. One of the most 
effective checks on potential biases or missteps is a transparent research design and data 
collection process.  This aspect of qualitative design—the researcher’s level of 
involvement in instrumentation and collection—often comes under great fire from those 
not familiar with the high standards and rigor of credible case study research.  And, as 
numerous qualitative researchers have noted, all research studies are open to biases and 
judgments, regardless of whether instrumentation is quantitative or qualitative in nature 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Merriam, 1998; Murphy, 1980; Patton, 2002). 
Merriam (1998) argues that one of a researcher’s chief concerns in interviews 
should be personality and skill.  The interviewer should bring both a sensitivity and 
even-handedness to the interview as a means to temper his or her biases and judgments. 
These variables compound an already complex interaction between the researcher and 
informant. Merriam contends that a skilled interviewer “accounts for these factors 
[biases, predispositions attitudes] in order to evaluate the data obtained” (p. 87).  One 
strategy for disclosing and accounting for these effects is to keep accurate and detailed 
notes that include interview and respondent reactions.  Careful note taking and 
transcription by the researcher was a crucial tool not only for recording data, but also 
for sifting and filtering data in a critical manner in this study. 
Patton (2002) argues that interview data can be enhanced by attending to the 
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dual concerns of rapport and neutrality.   Rapport requires the researcher to convey a 
basic level of respect; and neutrality refers to the lack of judgment regarding the content
of the informant’s response. In this study, the researcher attended to rapport thorough 
preparation, including learning background information about individual informant s as 
well as conveying a familiarity about the campus, its history and culture in each 
interview.  Maintenance of researcher neutrality required eliminating interview 
questions that may have “led” an informant’s response in one particular direction as 
well as elicited expressed judgment on the part of the researcher during interviews. 
Data Analysis 
According to Yin (1994), the goals of analysis in a case study are to discover 
how the data inform the research questions and to determine the degree to which the 
data “fit” with the various concepts outlined in the literature review for the study. In this 
respect, data analysis occurred in several stages beginning with the examination of 
individual data (i.e., an interview or document), followed by the aggregation of data 
across sources, and culminating with the integrated analysis and interpretation.  Data 
were scrutinized for clarity, accuracy, detail, and plausibility in each of these stages. 
Murphy (1980) suggests that qualitative data be reduced in a systematic manner 
in order to foster a comparative analysis with the categories both within and across the 
conceptual framework.  I scrutinized individual data sources and relied on the 
components of the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Two. I examined the data 
from each individual source—primary documents, secondary documents, and informant 
report—into the following categories: (a) factors that shaped the policy context; (b) 
actors identified in the policy process (both primary and secondary to the process); (c) 
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actors’ stances, alignments, and desired goals; (d) actors’ resources; (e) actors’ attempts 
to influence the policy outcome; (f) actors’ interactions during the policy process; and 
(g) actor’s policy “success” in relation to their goals and influence attempts.  Data were
scrutinized continuously throughout this stage.  This process included evaluating its 
relative weight and accuracy, including the determination of proximity to the process—
first or second hand accounts—content, clarity, plausibility, consistency, and level of 
detail. 
I assessed the data for each individual informant source by review ing notes and 
interview transcripts. I began this process by arraying informant data based on the level 
and duration of each individual’s involvement in the process.  This ordering allowed me 
to develop a coherent time line for the policy process—noting critical events and 
meetings, the matters and issues discussed, and the ideas and positions presented by 
participants. This process also allowed me to note discrepancies in the time frame for 
specific meetings and participants. I reviewed data provided by other key informants, 
and in these instances, this review necessitated additional contact with the informant to 
confirm the information under dispute. 
Following this process, I developed more comprehensive data files for these 
categories in each source area.  For example, I coded and parceled out data regarding 
key actors, their relative policy roles and positions, which I derived from all informant 
reports.  This step rendered three composite data areas (secondary documents, primary 
documents, and informant interview reports) matched against the six main conceptual 
categories outlined in Chapter Two.  These aggregate data pictures then enabled a 
comprehensive comparison of evidence across the categories.
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The next stage entailed assembling the case report of findings from this data 
reduction process. In a case study, preparation of the narrative report may take many 
forms because of the breadth and depth of the data sources and the intensive collection 
process (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1995).  Merriam (1998) notes that a case 
study is likely to be presented with more description than other forms of qualitative 
inquiry since the goal is to present a “holistic picture” and understanding of the case (p. 
194).   To this end, the case report in this study was preceded by a narrative that situated
and described the context for the case—a key component of an analysis of the political 
model.  
In order to craft such an understanding of the UMCP case in light of the 
overarching research question, my writing closely mirrored the outline of conceptual 
categories.  This process entailed a constant search for confirming and disconfirming 
data.  I began by characterizing the policy setting and the context for the issue debate, 
which evolved into a complete set of findings and reported in Chapter Four. Next, I 
identified and described the actors involved in the creation of the AAS at UMCP.  This 
analysis included a review of actors’ policy positions, their resources, and their relative 
power in the decision-making structure.  I followed these sections with a policy 
narrative that traced major events leading up to administrative action and subsequent 
outcomes.  Here, I situated the interactions of actors, their desired policy goals, their 
attempts to influence, and the outcomes of these interactions within the major phases of 
the process as well as across the stages of the process.   
The last section of the case study findings chapter presents interpretations about 
actors’ influence in light of the conceptual categories of the framework.  The final 
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chapter presents a summary of the study, its findings, and conclusions about the 
political nature of diversity issues given the weight of the evidence in the case.  Since 
Patton (2002) recommends that the researcher sort through case findings and make 
judgments based on the preponderance and plausibility of the evidence collected , 
disconfirming evidence, rival interpretations, and various insights that go beyond the 
conceptual framework are noted in the case report and final chapter of this study.   
Internal Validity: Checks for Bias and Error
The data analysis strategy outlined above demonstrates that the process did not 
function in discrete, sequential steps.  Qualitative case study data collection and analysis 
cannot be conducted skillfully and conscientiously without a keen awareness of the 
intertwined nature of these methodological steps.  Data synthesis requires the use of 
“constant comparison,” whereby the analyst refines and reduces data into conceptual 
categories through a continuous assessment through all phases of research (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Merriam, 1998). Given the somewhat fluid boundaries of the analytic 
steps, the case study researcher must employ certain protections to ensure the integrity 
of both the mechanics of the research process, the analysis of data, and the formation of 
findings and conclusions reached.  The following sections elaborate on the controls 
used in this study.    
Research Documentation
Merriam (1998) recommends that researchers develop an “audit trail” with 
regard to data sources and case evidence.  Similarly, Yin (1994) suggests that a 
researcher “maintain the chain of evidence” in a manner that allows the reader to easily 
“trace the steps” of the research, the findings, and conclusions made regarding the case 
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(p. 98).  According to Yin, this level of clarity will help ensure study rigor with regard 
to the research design.  I made concerted effort to achieve this degree of research 
transparency.   Each phase of the research design, data collection, data analysis, and 
case report writing were documented clearly not only in my internal record keeping, but 
also within the final case study report.
Data Sources:  Authentication and Veracity
With regard to specific data sources utilized, this study was highly dependent on 
data gathered through interviews.  Geary (1992) notes that in such studies the researcher 
must “remain alert to instances that might jeopardize the data,” including those that may 
affect the interview process and subsequent data interpretation (p. 86). The researcher 
must be cognizant of those biases that she may hold. These pre-existing notions or ideas 
may impact the collection and analysis as well as provide an opportunity for inclusion 
or exclusion of important data. 
Patton (1990) recommends that the researcher assume a neutral role in the 
interviewing process as a means to safeguard and check against the types of biases
described above. In this respect, I began the research study possessing a familiarity with 
the campus, but no knowledge of the process which gave way to the adoption of the 
AAS. My perceived expertise rather was my understanding of the conceptual lens that 
informs the study. I believe that this familiarity with the campus, but not the case in 
particular, allowed me to build rapport with informants.  This lack of knowledge about 
the policy process also allowed me to avoid premature judgment about the policy 
process and allow informants to provide candid data.
Both secondary and primary documents served as a solid resource for 
67
information about the actors involved in and the stages of the development of the AAS.  
These documents provided an internal reference check throughout the data collection 
and analysis phase of the study.  For example, these supporting documents—primarily 
campus newspaper articles, UMCP press releases, and official group meeting notes, 
videotapes, and minutes—allowed the analyst to check if information provided by 
informants meshed with dates and facts reported in these documents. In a few instances,
discrepancies between document information and informant data were apparent.  These 
data inconsistencies, however, were resolved upon additional informant contact.  
Finally, Murphy (1980) argues that documents often provide the researcher with 
“retrospective” information that may not be readily obtainable in interviews because of 
informant “memory problems and the filtering of data through current norms” (p.121).  
This resource may be especially critical in case studies of diversity issues that require a 
great deal of archival research in order to analyze the current day policy setting and 
situate case findings.  Similarly, since the AAS evolved over a decade , the analyst 
enlisted and relied on multiple sources as a means to assemble a chronological account 
of events during this time period.  This included sharing the case analytic chronology 
with informants as a means to increase accuracy of data secured in interviews (see 
Chapter Two and Appendix C).
Data Triangulation
Triangulation is also a research and analysis tool I used to check for research 
accuracy.  Stake (1995) calls this a process in which the researcher is “regularly sent 
back to the drawing board” (p. 94). By this characterization, I believe he means that the 
researcher “pushes” the findings ahead in an iterative process of cross-calibrating data 
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with the multiple sources of data. I conducted this checking not only with study 
informants, the interview data collected and documents, but also by clarifying study 
questions and data with two participants in the pilot the interview process.
Member Checks and Peer Review
Merriam (1998) outlines a number of key strategies that an investigator should 
use to enhance internal validity.  One of these steps is member checks.  This process 
requires that the researcher verify data content and interpretations with the source, 
particularly if the data are derived from interviews or observations.  This verification 
step builds in yet another method for catching missed or misconstrued perspectives by 
both the researcher and data sources throughout the duration of the study.  
Professional and peer review is another strategy to foster a study’s validity.  This 
process provides another vantage point for scrutinizing study findings for bias and error
as well as its congruency in the conclusions reached and their relationship to case 
evidence (Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Murphy, 1980; Geary, 1992).  Critique and review of 
this study came from individuals identified as appropriate and willing to hold the case 
confidential, including departmental peers familiar with the conceptual model utilized 
in this study, pilot interview informants, and dissertation committee members.
External Validity and Study Delimitations
A qualitative study’s internal validity is the direct result of sound research 
design and execution. A qualitative study’s external validity or the extent to which 
study findings and conclusions can be situated in a theoretical domain is only possible
when internal validity has been achieved (Merriam, 1998).  Likewise, external validity 
for this case study was not only dependent on the soundness of the internal design, but 
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also on the logical and clear presentation of findings and conclusions based on what Yin 
(1994) calls the chain of evidence.    
The purpose of this study was not to make statistical claims or generalizations 
about the nature of the politics of campus decision making and diversity issues.  Instead, 
the study’s purpose was to examine how the process at UMCP can be generalized to 
notions of the political model espoused by Baldridge (1971) and can generate 
preliminary propositions about campus politics around diversity issues.  In this respect, 
this case study produced conclusions and preliminary propositions in light of the 
broader conceptual model and according to Yin (1994), achieved the necessary end-
product as a means to ensure its external validity.
The establishment of clear parameters for the study contributed to its 
consistency in methodology and overall theoretical purposes. The conceptual 
framework was explained and justified in Chapter Two.  Its linkages and usefulness for 
data collection and analysis were delineated in this chapter. Again, the research purpose 
was to assess the dynamics of conflict that took place during the decision making
processes and to understand how and why different actors influenced the programmatic
outcomes at UMCP. 
There were also limitations based on the conceptual lens utilized and the set of 
issues under scrutiny at UMCP. As noted in earlier chapters, diversity and race issues 
on college campuses are delicate matters intertwined with societal and individual 
campus histories, cultures, and organizational structures. The creation of the AAS at 
UMCP evolved over a decade and included formalized advocacy by student groups in 
response to perceived administrative inaction and weak support for the APA 
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community. Given these conditions, there were a few instances of hesitancy on the part 
of informants to disclose information relevant to the components of the conceptual 
model guiding the study since implementation of the AAS is ongoing .  In all of these 
cases, informants asked that their comments be noted in an off-the-record manner.  All 
requests for off-the-record comments were honored as a part of this study. 
These types of limits, however, are embedded in any qualitative study that relies 
on archival documents and informant interviews as central data sources.  The role of the 
researcher, then, is to design a study in such a manner that data collection is as thorough 
and rigorous as possible given the inherent limits of the data sources.  The investigator 
has accounted for these limitations throughout all phases of this study.  
Ethical Considerations
A researcher must possess a heightened sensitivity when data collection involves 
member participation within the organization that is under study.  The development of 
the AAS at UMCP occurred during an era of changing student demographics and 
broader curricular decisions.  Policy decisions were made about extremely sensitive 
issues that may have elicited many emotions for those involved. In this case, I took a 
number of steps to ensure that I maintained an ethical and even-handed approach in my 
research.  First, I allowed each potential informant the opportunity to decline 
participation.  Second, I allowed each informant the chance to decline audio recording, 
as well as to remain an anonymous informant.  If an informant requested that some 
comments be discussed “off the record,” these comments were held confidential and 
were not used in the study findings and analysis.  I also offered informants the 
opportunity to request and review a transcript of the interview, as well as to access to a 
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copy of the document that resulted from the research project.  
Finally, I attempted to sustain the integrity of the process throughout all phases 
of the research process.  I maintained a high degree of ethical consideration in planning 
the study, contacting and consulting the informants regarding sensitive information, and 
in providing a clear account of all steps undertaken to reach my conclusions.  In this 
respect, I followed Merriam’s (1998) recommendations of clarifying and describing my 
own limits and level of familiarity with the case. In addition, when I was uncertain 
about substantive aspects of this study, I consulted the committee chair guiding my 
research project. 
Chapter Summary
This chapter outlined the research methodology that is appropriate for 
investigating the AAS at UMCP in light of the political framework described in chapter 
two.  This chapter included a discussion of the purposes of qualitative research 
generally as well as the specific method of case study.  This discussion also included a 
justification for utilizing the case method for investigating the AAS at UMCP. The 
final sections of this chapter addressed research strategies.  These sections included
outlines of data collection, data sources and record keeping.  The procedures of data 
analysis followed this outline of data collection.  This section addressed the specific 
controls employed to account for research accuracy and veracity of the findings, and 
conclusions made in light of the conceptual framework. Lastly, this chapter provided
insight into basic ethical questions for the investigator to consider.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CASE ANTECEDENTS AND ISSUE BACKGROUND
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the central facets of the campus 
decision making structure and the issue environment that gave way to the development 
and adoption of the AAS program at UMCP.  Here, the focus is on a part of the 
conceptual construct, the policy context.  This component of the framework requires the 
analyst to investigate not only an organization’s formal decision-making structures such 
as committees and campus wide governance bodies, but also those less formalized 
“arenas” (Kingdon, 1995) where decisions are made.  This analysis encompasses 
studying organizational routines and established practices as well as detecting those 
cultural “habits and traditions” which may be unique to the policy environment and 
directly related to the policy matter under consideration.   In addition to scrutinizing the 
decision structure and issue background, this assessment requires one to connect and 
situate the organizational structure and issue with external forces or environmental 
factors that may contribute to the decision making dynamics and policy outcomes.  
In this particular case, study findings demonstrate that a number of contributing 
elements shaped and anchored the policy context prior to the initial phase of decision 
making.  First, facets of the formal internal decision making structures predetermined 
the path of consideration of the AAS at UMCP.  Second, UMCP’s evolving 
organizational characteristics such as its changing institutional identity, its financial 
health as a state funded entity, and its overall transformation in academic priorities and 
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management practices combined to create new opportunities for nascent academic 
programs.  Third, the internal environment around diversity matters, including campus 
policy antecedents regarding enrollment, retention, and academics, provided a rich 
historical precedent for addressing diversity issues as campus policy priorities and, at 
the same time, exposed UMCP’s administrative and academic weaknesses regarding 
diversity issues. Finally, and perhaps critical to the success of the AAS, these key 
structural and cultural dimensions created a ready climate for AAP student issues, 
which became a burgeoning and robust part of campus life.  
This chapter’s structure, then, is borne out of a combination of these analytic 
requirements and the stated above precursors to the policy context.  This chapter 
presents these contextual findings, drawn from documents and informant interviews in 
three main sections.  As noted earlier, central actors are identified by name, but 
interview informants are not revealed by name in accordance with the methodology 
outlined for this case study in Chapter Three. 
The first chapter section explains the formal decision making structures within 
and external to the university that have the authority to approve policy changes in 
academic curriculum for undergraduate students. The second portion of the chapter 
serves as an organizational primer on the creation of UMCP as the “flagship” campus in 
Maryland.  This section also highlights the on-going fiscal realities of being a state-
supported institution and the effects these conditions have on campus-based academic 
policy priorities and decisions.  The third section covers the issue of “diversity.”  It 
traces the policy and programmatic evolution of diversity as a campus issue over the 
past 20 years.  This issue background is divided into two subsections:  the first identifies 
74
diversity as a broad campus issue and the second connects the campus environment 
directly to those issues of importance to the APA community prior to 1995.
The Structure of Campus Decision-Making:  Structural Processes vs. 
Organizational Norms
On paper, consideration of new academic programs unfolds in a seemingly 
logical, sequential process. Approval of new academic programs and policies occurs 
through two central decision making channels at UMCP.  The first approval stream 
takes place campus wide through the University Senate.  The second stream occurs 
through the Office of the Provost.  Both committee structures report their 
recommendations to the President.  New academic programs—defined as “curriculum 
leading to the awarding of a degree” as recognized by the Maryland Higher Education 
Commission—must garner the approval of both these bodies.  New academic programs 
then require the approval of the Board of Regents and the Maryland Higher Education 
Commission.  But stated processes do not always reflect the traditions embedded in the 
decision making habits of the organization.  Thus, this section reviews not only the 
processes of theses formal structures, but also illuminates the important cultural norms 
of decision making relevant to the creation of the AAS.
The Office of the President:  Symbolic Leadership and Professional Deference  
Presidents of large research institutions traditionally assume many roles, both in 
administrative and academic realms.  One such role is to serve as the institution’s 
symbolic leader with the overarching purpose of steering a campus through difficult and 
smooth times, reaching out to external fundraisers, alumni and officials, and generally 
maintaining the external “face” of the institution (Birnbaum, 1988).  At UMCP, the 
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presidency more or less adheres to this conventional thinking regarding the symbolic 
dimensions of institutional leadership.  
As the chief administrative officer, the President can make administrative 
decisions in isolation, but the same does not hold true for those in the academic realm.  
Birnbaum (1988, 1992) writes that the President, being a professor himself, must adhere 
to the cultural norms of consensus decision making of the Collegium. Historically, this 
cultural reality of the professional organization does hold true for UMCP (Senate 
Bylaws, 2000, p.3; Falk & Miller, 1993, p. 34).  And in the case of UMCP, although the 
majority of academic decisions are under both the purview of the Provost and the 
University Senate, the President can assume the role of ultimate arbiter of decisions 
based on the recommendations of both the Provost’s office and the University Senate.  
That is, while the President may not have administrative powers to initiate or eliminate 
new academic programs or policy (or the political fortitude to do so), he or she 
possesses the ability to influence outcome both during a process—via administrative 
networks—and at the end—via recommendations to external governing bodies.  
The University Senate:  The Voice of the Collegium
The University Senate is a campus wide governing body.  The Senate’s specific 
charge about academics is to “formulate and recommend to the President policies 
relating to programs, curricula, and courses including policies on the establishment, 
reorganization, or abolition of academic units” (Senate Bylaws, Article I, Section 1.2k).  
Matters of academic programming are considered before the Senate Programs, 
Curricula, and Courses (PCC) committee.  Although some committees engage in 
“rubber stamp” consideration processes, this committee is regarded as one of the more 
76
active and substantive committees since it has the power to endorse or reject new 
academic programs and policies to the entire Senate body. (Informants 01, 010, 013, 
016, 020).   
The policy decisions of the Senate are not binding, but rather “consultative” 
recommendations to the campus administration. In this respect, UMCP tradition aims to 
uphold the ideal of shared governance. At the same time, however, conflict is routinely 
resolved prior to deliberations of the full Senate.  For example, the Senate Chair and his 
or her advisory committee often remain in frequent contact with senior administrators 
and occasionally are invited to attend cabinet meetings as a means of maintaining open 
channels of communication. The Vice Provost for Academic Planning also regularly 
attends PCC Committee meetings in order to assist the PCC with technical and 
procedural questions about academic programs (“APAC Overview,” p. 1. Informants 
013, 016).  In the end, Senate decisions are presented to the President and cabinet, and 
are traditionally regarded as policy decisions enacted by the campus community.  
The Office of the Provost:  Concentrated Authority and the Power of APAC
The Provost is the chief academic officer for the campus.  Critical to this study 
is the recognition of the direct authority the Provost has over a unique academic entity, 
Undergraduate Studies (UGST).  The UGST Dean oversees the Division of Letters and 
Sciences, which is essentially an administrative structure established to provide an 
academic home for first and second year students without a designated major. Thus, this 
dean possesses a limited budget and related authority.  For example, unlike its college 
counterparts, UGST grants only one degree, a bachelor of arts or science in individual 
studies to those students who design and implement their own approved academic 
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course of study.  UGST does not support or provide faculty lines. 
In addition to this direct authority over UGST, the Provost possesses authority 
over the direction and use of the academic budget.  Theoretically, these decisions are 
made in consultation with the Associate Vice President of Budget & Fiscal Affairs.  In 
reality, however, the Provost receives the most significant input from two formal 
entities—the Deans Council and the Academic Planning Advisory Council (APAC).  
APAC has long been regarded as the most influential academic decision-making body 
on campus (Falk & Miller, 1993; Informants 010, 013, 016, 018, 019, 020).  This 
committee’s chief charge is to advise the Provost concerning academic issues with 
significant resource implications. APAC's advice is required when academic programs 
are proposed to be created or eliminated, or when departments or other units are to be 
created, merged, split, or eliminated. Over the past decade, APAC’s reach has 
expanded.  The committee has taken a role in many other initiatives, including strategic 
planning, the revision of the undergraduate curriculum, and the distribution of 
enhancement and research initiative funds (“APAC overview,” p.1). 
The Senate and APAC Decision-Making Streams:  The Pervasive PCC
A two-prong committee structure governs the decision channels for academic 
policies.  Both the Provost—via APAC—and the Senate—via its PCC—utilize a 
committee as the official vehicle for considering the creation or abolishment of 
academic curriculum.  This structure is present in the 13 individual academic colleges 
and in most departments.  In a prescriptive fashion, the Provost’s office publishes a 
“PCC Manual” to guide faculty and administrators through the various levels of 
decision making.  The following is an overview of the “typical” procedural steps 
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required in order to create a new academic program. Proposals to modify or create 
academic programs at UMCP must be submitted to the Provost by a college dean after 
full consideration by affected departments and respective college PCCs.  Most 
modifications to, or proposals for creating academic programs, are guided by a “home” 
college. Some programs, particularly those that span multiple disciplines or 
departments, may not have such a support structure in place and, according to the 
Associate Provost for Academic Planning and Program’s office, may have oversight 
issues that are “problematic” throughout the approval process (PCC Manual, p. 2).  As a 
result, the following guidelines have been established for interdisciplinary programs:  
(a) the program must be overseen by a group of faculty who “has a strong interest in 
assuring the success of students in the program;” (b) the program director should be a 
regular member of the tenure track faculty; (c) the program must secure the support of 
one or more deans “willing to serve as advocates for the program and oversee its 
management;” and (d) the program must have a “primary college home” in order to 
provide student advising and administrative support (PCC Manual, p.3).   The Provost’s 
Office further recommended that interested parties establish a faculty committee to draft 
and advocate for the proposal if it possesses interdisciplinary qualities. 
These prescriptive guidelines raise two critical issues for the creation of the 
AAS.  First, the success of an interdisciplinary program of this nature may very well 
hinge on the financial and administrative resources that an individual college “home” 
could provide.  Second, a formal, but weak precedent for enacting these types of 
interdisciplinary programs at UMCP exists.  Prior to the AAS, the campus maintained 
only two interdisciplinary programs under the traditional rubric of ethnic studies.  These 
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programs are department based, and include Afro American Studies and Women’s 
Studies.
The time frame for approval of new programs also varies, but the two existing 
interdisciplinary programs endured long processes.  Both the Afro American Studies 
and Women’s Studies programs began with course offerings in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, respectively, and took over a decade to become established approved academic 
majors (AAST, WMST official UMCP websites).  According to the PCC Manual 
authored by the Provost’s Office, a new academic program can be approved “well 
within a year” if significant support exists (p.9).  This time frame requires organizers of 
the proposal (e.g. Faculty, Deans, etc) to allow a three-month lead time to the Senate 
PCC and APAC.  Often the Senate PCC and APAC consider proposals concurrently and 
communicate areas of dispute or concern routinely throughout, which helps expedite the 
process.  It is significant to this case to note the caution offered by the Provost that 
“these time estimates may be greatly extended for controversial cases or adversarial 
situations” (p. 10).    
External Approval:  The Board of Regents and MHEC
Ultimately, new academic programs must receive the approval of two governing 
bodies external to campus.  First, programs recommended by the President are 
submitted to the University System of Maryland Board of Regents for approval through 
its Committee on Education Policy.  Second, MHEC must approve these programs. In 
actuality, however, this process is not so much an approval as it is a confirmation of the 
campus-based decision.  MHEC may only deny approval when it finds the proposed 
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program is inconsistent with the institution’s mission, is duplicative in nature such that 
it may “cause harm to another institution,” or is in violation of the state’s equal 
educational opportunity obligations under state and federal law (MHEC Policy III-7.01, 
1999).  Both approval requirements are seen by most as a pro forma process once a 
program successfully has been adopted on campus (Informant 016). 
Launching a Flagship State Research University:  Fiscal Woes, Retrenchment, and 
the Academic Policymaking Climate
The state and campus policy climate preceding the creation of the AAS was 
nothing short of tumultuous.  The review below highlights the dire historical and fiscal 
conditions that gave way to UMCP’s flagship status and the subsequent internal 
retooling of academic planning and policymaking. Specifically, this assessment reveals 
a highly restrictive, but not barren, landscape for the creation of new programs and 
demonstrates the increased power and influence wielded by APAC.   
Changing Campus Status and Colliding State Fiscal Conditions
UMCP was founded in 1856 to educate and serve Maryland residents, and was 
also designated as a land-grant institution under the federal Morrill Act in 1862. In 
accordance with this legal designation, UMCP is responsible for serving as the 
“statewide center for graduate education and research, and service programs for the 
state” as well as for offering an extensive range of undergraduate and graduate degree 
programs (“Enhancing the College Park Campus,” 1989, p. 2).  
Until 1988, UMCP was one of a five member campus system that received 
upwards of 40% of funding from annual state legislative appropriations.  In 1988, 
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however, the legislature reorganized Maryland’s public higher education sector into a 
13-member system and designated College Park as the “flagship” institution of the 
system (Chapter 246 of MD PL 1988).  The new law aspired to elevate UMCP’s 
reputation to that of a world class research university. The law also promised significant 
funding increases for the campus in order to attain the status enjoyed by universities like 
the University of California, Berkeley and the University of Michigan.  The 1989 
College Park Enhancement Plan authorized such an increase—upwards of $100 million 
over five years—in state appropriations for the campus (“The Flagship Initiative,” 1998, 
p. 2).  
This groundbreaking legislation collided with the beginning of an economic 
recession. Nationally, states were retreating from prior levels of fiscal support for state 
colleges and universities (Breneman & Finney, 1997).  As a result, many state 
institutions were forced to engage in very public defenses of their missions and 
purposes, their cost of “doing business” and in some instances, they had to argue for 
their very survival in front of state legislatures (McClendon & Hearn, 2003; Zumeta, 
1998).  Public officials questioned academic leaders about the cost effectiveness of their 
traditional means of instruction and modes of delivery.  Dougherty (1994) argued that 
during this tumultuous time, higher education suffered from compounding factors, 
including “an acute cost crisis, an increasingly demanding customer base, and an 
erosion of public confidence” (p. 3).
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Higher Education as a Business Enterprise and New Guidelines for Academic 
Policymaking
Against this backdrop of financial scarcity and public scrutiny, higher education 
institutions across the country were both forced (by state governing bodies) to adopt or 
to impose internal auditing processes not unlike those utilized in corporate America 
(Birnbaum, 2000, p.113).  Business practices such as Total Quality Management, 
Business Process Re-engineering, and Strategic Planning all became a part of 
administrative lexicon in higher education.  Colleges and universities now engaged in 
review of academic programs in light of revenue production, cost allocation, and 
consumer demand.  Many institutions were required to present their annual budgets to 
state legislatures in these new frameworks and subsequent budget decisions were based, 
in part, on these reports.  
The state of Maryland, and UMCP, were not immune from the effects of a 
declining economy, a country at war and the budgetary pressures felt by the state. By 
1991, the state had asked the campus to slash the university’s $244 operating budget by 
almost $50 million dollars over a two year time span. The campus’s aspirations outlined 
in the 1988 legislation and its 1989 Enhancement Action Plan were placed on hold.  
During the first half of the 1990s, the state demands and overall poor fiscal climate 
forced the campus to engage in a retrenchment process utilizing the strategic planning 
tools not unlike those discussed above.    
The university undertook the budget cutting process via its bifurcated decision-
making structure for academic programs highlighted in the first section this chapter.  
APAC shouldered the responsibility of analyzing the resource requirements of academic 
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proposals and advising “the provost on budgetary matters affecting the campus’s 
academic sector” (Falk & Miller, 1993, p. 34).  The campus Senate directed another 
assessment of campus academic programs and reported its findings to the President.  
During this budget cutting process, the two decision making streams were 
guided by a set of strategic and operating principles established by the President and the 
Cabinet at the outset of the process.  The events that transpired on campus were public 
and painful (Falk & Miller, 1993).  APAC required campus academic colleges and their 
departments to produce itemized statistics about courses, faculty time, student 
enrollment data, and related cost figures to a central planning committee (“Preserving 
Enhancement,” 1991).  Those academic programs that were termed “weak” based on 
these data were terminated.  Students protested, faculty and staff questioned the 
methods of evaluation during open hearings, and the resulting climate on campus was 
bleak. By winter 1992, the campus Senate had concurred with and approved the 
recommendations rendered by APAC after it conducted its own fact-finding process and 
voted on the matter. In May 1992, seven academic departments, 18 undergraduate 
degree programs, five doctoral programs, and the College of Human Ecology were 
officially cast for elimination.  Some faculty and niche courses were spared and 
absorbed into existing departments or colleges (Falk & Miller, 1993, p. 33).   
The above programmatic and department cuts were approved by the Board of 
Regents and MHEC in June 1992, and were then submitted to the Governor and the 
state legislature.  As Falk and Miller (1993) pointed out, however, the university’s 
position and ultimate direction derived its real strength from the fact that these 
academic program cuts were supported by MHEC, the Board, the Legislature, the 
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Governor—all of whom wanted the “university to reallocate its resources, eliminate 
programs, and take responsibility for its budget” from the outset (p.38).   These entities 
were responsible for and the primary supporters of the original 1998 legislation giving 
UMCP its “flagship” status, and again bolstered the state’s intervening role in campus 
operations and oversight. 
 Strategic Decision Making as Academic Policy Making
In the post-retrenchment environment, the Provost’s authority was more 
concentrated because academic policy making was now a tightly regulated process.  
Academic policymaking was a heavily documented, heavily scrutinized undertaking 
directly tied to the campus’s academic goals and priorities.  These goals and priorities 
were established as a component of the hallmark strategic planning exercises led by the 
Provost from 1994 to 1996.  The official UMCP strategic plan was intended to be the 
“primary planning document” for the campus for the five year period beginning in 1996 
(“Strategic Plan,” 1996, p.1).  
The strategic plan outlined the campus’s strengths and weaknesses, and 
acknowledged the “changing external environmental factors” that have affected and 
should affect decision making on campus (“Strategic Plan,” 1996, p.2).  The document 
outlined five primary initiatives against which new, and review of existing programs, 
would be measured.  The first three initiatives in the plan included:  (a) offering high 
quality education to outstanding undergraduates; (b) building cornerstone programs of 
excellence in graduate education and research; and (c) increasing the university’s 
contribution to society.  These broad areas were intended to tie closely with the 
campus’s traditional purposes of teaching, research, and service.  The final two 
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initiatives, encouraging entrepreneurship and rationalizing resource allocations, were 
explicit acknowledgements that the state’s role in financial support had dwindled and 
was not likely to rebound anytime soon.
The plan embraced the new aspirational mindset and mandated new business 
practices.  It required each department or unit to undergo a college level review using 
“the criteria of quality relative to peers, centrality relative to identified strategies and 
goals, and cost effectiveness relative to the best standards of practice in higher 
education and the private sector” (“Strategic Plan,” 1996, p. 25).  This new process also 
reflected a concentration of authority in which the President and the Provost would 
“work in conjunction with the deans to remove resources from units judged to be less 
central to the university’s strategic objectives, or less effective, or less efficient, and 
assign these resources to units better positioned to achieve excellence” (“Strategic 
Plan,” 1996, p.26).  This process delineated decision-making matters solely to the 
Provost, removed the Senate from the approval process, and strengthened the already 
expansive portfolio of APAC.  
This new policy landscape--with its prescriptive instructions--does not present a 
welcoming environmental outlook for the consideration of new academic programs, 
especially those like the AAS that require broad support and span multiple departments 
and disciplines. The 1996 plan, however, did hint at a possible alternative route for 
programmatic creation.  It authorized the Provost and APAC to address those 
“unanticipated opportunities” that may need special resource allocations. This 
referential authority was given with the caveat that APAC would not engage in a 
process that created an “ad hoc distribution of resources based entirely on the most 
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recent ‘great idea’” (“Strategic Plan,” 1996, p. 25).  It required these types of allocations 
to be in strict congruence with the goals and priorities outlined in the five initiatives, to 
follow the process and scrutiny of the normal academic approval process, and to not 
exceed an allocation request beyond those in the Provost’s budget for special 
allocations. 
In sum, the fiscal upheaval of the late 1980s and early 1990s proved to be a 
watershed moment for re-crafting the mission and the structure governing academic 
policymaking at UMCP.  This era culminated with the enactment of the 1996 strategic 
plan which became the paramount tool for campus academic policy making.  New 
programs and proposed changes to existing programs remained under the approval 
purview of both the campus Senate and APAC, although the Provost and APAC now
held more discretionary powers.  And, perhaps most importantly, the goals and 
priorities outlined in the campus plan now served as the framework in which these 
decisions would play out.
Adopting New Academic Programs:  An Era of “Diversity” and the Advent of an 
Asian American Undergraduate Presence on Campus
The previous sections shed light on the following relevant contextual streams:  
(a) the procedural paths for consideration of new academic programs; and (b) the 
relevant organizational forces and factors shaping these decision processes in the early 
1990s.  The policy context also encompasses factors shaping the nature of the issue 
under consideration.  The issue stream in this case assesses the organizational policy 
history regarding the issue of “diversity” and the campus-wide climate for considering 
matters of diversity at UMCP.  This section includes a review of significant past policy 
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actions regarding race and ethnicity on campus, and highlights the pertinent climate 
issues for APA students and situates them within the larger campus environment.  
Specifically, this review identifies the issue-related case antecedents as:  (a) the 
coalescing issues for APA students; and (b) the earliest discussions about AAS courses 
on campus. 
The Antecedents of Diversity:  Legal Mandates and Evolving Institutional Policies
Over the past 100 years, women and students of color have struggled for 
entrance, voice, and academic support at UMCP.  Although women enrolled at UMCP 
as early as 1916, the first African American undergraduate did not enroll until 1951 and 
only after a state judge ordered the campus to admit him (“Diversity Timeline,” 1997, p. 
1). Although the campus was legally desegregated in 1954, it was not until after a 1969 
U.S. Office of Civil Rights desegregation directive that African Americans were 
enrolled in considerable numbers. Even after this court intervention, UMCP remained 
for the most part, a segregated, predominantly White institution both statistically and 
culturally (“The Value of Diversity,” 1997, pp. 2-3).  During the 1970s, the 
administration undertook small measures to ensure equitable treatment for students, 
faculty and staff of color.  For example, the President’s Commission on Ethnic Minority 
Issues was created in the early 1970s to monitor the campus racial climate.  The Human 
Relations Code (1976) was enacted as a means to codify the campus’s procedures to 
ensure non-discriminatory practices on the basis of race, color, creed, sex, marital 
status, age, national origin, political affiliation, physical or mental disability (“Diversity 
Timeline,” 1997, p. 2).  
By 1991, almost 25 university commissions, committees, campus offices, and 
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over 70 student organizations had been established, all in some way encompassed the 
issue of campus diversity and the concerns of students of color.  This new found 
attention to diversity issues on campus marked the culmination of an era of official 
campus committees and reports that addressed not only the issues related to African 
American undergraduates, but also the broader, emerging concept of “diversity”(See 
Appendix F:  Summary of UMCP Diversity related Commissions, Committees and 
Task Forces).
The Language of Diversity:  a Public Proclamation and a New Campus-wide 
Agenda
Broad, public declarations about diversity are directly traceable to Chancellor 
John Slaughter’s 1984 remarks challenging the campus to become a “model multi-
racial, multi-cultural, and multi-generational” institution (“The Value of Diversity,” 
1997, p. 7).  This proclamation is important for two reasons.  First, it catapulted the 
status of diversity to one of campus wide concern.  Second, it presented diversity not 
solely as a matter of an admissions response to external legal mandates, but rather as a 
value tied directly to the core of the campus’s institutional mission and purpose.
 A few years later, a campus Senate ad hoc committee released its study on the 
quality of undergraduate education.  The report, Promises to Keep: The College Park 
Plan for Undergraduate Education (1987), embraced the Chancellor’s earlier challenge 
and recommended that all undergraduates be required to take one course focused on 
either “the history, status, treatment, or accomplishments of women or minority groups 
and subcultures; or cultural areas outside North America and Western Europe” (p.3).  
Shortly thereafter, the President’s Committee on Undergraduate Women’s Education 
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(1988) issued its own declaration and findings about the need to transform the 
curriculum and overall campus climate for female students (“Making a 
Difference,”1988).  The work of this committee resulted in the campus-wide 
Transformation of the Curriculum Project (1989) and the creation of guidelines for 
inclusive language in all university publications (“The Value of Diversity,” 1997, p. 6).
In spite of these apparent institutional policy advancements, subsequent state 
agency and university-wide plans still stressed issues relevant primarily to academic 
enrollment and not necessarily academic attainment.  For example, the 1989 Enhancing 
the College Park Campus: an Action Plan included stated objectives such as to 
“provide opportunities for minorities and other groups that have not been well served by 
higher education in the past” and numerical targets for increases in student enrollments 
(p. 10).  Specifically, the campus sought to increase the financial reward of its Banneker 
scholarships and increase the enrollment of African American undergraduates from 
9.7% to above 12% (p. 15).   Similarly, the Board of Regents approved a policy to 
require the campus to ensure that “women and minorities are equitably represented 
among the student body...so that the university reflects the diversity of the state’s 
population” (“Policy on Affirmative Action,” 1989, 1995).  
Internally, the campus administration continued to grapple with student 
enrollment and the bigger issue of retaining African American students.  Under the 
federally mandated campus desegregation/affirmative action plan, UMCP had achieved 
relative success with increasing African American undergraduate student enrollment but 
failed to graduate these students at the same rate as their white counterparts.  In the fall 
of 1989, the campus issued Access is Not Enough:  A Report to the President 
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Concerning Opportunities for Blacks at the University of Maryland, which sought not 
only to outline objectives for improving the academic conditions for African American 
undergraduates but also to improve the overall campus climate for these students, 
faculty and staff (1989, p.5) .  
These internal attempts to address these issues were simultaneously consumed 
by external policy challenges.  No struggle would prove a greater test of administrative 
commitment to diversity than the legal challenge to the campus’s Banneker Scholarship 
program in 1991 (Informants 08, 011, 013, 015).  Banneker was a small program, but a 
critical step in mending the institution’s poor reputation in attracting and retaining 
African American students.  The original federal lawsuit and subsequent ruling 
dismantled the scholarship program on the grounds that UMCP could not sufficiently 
prove the existence of “present effects of past discrimination”— i.e., poor reputation 
within the African American community; an under representation in African American 
enrollment; a low retention and graduation rate for African Americans; and a “chilly” 
campus climate.   Like other lawsuits challenging affirmative action, UCMP adopted a 
morally and philosophically sound but ultimately legally devastating stance that its 
structure and criteria for scholarship awards were established on what it believed were 
legitimate and defensible present effects. (Podberesky v. Kirwan, 1994 38 F.3d 147).
There was a pivotal organizational by-product in this public protracted four year 
legal battle.  Diversity as a term of art and institutional priority slowly was working its 
way into the fabric of campus culture (Informants 08, 011, 013, 015, 018, 023). 
Diversity and its accompanying importance to the institution’s future were especially 
embraced by then President Brit Kirwan.  Kirwan was the first campus president to 
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declare diversity as a shared campus value.  To this end, the president believed that the 
university should be measured, recognized and rewarded for its commitment to 
diversity (Kirwan, 1989, 1993). 
During this time period, the campus also witnessed a slow-building, but 
ultimately significant transformation in the racial and ethnic composition of its 
undergraduate student body. From 1990 to 1993, the enrollment of other 
underrepresented populations increased.  For example, Asian American undergraduates 
increased from 7.6% to 13.7% and Latino undergraduate enrollment increased from 
2.5% to 4% (AHNA ask Force Report, 1995, p. 34).   These demographic shifts in the 
undergraduate population had begun to influence the traditional mode of thinking about 
race and ethnicity on campus, and the types of policies and programs available for 
students of color. 
For example, the Diversity Initiative began in 1986 as a small day long program 
called “multicultural day” run by the Office of Human Relations Programs (OHRP).  
The original purpose of the event was to “build a more inclusive community grounded 
in respect of differences based on age, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, disability, sexual 
orientation, class, marital status, political affiliation, or national origin…by encouraging 
and facilitating a more sensitive and welcoming environment through programs and on-
going projects” (“Diversity Initiative Mission Statement,” 1994).  By 1991, OHRP had 
expanded its day-long event into a “diversity week” in order to accommodate the 
demand for programs and events.  In 1993, the Diversity Initiative received an annual 
allocation from the Office of the President to sustain itself as an ongoing project run by 
the OHRP as well as receiving external foundation funding to expand its efforts.  
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University officials and official committee reports continued to view diversity as 
a touchstone component of campus planning and programming.  By 1991, the campus 
had fully implemented the Pease Report (1987) recommendation of a general education 
requirement in the area of diversity for all undergraduates (CORE Diversity). The 
campus Human Relations Code was amended in 1992 to include sexual orientation as 
one of the campus’s protected categories.  Around the same time, the campus Senate 
passed a number of resolutions recommending that the Board of Regents examine the 
possibility of extending faculty and staff benefits to domestic partners. 
In 1995, the campus outlined a two level definition of “diversity.”  The campus 
defined diversity as:  
…otherness or those human qualities that are different from our own and outside 
the groups to which we belong, yet are present in other individuals or 
groups….Primary dimensions are the following:  age, ethnicity, general physical 
abilities/qualities, race and sexual orientation.  Secondary dimensions are those 
that can be changed, and include but are not limited to: educational background, 
geographic location, income, marital status, military experience, parental status, 
religious beliefs, and work experiences.” (“University of Maryland Definition of 
Diversity,” 1995).
At the same time, the university instituted a requirement that each campus unit, 
department, and individual college file a Diversity Accountability and Implementation 
Plan (DAIP).  The intent of DAIPs is to allow each unit or department to determine how 
it can best assist the campus in achieving its diversity goals.  This outline requires units 
to detail their program support and activities during an academic year.  Each DAIP is 
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ultimately reviewed and approved by the Office of the Provost (“DAIPs at UMCP,” 
1999, p.1).  
Both the policy and procedural changes outlined above represent a substantive 
cultural shift regarding diversity on campus.  This evolution may be attributed in part to 
changing demographics but also to the willingness of campus leadership, notably 
President Kirwan and the Provost (1993-1996), to accept diversity as a cause worth 
embracing.  The Provost was hired specifically to take the charge of increasing minority 
participation on campus (Choudhury, 1995, p. 3). The Provost also spearheaded the 18-
month strategic planning process that produced a report issued in July 1996.  
In addition to the fiscal realities noted earlier, the 1996 Strategic Plan 
highlighted “diversity” as a campus value and an integral part of the fabric of 
undergraduate education.  The report acknowledged the importance of the changing 
student demographics on campus and the leadership role the campus assumed through 
its “commitment to diversity and the transformation of curriculum to address issues and 
new scholarship relating to women and our multi-cultural heritage” (“Strategic Plan, 
1996, p. 4). The plan called on faculty and staff to maintain the “inclusive campus 
environment” as a means to prepare students for success in a “global society,” by 
providing an innovative, culturally inclusive, and technologically advanced curriculum 
for undergraduates (“Strategic Plan,” 1996, p. 8).  Specifically, this provision authorized 
the Provost’s office to provide incentives for faculty and units who created academic 
curricula to address this goal and simultaneously increased the number of students of 
color participating in these programs.
During this same time period, the President appointed the first campus-wide 
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Task Force to address issues of concern to Asian, Latino, and Native American 
populations on campus.  The 1995 Asian, Hispanic, and Native American Task Force 
Report resulted from two years of committee work, which included compiling statistics 
on student, staff, and faculty recruitment, retention, financial support, and 
compensation.  The Task Force also sought to provide a picture drawn from student, 
faculty, and staff focus group interviews of the overall campus climate in terms of 
quality of life and working environment for these groups. The Task Force ordered these 
qualitative findings in a three level framework of organizational progress devised by the 
University of California, Berkeley (1991):  diversity as an option; diversity as separate 
enclaves; and diversity as mutual enhancement.  Generally, the conclusions reached 
mirrored those found in earlier campus reports for African Americans.  These 
conclusions included campus deficiencies in the recruitment, retention, and graduation 
of Asian American, Latino, and Native American students as well as the findings of a 
generally isolating climate for these students (pp. 60-61).
The Task Force report cited the lack of academic offerings in Asian culture as 
the most relevant finding with implications for the future of an AAS program. It 
specifically recommended the following:  “Expand curricula throughout UMCP to 
include courses that expose the UMCP community to the experiences of 
Asian…American people” (p. 8).  In this respect, the Task Force recommendations 
elevated any potential for serious consideration of an AAS program as it vaulted the 
need for AAS course offerings from a priority for the Asian American student 
community into an official campus-wide sphere of academic policy making. 
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 The Asian American Community, Coalescing Issues, and AAS Curricular Seeds
Thus far, this section has conveyed UMCP’s historical legacy and entrenched 
environment for diversity issues, particularly those affecting African American 
students.  It reveals that campus diversity held increasingly important implications as it 
related to institutional mission, administrative procedures, academic policy, and student 
support services. In addition, it portends a vital connection between the increased power 
and authority of the Provost and the inclusion of “diversity” as a stated goal of campus 
strategic planning.  But how did issues of importance to the APA community fit within 
this dynamic campus climate?  The following section situates and connects issues 
pertinent to the APA community during the latter period of this diversity “awakening” 
on campus. 
By fall 1992, Asian American undergraduate enrollment reached an all-time 
high of 15.9% of the overall student population. Although Asian American student 
numbers were on the rise, student organizations mirrored the vast diversity within the 
Asian American student population.  The primary problem for APA undergraduates was 
the lack of a central student organization.  Students gathered by their national and ethnic 
heritages.  This decentralization left six separate student organizations without a 
streamlined way to advocate issues of importance before the administration or to gain 
access to the limited, but not insignificant financial resources available to campus 
student groups through the Office of Campus Programs. Finding guidance and 
mentoring among staff and faculty also was an issue for Asian American students.  Both 
Student Affairs and Academic Affairs (specifically the Office of Multi-Ethnic Student 
Education or OMSE) did not maintain APA staff, and there were only two Asian 
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American administrators above the university’s director level (AHNA Task Force 
Report, Informant 006). In this respect, there were only a few obvious authoritative 
channels to which students could turn or to have their grievances heard. 
Against this backdrop, student leaders from the various Asian American student 
organizations began working with staff from OHRP and a few graduate students to find 
a way to form a formal umbrella organization.  The first step was inviting an assistant to 
UC Berkeley’s Chancellor to speak to Asian American students about forming an Asian 
Student Union.  Shortly thereafter, undergraduate students founded the first Asian 
Student Union (ASU) under the guidance of OHRP staff and a few graduate students. 
The initial purpose of the ASU was to provide a “forum for issues concerning Asian 
students and to provide Asian students with experience in leadership and organization 
skills” (“ASU Overview Pamphlet,” 1991; “History of the ASU,” 2001).  
ASU leaders called for a meeting with the President as one of their first actions.  
The goal of the meeting was to introduce the organization to campus leadership at the 
most senior level and present two primary matters of concern within the Asian 
American undergraduate community (“Letter to Kirwan,” 1991, p. 1).  The first area of 
concern was to engage the broader campus in deconstructing the pervasive myth of the 
“model minority,” or the stereotype that Asian American students assimilate and 
achieve to a higher degree than their counterparts (“ASU Pamphlet,” 1991).  The 
second area of concern was the absence of representative staff support for Asian 
American students both in academic and student affairs.  Around the same time, the 
ASU began publishing the Asian Voice (now the PublicAsian), a newspaper for the 
Asian American community on campus, as a means to raise the profile of the 
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community and support its efforts (Informants 03, 09, 021).
Annual leadership retreats were yet another example of a coalescing step for the 
APA student community following the initial milestone of forming the ASU. Beginning 
in 1991, graduate students coordinated summer leadership institutes for ASU leaders.  
The goals of these early meetings were to provide students with organizing skills as 
well as to educate students about Asian American history, the national Asian American 
Studies movement, and priorities for campus advocacy.  These priorities continued to be 
hiring staff in academic and student affairs support roles,  developing course offerings 
in Asian American Studies, and combating what was generally perceived as an 
unwelcoming campus climate for Asian Americans in which stereotypes were pervasive 
(“History of the ASU,” 2001). 
By the 1993-1994 academic year, the ASU was officially recognized as an 
umbrella organization by the six Asian American student groups on campus.  
Meanwhile, faculty, staff and graduate students—primarily the same staff involved in 
guiding the newly founded ASU—formed the Asian Faculty, Staff, and Graduate 
Association (AFSGA).  Through this new organization, group members began to 
exchange ideas about the potential for academic offerings in the burgeoning field of 
Asian American Studies.  AFSGA is viewed as the small, but nevertheless, critical 
nexus for the earliest discussions of the AAS (Informants 03, 06, 018).
Professor Shirley Hune, now a faculty member in the AAS Department at the 
University of California, Los Angeles and then an adjunct faculty member at UMCP, 
taught the first Asian American Studies course in the late 1970s.  The course was 
offered through the American Studies Department but was not continued primarily 
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because of a low enrollment (Informant 018). Formal interest did not regain momentum 
until the early 1990s when AFSGA was formed, and faculty led by the Assistant Dean 
for Undergraduate Studies Bonnie Oh created a small working group. In September 
1993, this group presented a letter to the Provost requesting approval and fiscal 
allocation for a three credit course entitled “The Asian American Experience.”  
Administrators, however, declined funding for the course and administrative changes in 
the Undergraduate Studies Dean’s office left this small group of APA faculty and staff 
with a fizzled out opportunity to begin teaching AAS curriculum on camps.     
In spite of this setback, the 1994-1995 academic year proved to be a turning 
point for the launch of the AAS at UMCP.  ASU students and interested faculty still 
worked “behind the scenes” to push for funding of this initial course (“History of Asian 
American Studies,” 2001).  And as noted in Chapter Two of this study, almost one-third 
of AAS programs nationwide came into existence in the early 1990s so the movement at 
UMCP did not occur in isolation.  In fact, many of these students maintained contact 
and consultation with students and faculty working at other institutions that either had 
established or were working to establish such programs (Informants 03, 06, 018).  For 
example, UMCP ASU members held a fast and vigil in support of Northwestern 
University students working for a program during the year (Choudhury, 1995, p.1; 
“History of the ASU,” 2001). And as the next chapter explains, these networks and 
expert information sources would provide a useful resource for students, faculty, and 
staff as they advocated for the AAS program on campus. 
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Summary of Key Contextual Precursors of the Policy Landscape 
This chapter sought to explain the central facets of the decision making structure 
and issue environment preceding the development of the AAS program at UMCP.  The 
first contextual dimension includes the formal decision making channels, which 
consider and approve new academic programs on campus. This section highlighted 
those institutional governing bodies and authorities which have purview over such 
decisions.  These include the President, the Provost and APAC, the University Senate, 
college deans, department units, and respective PCCs.  External to the campus, these 
oversight bodies include the system Board of Regents and MHEC.  
The purpose of examining the official campus policy structure was not only to 
understand the formal channels and paths of academic decision making, but also to
draw an analytic distinction between these formal channels and the informal norms and 
habits of organizational decision making.  The analysis of these organizational norms 
also defined the potential targets of actors’ influence efforts in the policy process.  
These potential targets of influence include the President, Provost and APAC and the 
Office of the Dean for Undergraduate Studies.  
The second contextual dimension illustrated changes in academic planning on 
campus which preceded the AAS program creation. This section revealed how 
budgetary conditions resulted in an overall campus climate of restraint and scrutiny 
around academic funding, and again revealed the authoritative range of the Provost. 
This discussion also highlighted the 1996 Strategic Plan which would serve as a guiding 
document for tying academic priorities and decisions to controlled budgets.  Notation of 
this plan is significant for two reasons:  it reveals a funding opportunity for new 
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academic programs such as the AAS, and again reveals the Provost’s Office as a target 
of influence for policy actors as well as a potential arena for policy conflict.     
The third dimension of the policy context is the preexisting policy climate 
surrounding the issue of diversity at UMCP.  This dimension includes the campus 
legacy of discrimination, especially those policies directed at African American 
students; and the incorporation of diversity into the fabric of campus culture, 
particularly in public rhetoric, administrative commitment, and programmatic support. 
Most important to this case, this analysis demonstrates an organizational precedent and 
a willingness by authorities to consider policies targeting diversity issues.
The last contextual dimension situates and connects the nature of the policy 
environment to the issues in the emerging campus APA community.  This review 
identified those actors who appeared willing to advocate for an AAS program, and at 
the same time, also identified key triggering events and coalescing activities by APA 
students, faculty, and staff.  These events included APA faculty, staff and student 
efforts to organize the APA community on campus, outreach to various campus 
constituencies including administrators and the media, and official campus recognition 
of academic and administrative deficits relative to the APA community.  
In this respect, examining the issues percolating within the APA community on 
campus offered insight about the potential dynamics of the policy process that lie ahead. 
First, this analysis illuminated the small, but committed coalition of partisans working 
to raise the profile of the emerging APA student population within the broader campus 
community.  Second, in spite of the newness of the ASU and AFSGA, it revealed
actors’ organization skills and expertise in educating their own members about the 
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policy goals of their community.  Last, this analysis shed light on the eventual policy 
goal of bringing an AAS program to campus that approximated those found on 
campuses across the country.  
In sum, arraying these data has provided an analytic explanation of the factors 
that shaped the policy structure within which actors would advocate for the adoption of 
the AAS program.  The next chapter, then, presents case findings in the other constructs 
of the conceptual framework.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS
This chapter presents the findings of the case study of the policymaking process 
resulting in the adoption of the Asian American Studies (AAS) program at the 
University of Maryland, College Park (UMCP). Building on the contextual factors that 
shaped the landscape of future policy decision making arrayed in Chapter Four, this 
chapter presents findings in accordance with the other process-focused constructs of the 
conceptual framework. This chapter begins by analyzing  central policy actors, their 
goals and resources. This chapter explains the various influence strategies and tactics 
these actors utilized in order to shape the policy outcome.  These dynamics are captured 
within two phases of the policy process:  interest articulation and legislative 
transformation.  Finally, this chapter interprets actor influence on the policy outcome 
based on study data, and offers an analysis of the relevant actor resources and 
successful strategies used to influence the policy outcome.  
As in Chapter Four, policy actor identities were a matter of public record.  Thus, 
actors are identified by name and their actions in the policy process are described in 
documents and interviews.  However, names of informants remain anonymous and 
informant quotes are referenced solely by numerical code.
Policy Actors, Goals, and Resources
As defined in the conceptual framework, policy actors are those individuals or 
groups who advocate their policy goals and ideas in the various stages of the decision 
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making process.  Pfeffer (1981) recommends that these actors be grouped according to 
their policy positions and shared goals.  Specifically, authorities are defined as “those 
people in the organization that make binding decisions for the group,” partisans are 
defined as those “in the organization that are significantly affected by the decisions.”  
Often, policy actors coalesce or conflict because of their policy goals, or their 
respective rationales and motivations for seeking policy changes and desired policy 
outcomes. All actors possess resources, some means by which they could influence the 
policy outcome. 
Actors may fade in and out of the decision making process, depending on the 
content of the contest, their interest, and overall desire to shape the outcome.  In this 
particular case study, three small, but critical groups of actors—proponents, opponents, 
and authorities—remained vested in the policy outcome and therefore were central to 
the policy process throughout its duration.  The following section arrays case study 
findings regarding these groups of actors, their goals and their resources. 
Partisan Proponents
In the early 1990s, a small group of untenured female faculty and staff, along 
with a few CAPS graduate students, formed the Asian Faculty, Staff and Graduate 
Student Association (AFSGA).  Group members included OHRP associate director 
Gloria Bouis, WMST professor Seung-kyung Kim, ENGL professor Sangeeta Ray, and 
CAPS graduate assistant William Liu.  AFSGA served as the main venue for the first 
organized discussions about AAS course offerings at UMCP.  This same group of 
faculty and staff members, led by then Assistant UGST Dean Bonnie Oh, initiated and 
formed the Asian American Project in 1993.  Administrative memorandum identifies 
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faculty held positions in three different departments (two from Arts & Humanities, and 
one from the Behavioral Sciences), and “represented the Asian-American Project 
Committee” (Administrative memorandum, September 13, 1993).  Informant data 
suggest that the same AFSGA faculty and staff members:
…met and talked on an on-going basis back then (Informant 018).
…had discussions about a potential course offering [that] involved others from 
various departments around campus (Informant 06).  
Additional informant interviews confirm that these faculty and staff were central 
actors in the earliest discussions about bringing AAS courses to campus (Informants 03, 
08, 010, 013, 014, 015, 018).  
A few graduate students also held membership in AFSGA.  For example, Asian 
American CAPS doctoral students Alvin Alvarez and William Liu worked closely with 
undergraduate students in an advisory capacity and assisted in the formation of the 
undergraduate Asian Student Union (ASU, later renamed the AASU or Asian American 
Student Union).  The AASU served as the umbrella organization for all undergraduate 
Asian cultural groups on campus.  Like AFSGA, the AASU was led by a small core 
group of students, including Wendy Wang and future AASU President Christina 
Lagdameo, who eventually formed Working for an Asian American Studies Program 
(WAASP), an alliance dedicated to advocating for an AAS program on campus.  
In sum, documents and informant data suggest that a small group initiated the 
AAS program (“AAS Timeline,” Informants 01, 02, 03, 06, 010, 013, 018, 027).  This 
group included Drs. Kim and Ray, graduate student William Liu, and two AASU 
undergraduate leaders, Wendy Wang and Christina Lagdameo.  All individuals 
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remained fully engaged as central actors in the proponent advocacy process, with the 
exception of Wang who graduated prior to the creation of the AAS Program. 
Partisan Proponent Goals
Leading up to the 1995 academic year, data confirm partisan proponents
maintained two interrelated goals.  The first goal was to increase the public profile of 
the APA community and raise the campus conscience regarding the issues of 
importance to APA students, including combating the perpetuation of the “model 
minority” stereotype. Undergraduate students created the AASU to “provide a forum for 
issues concerning Asian students” as well as to provide an organization through which 
they could “express their academic, social and political concerns” (AASU flyer, 1991).  
As two study participants recalled:
…[students were] interested in gaining visibility…[they] knew there were 
stereotypes out there about APA students…[they] began to push for greater 
understanding of the APA community…(Informant 09)
…the “model minority” issue was big, [students were] really trying to battle 
this, especially at Maryland, and then just getting new images out there, getting 
our face in front of administrators, and letting them know we had issues with 
academic and student services. (Informant 017)
For faculty and staff, this first goal included educating APA undergraduate 
leaders about their own histories and connections to APA student communities across 
U.S. campuses and to develop a voice on campus.  As informants recalled:
…we would chat about issues generally, what students needed, and where things 
were going, how we could ultimately establish an AAS program, but this was 
far, far off at this point. …so it was small steps to be seen on campus. 
(Informant 03)  
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…the group [was founded on] getting students to understand that they had a 
voice [on campus]…even then the goal was to articulate some of the issues like 
the model minority stereotype and the old black/white paradigm on campus, and 
the [demographic]numbers were reflecting this change…(Informant 06)  
The second goal was to promote AAS studies and courses with strong curricular 
ties to the liberal arts and to comparable programs already in existence across the 
country. The content design, crafted primarily by AAS Project Coordinator WMST 
Assistant Professor Seung-kyung Kim and graduate assistant William Liu, drew from 
the traditional ethnic studies roots held by most AAS programs in existence at the time 
as well as the AAS course taught on the UMCP campus.  The words of one informant 
capture the prevalent view: 
…there was a philosophy on where the program should go, what was focused on 
really came from that orientation, that philosophy, ethnic studies, and this is 
what students wanted. (Informant 021)
In this respect, the first proposal submitted by the AAS project staff in 
December 1995 embraced this philosophical tie to ethnic studies held by AAS programs 
around the country.  This first proposal sought a significant budget as a means to 
support an undergraduate certificate program in AAS.  This request stood as a sizeable 
increase from the current course by course structure.  It outlined new faculty positions 
to teach courses in the program, annual funding for those lines, and the appointment of 
a permanent director to oversee the program (AAS Proposal, December 5, 1995).  
Partisan Proponent Resources
Data point to a number of key partisan proponent resources.  These resources 
were both contextual intangibles—or environmental factors that shaped the framing of 
APA issues and served to bolster arguments for an AAS program in public arenas—as 
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well as personal characteristics or qualities possessed by group members that bolstered
the quality and credibility of their advocacy attempts in administrative and academic 
circles.   
 The first contextual intangible included proponents’ keen understanding of the 
demographic changes occurring on campus and their connection to campus priorities. 
As noted in Chapter Four, the Asian American undergraduate student population at 
UMCP began to surge in the early 1990s.  By 1993, Asian American students 
comprised over 14% of the overall undergraduate population.  Programmatic, academic, 
and administrative infrastructures to support this new group of students on campus did 
not keep pace. Two informants recounted: 
…at the time, really, “all things Asian”—the Asian curriculum in general—was 
ignored on this campus and discriminated against as a result—no funding, no 
attention, so it was only a matter of time before it surfaced to the point of action 
given student population shifts and curricular demands coming from students, so 
the window so to speak was really wide open for folks to shake it up and get 
what they were due. (Informant 023)
…we saw the numbers rising, we knew we were getting organized, but nothing 
was being done by administrators in terms of support or courses…we had 
nobody at OMSE, nobody of significance in the administrative ranks…and yet 
they [administrators] always seemed ready to point out our [APA students] 
value in public comments about diversity, like the diversity week, admissions, 
the uniqueness of the campus….we were a part of that ‘pitch’ for them.
(Informant 09)  
The surge in APA student population in combination with an absence of campus 
support holds more potency if situated within broader campus issue agendas and efforts 
around diversity in the early to mid 1990s outlined in Chapter Four.  For example, due 
to legal and demographic factors, the campus historically considered matters of 
diversity in relation to the African American student population.  But beginning in the 
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late 1980s, the campus administration had begun to formulate its academic plans and 
programming in support of a broader notion of cultural diversity.  This planning and 
programming included the work of academic committees, campus-wide strategic 
planning processes, and the advent of diversity programming within the Office of 
Human Relations Programs (OHRP) noted in Chapter Four of this study.  
Thus, diversity was the new touchstone of both campus planning and academic 
mission. The campus supported new programming efforts such as Diversity Week and 
empowered the Provost to fund innovative academic programs that met campus 
diversity goals (1996 Strategic Plan). Likewise, campus reports throughout the late 
1980s and early 1990s had urged the campus not only to recruit students of color, but 
also to provide the infrastructure to create a welcoming campus climate as one means to 
ensure successful retention and graduation.  By 1993, the Office of the President had 
taken steps to address formally the issues of concern to students of color, most notably 
with the formation and report of the AHNA Task Force.  In this regard, the campus’s 
new found commitment to students of color and related academic programs left 
administrators little room for public or programmatic missteps with issues surrounding 
student diversity.   As one proximate observer noted:
…look at the Diversity Initiative and the Strategic Plan as well as the 
recommendations of the AHNA [Task Force]…it is directly correlated to the 
substance of something like an AAS curriculum, so the administration would 
have little choice, really in a public sense, and be foolish, not to respond to a 
demand for it. (Informant 023) 
The second contextual resource was the continuous academic and administrative 
change in the 1990s.  This tumultuous time period ushered in a new Provost and seven 
new academic deans, all of whom possessed some ability to earmark money toward new 
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and innovative academic curriculum based on campus plans and priorities.  Partisan 
proponents, who could have viewed these changes as an obstacle to their advocacy 
efforts, instead saw value in these shifts.  For example, these administrative changes 
afforded proponents opportunities to build networks and support, and time to gain an 
expertise in the procedural workings of campus.  Three informants recalled the 
opportunities (as well as the frustrations) this administrative flux created:
…I knew in some respects we would have to keep at it, with all the change, but 
it also gave us a chance to develop solid contacts with those who could help out, 
the ‘friendly voices’ so to speak, and keep the lines of communication 
open…(Informant 018) 
…students come and go every four years, so if the program was going to grow 
and succeed, it had to have committed faculty and staff behind it, to get it out to 
faculty, find broader support for it, and a home so to speak, or college, to push it 
along through all the change happening…because there were clearly [academic] 
administrators who did not have it as a top priority, or even on their radar screen 
because of the constant administrative changes…(Informant 013) 
…it was kind of frustrating at times to feel like there were administrators out 
there who didn’t have a clue about what we were talking about, or what we 
needed to do, or what to do with us for that matter….I mean, I got it that they 
might have bigger campus decisions to make then this one because they were 
new to campus…but we had been working the Diamondback, the SGA, OMSE 
for what seemed like years at this point…so we worked this angle…we became 
sort of the keepers of the information on the AAS…I think we learned how to 
appear as the “go to” people for how this thing should move forward (Informant 
04)         
Partisan proponents also possessed valuable personal resources. First, although 
small in numbers and new to campus, partisan proponents possessed external 
connections which could propel their organizing efforts at UMCP. APA faculty, staff 
and graduate students maintained relationships with faculty and staff at UC Berkeley, 
UCLA, University of Colorado, Cornell, Columbia, Northwestern, Stanford, University 
of Illinois, and the University of Pennsylvania (Informants 01, 02, 03, 06, 012, 018, 
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026).  These institutions had established or were working to establish AAS programs at 
the time.  This informal network was bolstered by similar connections within AAS 
national associations as well as APA associations.  As two informants recollected:
…we were curious as to how other campuses had made these programs 
happen…so we reached out to these folks, chatted them up, and invited them to 
come speak at conferences on campus at the time. (Informant 03) 
…had APA friends on other campuses…they were doing the same things as we 
were at Maryland.  We could talk and exchange experiences.  Plus, we held our 
own conferences here at Maryland, and sent students to the national ones 
[conferences].  This was just good networking for us. (Informant 02) 
 In addition to these network streams, AFSGA members could call upon their 
relationships with AAS experts who resided in the Washington, D.C. area including 
adjunct faculty employed in the government and nonprofit sectors (Informants 01, 05, 
028).  
A second key personal resource shared among faculty, staff and graduate 
students was a common background in working on APA issues on other college 
campuses.  In particular, the majority of these individuals gained their experience with 
APA issues on California campuses.  These experiences ranged from forming APA 
student and faculty organizations to all out efforts to launch AAS courses and programs.  
As several informants put it: 
…[people] used [their] experience to begin to be visionary about what were the 
important issues…and students were very interested in gaining visibility and 
beginning to see what was happening around the country, particularly in 
California…they saw that we were way behind, but we had the numbers [of 
students], the critical mass to lobby for social change… (Informant 06)
…[an individual] had done this stuff in California, the AAS and ethnic studies 
programs, so [she/he] knew we could do it here…we had the interest and a great 
group of students. (Informant 003)
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…[one of the group members] was a part of student efforts a few years ago, so 
[she/he] was familiar with the whole grassroots thing. (Informant 002)
…[some people] have a background in grassroots organizing and these issues, so 
it was like second nature really. (Informant 018) 
Data suggest the third personal resource possessed by group members was their 
unified, steadfast commitment to advancing the AAS curriculum even in the face of 
institutional and opponent challenges to their overall policy goal.  As two study 
informant explained: 
…the biggest resource for us besides the [APA] numbers was a very articulate, 
very determined, and very active AA student body…unification, and more 
importantly, absolute dedication, was central to achieving our goals at the time.
(Informant 03) 
…we were all committed to working on a few key matters, working 
together….so we had these critical kinds of circles, arenas, where we were 
collectively pushing and the population continued to climb as well…you need 
these allies that can support you through thick and thin…especially through the 
tumult of pushing this program at Maryland. (Informant 018)
One graduate student, William Liu, and one undergraduate student, Christina 
Lagdameo, played proximate and consistent roles in interest articulation.  Liu served as 
the graduate assistant to AAS project under WMST Professor Seung-kyung Kim 
(Informants 03, 018, 027; “AASP Introductory Syllabus,” 1996).  Liu also served as an 
advisor to the ASU and WAASP, and organized leadership retreats for undergraduate 
student leaders, which helped develop and sustain a level of  unification among partisan 
proponents.   Similarly, Lagdameo gained a solid understanding of the field of AAS 
from working closely with both the AAS project staff and by taking AAS courses.  Both 
individuals reportedly maintained an unflagging commitment to establishing a campus 
AAS program and later served on the Provost’s Task Force (Informants 03, 06, 07, 010, 
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012, 013, 027).  And like their faculty counterparts, these students were viewed by both 
faculty and administrative informants as articulate, serious and committed to their belief 
in an AAS program with strong ties to traditional ethnic studies curriculums (Informants 
03, 06, 08, 012, 013,018, 022). 
Partisan Opponents
Although various actors opposed the AAS program, a group of four tenured 
male faculty members, two of whom were Asian American, actively opposed the AAS 
program proposal.  Primary documents and informant data identified Director of the 
Honors Program and English Professor Sandy Mack, Microbiology Professor Robert 
Yuan, Entomology Professor Michael Ma, and East Asian Languages Chair Robert 
Ramsey as vocal opponents to the AAS program (Informants 03, 06, 08, 010, 012, 017, 
018, 026, 027; Administrative memorandum, December 6, 1996). 
Partisan Opponent Goals
Partisan opponents expressed their opposition to the goals of the AAS program 
prior to the Task Force creation in 1997, and later during the Task Force deliberations. 
These faculty members never opposed the AAS program outright.  Instead, these faculty 
opponents expressed two concerns with the proposed program content.  The first 
concern was that the liberal arts orientation was too parochial and short-term in its 
thinking.  The second concern was that this traditional orientation was too academically 
“thin.” As one informant recalled, opposing faculty believed the proposed program and 
current AAS project faculty focus was “too narrow for this campus, that ‘we have the 
potential to do something ground breaking here, not just the same old ‘victims’ studies 
programs’” (Informant 012).  Another informant recalled that opponents believed that 
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an AAS program: 
…needed to reach out to other segments of the campus beyond the arts & 
humanities…needed some courses from the sciences.  This is a sciences campus. 
(Informant 010)
Thus, opponent faculty members’ overarching goal comprised two 
interconnected aims: first, prevent the AAS project faculty and WAASP students from 
designing a program that drew its fundamental structure and philosophy from the 
traditional ethnic studies orientation of Asian American Studies; and second, to push for
instead, an AAS program that drew from the sciences.      
Partisan Opponent Resources
Opposing faculty members possessed a number of key positional and personal
resources at their disposal.  Proponent positional resources included longevity on 
campus.  Combined, these four amassed almost 100 years experience working as 
professors on the UMCP campus. All of these faculty members held tenure.  Two 
Caucasian professors held appointments in ARHU departments, one of whom served as 
the director of the campus honors program; another served as department chair of the 
existing East Asian Studies program on campus.  The two Asian American professors 
from the sciences also possessed administrative experience.  One of these faculty 
members served as the co-chair of the President’s AHNA Task Force.  The other 
sciences faculty member served as a member of this Task Force and had served on other 
campus-wide committees (AHNA Task Force Report, 1995; Informant 012).  
Personal resources included ongoing professional and academic relationships 
with some partisan opponents.  For example, two faculty members served in academic 
advising roles for WAASP student leaders (Informants 010, 012, 013, 027).  Other 
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faculty had used their credibility and in some instances, budgeting authority, to make 
financial contributions to the nascent activities of AFSGA, the AASU, and the Asian 
American lectures on campus (Informants 01, 06, 013, 018).  These connections to 
partisan proponents gave faculty opponents an in-depth familiarity with the desires and 
goals of the proponents at the outset of Task Force deliberations, as well what one 
informant recalled was the perception of expertise regarding broader campus academic 
priorities:
…just kind of an air about how things should go, what was most important on 
campus, and generally “this is how things get done around here” attitude…yes, 
they had lent their support to the idea, but they had also had helped us in the past 
and they were going to continue this kind of “help” because the program needed 
the right spin to win over a faculty. (Informant 03)  
These positional and personal resources combined to give opposing faculty a 
possible weighty advantage when it came to manipulating the campus procedural and 
cultural terrain for new academic programs on campus. Their stature and prominence 
within the campus honors community and the hard sciences were favored academic 
areas during the 1990s, according to the campus planning documents and publicly 
stated priorities referenced in Chapter Four.  Data support the notion that the 
professorial culture on campus is dominated by White males, takes its roots in the 
sciences, and is overseen by senior administrators who possess academic backgrounds 
in the sciences (Informants 01, 02, 03, 06, 07, 08, 09, 010, 012, 014, 015, 018, 021, 022, 
026, 027, 028).  Two informants characterized this dimension of the institutional culture 
in the following manner:   
…issues of diversity on campus were big at the time, but let’s face it, this is a 
campus run by “scientists” in a very traditional male sense…nothing “Asian”
was normalized on this campus at the time…this campus was not reflecting the 
values it praised so publicly…there was discrimination, whether intentional or 
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by omission…it [AAS program] was never going to be an issue or cause led by 
administrators, frankly, because there was no one there to do it . (Informant 023) 
…I think the institution has come a long way, but if you look around at 
leadership compared to the faculties that comprise departments in the liberal 
arts, there is a stark difference…leadership has done a good job at espousing the 
right ‘values,’ but it is not normal behavior for them; they are all scientists, these 
sorts of things require a different world view, different experiences…not 
something that is familiar or second nature down in Main Admin, for the most 
part (Informant 013). 
In this respect, partisan proponents faced an uphill battle against partisan opponents
who held strong connections with like minded administrators on a campus that relied on 
a male-dominated, sciences oriented policy making structure.  
Authorities
Administrators played a proximate role in both shaping and shepherding the 
substantive direction of the AAS proposal throughout the duration of the case. 
Document review and informant interview data indicate only four academic 
administrators had direct involvement during interest articulation.  These individuals 
included three White males, Provost Daniel Fallon, Provost Gregory Geoffrey, UGST 
Dean Ira Berlin (until 1994), and one African American male, UGST Dean Robert 
Hampton (Informants 01, 03, 06, 08, 013, 018, 027).  An additional administrator, 
Interim Provost Nelson Markley, oversaw the AAS project budget review, but only for 
a short period of time in 1996 and informant data indicate that he did not play a 
proximate role in decision making (Informants 013, 015, 017, 018). Data also indicate 
that two other White male academic deans, ARHU Dean James Harris and BSOS Dean 
Irv Goldstein became involved, but only when Provost Fallon and Dean Hampton 
sought their consultation and only in response to proposals and funding configurations 
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(Informants 08, 013, 019; Administrative correspondence, September 13, 1993; 
Administrative emails, April 3 and 6, 1996). 
Authorities’ Goals
Authorities’ goals or policy stance cannot be parceled out as endorsement of 
either the advocates or the opponents.  Some administrators possessed an intellectual 
familiarity with AAS studies and expressed general support for a program in this field 
of study.  No administrators expressed resistance to the concept of a program at the 
outset.  More importantly, no administrators expressed a desire to oversee the content 
direction of the program.   They defined their involvement as procedural in nature.  
Their overarching policy goal was to ensure adherence to academic processes and 
compliance with budgetary requirements.  
Administrators who received the original AAS memorandum from partisan 
proponents reported an intellectual appreciation of the idea of Asian American Studies. 
Provost Fallon remarked that the AAS program was “something that I was very familiar 
with…I personally have a long history of being associated with ethnic studies 
programs” (Administrative correspondence, September 22, 1993).  Another dean wrote 
that “intellectually, this is a very exciting sub-field, which is a part of a larger, even 
more exciting field—ethnic studies” (Administrative correspondence, September 23, 
1993).  
In their correspondence, however, these administrators expressed reservations 
regarding quality in program development, the impact of a lecture series, and the fiscal 
plausibility of an academic program.  Administrators noted the vast range in program 
content and quality at campuses across the country as well as the fleeting, “ephemeral” 
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nature of a lecture series.  Since the campus was still recovering from state-mandated 
budget cuts in the previous two academic years,  one administrator noted a program like 
this one, at this particular time, would require “creative leveraging…with our limited 
and competing resources on campus, both material and intellectual” (Administrative 
correspondence, September 23, 1993).   
At this point, UGST Dean Berlin, based on his own disciplinary experiences as a 
historian and understanding of the broader field of ethnic studies, was the primary 
administrative supporter of the program.  In a memorandum to Provost Fallon, Dean 
Berlin wrote that overall this “was good for the university…and it had to be something 
that was seen as mainstream and could be justified before a broader audience” 
(Administrative correspondence, September 23, 1993).  Given this rationale, Dean 
Berlin agreed that the budget had to reflect a program of its scale and be in line with 
comparable university programs in order to eventually make it through the scrutiny of 
the APAC and Senate consideration.
Authorities’ Resources
.  Authorities possessed key administrative and personal resources. From an 
administrative perspective, the Provost retained the power to fund AAS courses and 
related activities, as well as to accept or reject AAS proposals. Operational oversight of 
such activities, like the AAS project, fell to the UGST Dean. That is, the Dean was 
responsible for project records, direct fund allocation, and project status and staffing 
reviews.  Neither the Provost nor the Dean, however, held discretion to develop content 
of an AAS program. This authority fell to campus faculty members, academic 
departments, and colleges, and in this instance to partisan groups.  This authority also 
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was in line with the cultural and decision making norms on campus. 
Personal resources, however, varied among administrators. In the Provost’s 
Office, these resources included intellectual capacity and administrative expertise. 
Partisan proponents submitted an AAS proposal to three different Provosts during the 
three cycles of interest articulation.  The first, Provost Fallon, held a background in the 
liberal arts, understood the field of ethnic studies, had over 20 years experience as an 
administrator, and maintained a strong desire to execute the campus’s diversity agenda, 
much like the campus President at the time.  Data indicate that the second Provost, an 
interim appointee, did not have this background, experience, or reported commitment to 
these campus priorities (Informants 01, 03, 013, 015, 017, 018). 
Shifts in the UGST Dean’s office occurred during this period as well.  Although 
Dean Berlin originally expressed an interest in the AAS ideas, his retirement in 1994 
predates any significant action toward a policy solution. Instead, UGST Dean Hampton,
appeared to possess the potentially worthy combination of formal academic authority—
oversight of any new program earmarked by the Provost—as well as essential personal
resources.  These resources included a personal background as an African American 
who had advocated for ethnic studies programs at other college campuses, an 
understanding and respect for the official academic channels, and a desire to assist 
partisan proponents in this process.  Most of all, this dean had communication access to 
the Provost, APAC, college deans, and the campus Senate.  As some informants recall 
Dean Hampton’s qualities and position:
…it may well have been fortuitous that it [AAS] wound up in Bob Hampton’s 
shop…he had the background to address it, and the freedom really, because he 
had no ties to departments and chairs…he could go straight to the Provost and 
work APAC if need be.(Informant 023) 
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…I think he felt some responsibility to and respect for, Dr. Kim and the 
students, to educate them so to speak in the processes of creating new academic 
programs…he was the right person for the job, given his own background with 
the Black Studies movement at Princeton .(Informant 06)
…He knew from the pure business side of the house, this thing made sense to 
do, just a matter of how it was going to get done…he had a good sense to figure 
things out in the Provost’s Office and at the same time, channel the ‘energy’ of 
those students. (Informant 014) 
Summary of Actors, goals and resources
In sum, partisan proponents were comprised of a small number of untenured 
female faculty and staff, working with a few graduate and undergraduate students.  This 
group sought to raise the profile of the APA community on campus while 
simultaneously advocating for an AAS program in line with other AAS programs across 
the country.  This group had a few potentially effective resources at their disposal. 
These resources included contextual and intangible factors such as increasing APA 
student demographics, a campus commitment to diversity issues, and continuous 
administrative turnover. Personal resources included local and national networks in the 
APA community, common backgrounds in campus APA issues and student movements, 
and overall unified, deep commitment to the goal of bringing an AAS program to 
UMCP.   
On the other hand, Partisan opponents were comprised of four tenured, male 
faculty members.  Two members were APA faculty from the sciences; the other two 
were from liberal arts departments.  All possessed extensive experience in academic 
leadership positions and on campus committees.  Their goal was to prevent partisan 
proponents from crafting an AAS program with ties to the traditional liberal curriculum, 
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and at the same time, advocate a program with a bent toward the sciences.  These actors 
held potential to influence the policy outcome of the AAS because the combination of 
their goals and resources were aligned with the organizational norms and culture of 
UMCP.  
Authorities encompassed primarily two central academic administrators, 
including the Provost and the UGST Dean.  While other authorities played a tertiary 
role in the consideration of the AAS, Provost Fallon and UGST Dean Hampton were 
central to the consideration of the AAS during issue articulation. These administrators 
did not have expressed stances on the content of the AAS program.  Rather, each 
articulated an intellectual appreciation for the concept of a program.  With regard to 
their resources, each administrator held discretion over budgeting and finance for a 
program.  In addition, these administrators possessed a background in ethnic studies and 
experience in academic administration of such programs. 
The Dynamics of the Policy Process:  Phase One, Interest Articulation
Goals and resources help explain why and with what means groups of actors 
may attempt to influence the policy outcome.  These conceptual constructs, however, do 
not explain actor interactions and outcomes in the policy process.  In order to gain such 
an understanding, one must analyze how actor groups deploy such resources.  Thus, this 
section focuses on the strategies and tactics actors used to influence the policy process 
and the critical decisions that occurred through that process.  This section traces the 
case “story,” and its structure mirrors the chronological path of development of the 
AAS at UMCP.  In laying out the case, this section summarizes policy decisions, 
analyzes actor strategies and tactics, and assesses their effects on policy outcomes at 
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each decision making point. 
Interest Articulation, Cycle One
Baldridge asserts that Interest articulation encompasses policy actions prior to 
deliberation by formal legislative bodies.  Interest articulation in this case endured 
multiple iterations reflecting the most deliberative, contentious stage of policy making 
in this case. The first cycle of interest articulation spanned the early 1990s and 
culminated in spring of 1995.  A small group of faculty submitted a skeletal proposal 
for a course offering to the Provost in 1993, and the Department of American Studies 
offered the first course, “The Asian American Experience,” in the spring 1995 semester. 
Later that same semester in response to APA student protests and demands for more 
AAS courses, the new Provost Daniel Fallon granted $40k seed money to develop 
additional AAS courses.  This allocation—a result of the Provost’s new ability to 
earmark funds for new programs in an off-line manner—was dubbed the “AAS 
Project.”
Influence Dynamics I: The AAS “Trial Balloon”
In 1993, under the pen of UGST Assistant Dean Bonnie Oh and a few other 
AGSGA faculty members, partisan proponents wrote Provost Fallon requesting a $20k 
allocation to support the administrative and teaching loads of one AAS course offering 
and to underwrite the expense of an APA lecture series. Having no prior interaction 
with authorities, proponents used this first memo as a strategy for getting APA issues on 
the administrative agenda and introducing the concept of AAS course.  In the words of 
one informant, the memo to Fallon was:
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…really kind of a trial balloon,…we had been having conversations, so now 
let’s plug in with [Bonnie] and see what we might be able to get, but these were 
scarce times on campus, so the likelihood seemed slim, but worth a try….we 
knew this [getting an AAS] program was going to be multi-year process.
(Informant 03)
In sending this memo, partisan proponents tapped into two resources.  First, they 
utilized their administrative contact and ally, UGST Assistant Dean Oh, to lend 
administrative credence to their aims.  Second, they used their knowledge of campus 
demographic shifts, campus academic priorities, and their own organizations to bolster 
the rationale for their demands when they wrote: 
…a diverse group of faculty and administrators agrees that the time is ripe to 
establish Asian American Studies on this campus…as of this fall, fourteen 
percent of our student population is of Asian origin.  We now have and Asian 
Student Union and an Asian Faculty Staff and Graduate Student Association.  In
addition, a joint Asian and Hispanic Task Force is about to be appointed by 
President…. 
…One of the recommendations of the task force will most likely be the 
establishment of a relevant curriculum…but it [the report] will not likely be 
ready for two years. (Administrative memorandum, September 13, 1993)
The memo further signaled a criticism of the campus administration’s lack of 
timeliness in the treatment of matters of importance to the APA community and it hit 
upon a potential administrative vulnerability.  That is, it exposed the gulf between stated 
campus mission and priorities—diversity and a welcoming climate for students of 
color—and an infrastructure to support this mission and priorities.  The authors—again 
seizing on the policy environment—adeptly drew a link between growing student 
concerns over the lack of campus-led support for the emerging APA student population 
and the respective campus racial and ethnic climate for these students:  
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…the Asian American student population at College Park is increasing and has 
been making demands that we provide an Asian American curriculum and 
support services. Such services are indeed crucial to the future of these students 
and the eradication of anti-Asian sentiments among non-Asian students.
(Administrative memorandum, September 13, 1993)
Here, authors point to demands by the APA student community to demonstrate 
that this memo was not borne solely out of academic self-interest.  Instead, it indicates a 
deeper support for campus redress on these issues as well as portends the budding 
student activism among the APA undergraduate population.  
Prior to responding, Provost Fallon, who was in his first semester on campus, 
contacted AHRU Dean Griffith and BSOS Dean Goldstein.  Although both deans 
agreed to offer financial assistance to support the proposed APA lecture series, they 
were uncertain about an AAS curriculum on campus. This hesitation was due in part to 
the stark fiscal climate, especially for existing academic programs let alone prospective 
programs (Administrative correspondence, September 28, 1993).  
In response to proponents, Provost Fallon did not offer to fund the request for
the AAS course.  Noting his appreciation for the liberal arts and past administrative 
encounters with the development of ethnic studies program, he relayed his 
“sympathy…with the idea of strengthening our curriculum through the addition of 
programs such as AAS” (Administrative memorandum, October 12, 1993).  According 
to some informants, this memo gave partisan proponents a few directional “clues” for 
better success in their future influence efforts.  As two informants remarked:
…I think he [Fallon] got what we were trying to do...he had experience at 
SUNY with this kind of program development…he appeared to be sympathetic 
to our ideas, so that was encouraging. (Informant 03) 
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…It was good just to get the idea out there; I think we knew that finances would 
be wrapped up in the response, but Fallon shed some light on the procedural 
norms for us, too. (Informant 018) 
First, the Provost noted that the campus has a formal, longstanding process for 
the development and implementation of new academic programs, but the Provost does 
not assume a sponsoring role in that process.  Instead, the creation of new academic 
curriculum is generated from faculty members, departments, and colleges.  Second, he 
recommended proponents consult both ARHU and BSOS administrators in an effort to 
find a “home” for such a program in order to gain curricular support and be reviewed 
through appropriate campus channels.  Third, the Provost advised that until the program 
was attached to, and approved by a college, he could not consider the program in full 
(Administrative memorandum, October 12, 1993).   
Provost Fallon’s pragmatic response, however, did not deter partisan proponents 
from pursuing other amendable academic channels on campus. In fact, faculty members 
turned to the Department of American Studies, which as one informant recalled, was 
“open to sponsoring new interdisciplinary liberal arts courses” (Informant 013). Faculty 
designed this course as an introductory level survey, which received approval as a 
CORE diversity requirement in winter 1994 and was offered in spring 1995 (“History of 
AASP,” 2001).   
In this regard, the policy “trial balloon” produced some positive outcomes for 
partisan proponents.  First, they succeeded in gaining financial support for the APA 
lecture series, if not attention to the idea of an AAS curriculum on campus.  Second, 
they received worthwhile strategic advice from an influence target, the Provost.  Last, 
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they secured a departmental sponsor within ARHU to offer the initial AAS course, 
which also received academic legitimacy as a CORE diversity requirement.  
Influence Dynamics II: Small Circles, Steady Strategies
For partisan proponents, persuasive efforts continued to be the tactic of choice, 
the means to keep APA issues and the AAS on the administrative radar screen. They 
regularized communication with academic officers through their one administrative 
contact, UGST Assistant Dean Bonnie Oh.  For example, Oh sent a memo to the deans 
who financially supported the year’s lecture series in order to thank them as well as to 
inform them of the “progress made on Asian American projects on our campus” 
(Administrative memorandum, December 15, 1993). This memo contained an update 
regarding the progress of AAS course developments and the group’s involvement with 
the newly appointed AHNA American Task Force. 
In March 1994, Oh penned another memo seeking financial support for the 
lecture series for the upcoming year. Oh again strategically used this correspondence as 
an opportunity to update retiring UGST Dean Berlin about AAS course developments 
and the critical demand for providing “intellectual events on Asian Americans, who 
constitute 15% of our student population” regardless of the current campus budgetary 
crunch (Administrative correspondence, March 16, 1994).  In response, Dean Berlin 
agreed to contribute $600 toward the 1994-1995 lecture series. A few months later, Oh 
informed the Dean that she would be leaving the university to assume an administrative 
post at Georgetown University. 
Thus, UGST Assistant Dean Bonnie Oh’s departure marked the loss of the 
interest group’s chief administrative communication conduit and most effective means 
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thus far for cultivating administrative interest in the AAS.  Since UGST Dean Berlin, a 
budding administrative ally, retired during this same time period. Partisan proponents 
began the 1994 academic year without the administrative network upon which they 
relied. 
Influence Dynamics III:  Administrative Change, Tactical Shifts, and Student 
Engagement 
This contextual shift in the administrative landscape led partisan proponents to 
regroup and to switch their advocacy strategies.  In the words of one informant, the 
administrative turnover not only required partisan proponents to identify and cultivate 
relationships with the new administrators, this change forced “us [partisan proponents] 
to really stay on message and continue our efforts through the new AAS course and our 
APA organizations” (Informant 03).
Given these conditions, proponents’ adopted several new strategies to bolster 
their internal and external networks.  First, proponents turned to student affairs, where 
personnel and budgets could be tapped for support in student leadership training, and to
strengthen the ASU and remaining ethnic Asian student organizations. And, by fall 
1994, these six remaining organizations had endorsed the ASU as an umbrella spokes 
group for APA student issues on campus.  Second, the ASU reached a milestone when, 
with the help of the Office of Campus Programs (OCP), it won the opportunity to host 
the 1996 East Coast Asian Student Union (ECASU) conference.  This conference 
presented proponents with the chance to expand its network and to bolster connections
to other campuses and disciplinary experts.  
At the same time, proponent faculty were teaching the first AAS course and 
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utilizing the classroom experience as a means to solidify student proponents.  
According to one observer, the end goal of the first course reached beyond educating 
students about AA history and literature:  
…the short term goal was to teach the class, then get the students involved and 
get them to see this [AAS curriculum issues] was important, get them committed 
to social change and representation on campus…and one clear way was through 
the class in addition to our involvement with the student leaders of ASU… 
(Informant 06) 
Course instructor, ENGL Assistant Professor Sangeeta Ray, taught the course 
from a literature perspective.  Course content was primarily focused on Asian American 
authors. Graduate assistant William Liu, however, brought his experience as a student 
activist in California and his own perspective on Asian American activism.  Regardless 
of this mix of perspectives, informants reported that students responded to the 
opportunity the class provided as a forum for discussing important APA issues on 
campus.  As one informant reflected,
…that course was pivotal…the chance, every class, to announce what was going 
on with the ASU, APA issues on campus, discussing these issues, like the model 
minority issues, lack of representation in student services, courses….or whatever 
it was, ...there was the space for issues and discussion…(Informant 09)
Proponent faculty succeeded in engaging student advocates. Two students 
believed that immediate student-led action was needed if opportunities like this [course] 
were to going to continue at UMCP.  These students, Wendy Wang and Christina 
Lagdameo, worked in consultation with William Liu and the ASU faculty and staff 
advisors to form an auxiliary group of the ASU (Informants 03, 06, 010, 018, 021, 027).  
These students subsequently founded, WAASP, Working for an Asian American 
Studies Program with the sole purpose of advocating on behalf of an AAS program.  
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Thus, this inaugural AAS course produced a successful two-fold change for 
partisan proponents.  First, it marked a strategic turn inward as a means to educate and 
activate students who were otherwise supportive of the AAS program work, but at the 
time, stood disengaged from influence efforts.  Second, it expanded proponents’ 
resource base and strategic repertoire with the formation of WAASP, a stand alone 
student-led group with the sole purpose of fighting for an AAS program. 
Influence Dynamics IV: Expanding the Issue Scope, Winning Administrative and 
Programmatic Support 
Shortly after its formation, WAASP members executed the first influence 
attempt in the process to bring an AAS program to UMCP.  Student tactics abandoned 
the reasoned, rational memo writing faculty and staff had previously employed.  
Instead, student strategies threw partisan advocacy efforts onto a more public stage with 
tactics of the disenfranchised such as student rallies and protests. 
For example, on April 12, 1995, WAASP members held a 12 hour hunger strike 
in support of student efforts at Northwestern University to bring AAS to their campus.  
WAASP students camped outside the student union and asked students to sign a petition 
in support of student efforts to get an AAS program at Northwestern University and to 
bring an AAS program to UMCP. Although the hunger strike was successful in 
garnering the attention of students on campus and the campus newspaper, The 
Diamondback, it did not spark a response from Provost Fallon’s office or other 
academic officers.  
WAASP’s next step was to target the attention of the Provost in a direct and 
dramatic fashion during a public meeting with the Governor held on campus a few 
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weeks later.  Students disrupted the Town Hall meeting, originally held to discuss the 
status of higher education in Maryland, by passing out flyers with the stark statistics 
about the lack of adequate academic programs and services for APA students, as 
explained: 
…not sure where the idea came from…but we thought we might catch him [the 
Provost] off guard.  The Governor was holding a town hall meeting on learning 
or something on campus…we thought we would distribute a flyer with our 
statistics on it (APA population) and demand a meeting with him…(Informant 
027)
…it was disruptive, but I don’t think overly so, people took notice, we didn’t 
feel like our voice was being heard, so this is where we went—Main 
Administration—to get their attention…(Informant 021) 
…they [the students] were using activist language such as ‘we want it now.’ 
These activities definitely ‘increased the volume’…it was an increase in 
militancy, but WAASP at the time, seemed pretty low on the militancy 
standards… I guess they [students] did succeed in raising the volume in a way to 
suggest [to administrators and the campus] that they were serious, that they were 
committed, and that they may be willing to engage in collective action.
(Informant 013)
In response to WAASP’s public protest, Provost Fallon agreed to meet with its 
members, interested faculty, and staff.  This group included undergraduate and graduate 
students, staff, and faculty from multiple disciplines, including those from the sciences. 
The founding members of WAASP were present at the meeting as were AAS course 
faculty.  Students prepared for the meeting with research, notes, and submitted an 
agenda to the Provost prior to the meeting as a strategy to project their steadfast 
commitment and seriousness about the demand for an AAS program. One attendee 
recalled proponents’ intentions at the meeting: 
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… when you are starting out with something new, there are multiple motivations 
for things that are going on….but these were very bright, intelligent dedicated 
people….if given the opportunity, they would think seriously about things, 
given some hints and clues as to how they should do it, but I don’t think at that 
point they had clearly set out the details in their minds…they presented a whole 
set of ideas, but it was not terribly crisp or focused…there was a demand—and 
demand is the right word—for an AAS department… (Informant 08) 
Study informants present at this meeting recalled a general agreement that there 
should be academic curriculum of some kind in AAS, but there was no substantive 
discussion of this curriculum (Informants 03, 06, 08, 010, 013, 018, 027). The meeting 
outcome, however, marked a pivotal policy victory for proponents even though it did 
not garner the establishment of a full-fledged program. Provost Fallon, cited his support 
for some sort of academic course development beyond the current level, in addition to 
what he viewed as “their [students] overall seriousness, even though there were lots of 
unanswered questions that needed investigation before they could be credible with other 
audiences,” and awarded the group “academic planning money” from the Provost’s own 
budget (Administrative memorandum, May 13, 1995)  The $40,000 allocation came 
from the Provost’s set aside budget line, which was a component of the newly 
established strategic planning process.  The Provost then delegated oversight of the 
project to UGST Dean Hampton, who was also in his first year of service.
In early June 1995, Dean Hampton consulted AAS course instructor Sangeeta 
Ray and Microbiology Professor Bob Yuan to gather their opinions about the program 
direction and the use of the project funds.  Yuan expressed concern that the current 
faculty “shepherding this movement…were too focused on Asian American literature 
and history, but this may fall short of satisfying the intellectual demands of these 
students” (Administrative email, June 6, 1995). On June 9, 1995, the Dean submitted 
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his formal recommendations to the Provost, which included:
…fund two courses at a cost of $6000, designate a  point person to continue 
developing courses in the short term, and gather information that would lead to 
the creation of a working proposal on how to address program development on a 
longer-term basis, provide a GA to work with this person …and identify the two 
individuals who might serve as temporary coordinator for next year… 
(Administrative correspondence, June 9, 1995) 
Dean Hampton indicated that WMST Assistant Professor Seung-kyung Kim and 
Professor Yuan from Microbiology were two lead candidates to coordinate the program 
on an interim basis.  In his recommendation, the Dean noted the positives as well as the 
“liabilities” of each candidate and specifically remarked on the lack of support that 
Yuan may have from both WAASP members and ARHU faculty.  Given this condition, 
the Dean recommended Kim as the project coordinator for the AAS project.  Provost 
Fallon approved the recommendations by the Dean, and offered Dr. Kim the position 
and she accepted.
Thus, the establishment of the AAS Project marked the end of the first cycle of 
interest articulation.  This first cycle of partisan proponent influence attempts reflects 
an expansion of resources, specifically through the engagement of student groups. 
Proponents, led by faculty and staff, initially sought to influence the direction of 
authoritative consideration through persuasive efforts.  Their low key strategies by that 
capitalized on demographic changes and academic policy precedents at UMCP.   In 
addition, faculty and staff utilized their one administrative contact—UGST Assistant 
Dean Bonnie Oh—a communication conduit to more senior academic officers.  
Although their efforts were not entirely successful, administrative response was at least 
candid enough to provide a gauge of potential interest as well as useful information 
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regarding the potential avenues for pursuit of such a program. 
Student involvement—with the formation of WAASP—expanded proponents’
resource base and strategic abilities. The 1995 AAS initial course offering provided the 
necessary receptacle for students, staff, and faculty to share ideas and strategies.  Its 
byproduct, WAASP, fortified the partisan coalition and offered some tactical 
alternatives for advocating for the AAS program.  That is, students, by dint of their 
transient organizational status, were capable of reaching a broader public audience by 
utilizing more extreme advocacy measures such as hunger strikes, protests, rallies, and 
disruptions.  In the end, this expanded coalition and elevated presence on campus 
produced an initial policy win for proponents in the meeting with Provost Fallon and in 
authorization of the AAS Project.     
Interest Articulation, Cycle Two
The second cycle of interest articulation commenced with Provost Fallon’s 
delegation of oversight of the new AAS Project to the new Dean for Undergraduate 
Studies (UGST) Robert Hampton.  Dean Hampton authorized and recommended the 
appointment of untenured Women’s Studies Assistant Professor Sun Yung Kim as the 
first AAS project coordinator.  Dr. Kim, along with a few interested liberal arts faculty 
members and her graduate assistant, submitted the first official proposal for an AAS 
program Provost Fallon in December 1995.  Existing departments such as American 
Studies continued to offer additional AAS courses through the 1996 academic year.  
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Issue Dynamics I:  A Return to Formal Channels and Persuasive Tactics
After the initial, incremental policy “win,” partisan proponents changed their 
advocacy strategies.  This change was due in part to their new place within the campus 
organizational structure. The AAS project offered partisan proponents organizational 
resources such as a campus address, office, budget, staff, and in a sense, an outward 
appearance of a legitimate academic program, albeit without an officially sanctioned 
academic program.  The financial resources of the AAS project also helped sustain the 
organizational strength of proponent’s core coalition of actors.  For example, AAS 
project staff could now offer some financial support for WAASP’s campus activities.
Given these developments, the mainstay of proponent strategies returned to a 
formal engagement with academic administrators.  In December 1995, AAS Project 
staff submitted a proposal for an AAS program to UGST Dean Hampton.  This first 
proposal tied program rationale to: (a) the demographic shifts in undergraduate student 
populations; (b) the emergence of student demands for academic courses in the field of 
AAS; and (c) a weak and disparate structure of current course offerings that could not
possibly meet the demands of this sizeable student group and the greater campus (AAS 
proposal, December 1995, p. 7).  
Moreover, partisan proponents attempted to align their AAS program rationale 
with the sea change in academic planning as it related to campus mission, goals, and 
climate for diversity. The proposal authors reasoned that creating an AAS program 
would support the university’s strategic planning objectives by “building on to its 
existing strengths in areas which emphasize social policy…and support the university’s 
commitment to excellence through diversity” (p.11).The authors also pointed out that 
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the President’s AHNA Task Force (1995) found deficiencies and related cause for 
increasing academic offerings in Asian American studies area.  Given these well-
documented deficits, AAS project staff recommended administrators take the following 
actions over the next two years (1996-1998) to bolster delivery of a program:   
1.  Establish the AAS program within the College of Arts & Humanities as an 
undergraduate certificate program.
2.  Hire a “senior scholar” to serve as the director of the program and several 
junior faculties with joint appointments in other departments with coinciding 
interests in AAS.
3.   Allocate course development funds for the new AAS courses.
4.   Allocate research funds for hired faculty.
5.   Allocate at least four lines for graduate assistantships for the AAS program.
6.   Appoint an Asian American advisory committee to assist in administering 
the program.
7.  Allocate funds for Asian American books and periodicals in the library.
8.  Allocate funds for the “promotion of Asian American culture at the 
University of Maryland.
Although the project enjoyed the good fortune of an off-line Provost’s 
allocation, securing permanent lines for the creation of a new program meant competing 
with colleges and departments that were still mending from the scorch of the early 
1990s budget crisis. In this regard, the proposal exposed partisan proponents’ minimal 
expertise in academic planning and limited knowledge of remaining budget constraints.  
As written, the proposal lacked itemized financial figures for these recommendations.  
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Informant data reported that the original total figure for the program fell somewhere in 
the $300-$400K range (Informants 03, 06, 08, 010, 013, 015, 016, 018).  The estimated 
two year time frame also omitted any acknowledgment of the campus APAC and 
college-based PCC processes as well as the campus Senate process. One informant 
explained the significance of these omissions:
…it was clear that the proposal was missing key information for serious 
consideration by, or even presentation to APAC at this point.  I mean, here we 
were as a campus, still pasting together some budgets, and this thing was asking 
for a sizeable chunk.  In all honesty, new programs need time for formal vetting 
on campus, and it just wasn’t going to get to APAC without substantiation for its 
size…[we] definitely would have been asking…to take away from existing 
programs. (Informant 016)
In addition to this discussion of the burden of a redistributive proposal, the 
proponents submitted the proposal the last week of classes in December 1995.  The 
campus routinely takes a five week hiatus until spring semester resumes in late January.  
Realistically, it might be months before academic administrators took a close look at the 
proposal   But in spite of these two missteps in form and timing, partisan proponents 
still stood a solid chance of getting their proposal considered by administrators because 
of the AAS project had demonstrated success by offering courses that were in high 
student demand and met the campus’s diversity mission.  
Issue Dynamics II: Administrative Pause Over Cost and Proponent Deference to an 
Administrative Ally 
Administrative reply to the proposal occurred in mid-February 1996, over two 
months after its initial submission. In spite of this delay, proponents found an 
authoritative intermediary of sorts in UGST Dean Hampton (Informants 01, 02, 08, 
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012). The Dean consulted BSOS Dean Goldstein and ARHU Dean Griffith, the two 
college deans involved in discussions over the past few years.  Via email, Dean 
Hampton informed Deans Goldstein and Griffith about an upcoming meeting with AAS 
Project staff, WAASP student leaders, and other interested faculty. The Dean indicated 
his support for the existing program and outlined his purpose and goals:
…the meeting is meant to provide us with an opportunity to discuss the status of 
the project….I am planning to recommend [to the Provost] that we [Academic 
Affairs] continue to fund the project for another year….We would provide 
resources for at least 4 courses next year and modest administrative support….I 
am also going to recommend that we form an advisory committee to work with 
us on developing the next stages of program development…I think there is a 
strong commitment to do something, we just want to make sure we are moving 
in a coordinated manner. (Administrative email, February 23, 1996) 
At the meeting, Dean Hampton highlighted the strongest failing of the proposal—an 
unsubstantiated and bloated budget.  As one meeting attendee recalled:
…we had departments on campus, struggling with less than the proposal sought, 
…it [the request] was not feasible not for a untested program, and it was clear at 
this meeting that neither ARHU nor BSOS was jumping in to support it, 
particularly BSOS, which Dean Goldstein saw minimal course crossover in it for 
the college, so pulling from other departments was not going to be a fruitful 
endeavor for BSOS…This financial gap did not appear to resonate with the 
students in particular, who failed to get that there was a bigger, more legitimate 
process than just awarding money for a program that, at this point, in this 
particular proposal, was very, very skeletal and unsubstantiated…(Informant 
013)
Given this administrative pause about the proposed budget and, perhaps 
program detail, proponents’ next tactic was advocacy by proxy.  They took no 
immediate action after this meeting, recognizing that, according to one informant, it 
“was the middle of the semester, in some ways we knew that the committee structure 
would be coming, and we needed Dean Hampton on our side” (Informant 03). 
Proponents then relied on Dean Hampton’s communications with BSOS and ARHU. In 
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April, the Dean wrote to Deans Goldstein and Griffith to say that he would go ahead 
and recommend a continuation of funding at its current level (enough to support the 
administrative structure that had been put in place), and work to coordinate the 
Advisory Committee discussed at the February meeting (Administrative email, April 3, 
1996).  
But it was apparent that the AAS program was neither an administrative nor an
academic priority for these deans. Both Goldstein and Griffith replied that it was a busy 
month, and consideration would have to wait until at least May.  In fact, BSOS Dean 
Goldstein expressed his reluctance to become further involved in the matter since he 
“…knows very little about the efforts here and I am not sure what our goals are” 
(Administrative email, April 8, 1996). This reluctance, in turn, left the majority of the 
decision making to Dean Hampton, who in May requested that the Provost continue to 
fund the project at $45K for another year (Administrative memorandum, May 10, 
1996).  
Dean Hampton’s efforts to secure funding for the AAS Project’s second year 
were temporarily stalled when Provost Fallon resigned in early June and his deputy, 
Nelson Markley, was installed as Acting Provost. Dean Hampton employed his 
positional proximity to the Provost as a means to ensure that the AAS project did not 
stall out.  According to one informant, this turnover and the lack of experience and 
knowledge of his replacement necessitated Dean Hampton meet with Acting Provost 
Markley in order to “re-educate” an otherwise uninterested administrator (Informant 
013). Dean Hampton followed up his meeting with an informational memorandum to 
Markley in June 1996.  
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This strategy of deference to Dean Hampton was not without its risks for 
proponents.  In fact, Dean Hampton’s memo included an update about the AAS 
program that was a bit of a detour from proponents’ goals and threatened the content 
and scope of the program. His letter presented two apparent compromises as a means to 
trim its budget and to appeal to other campus leaders and professors for support. These 
provisions included an AAS program designed with “concrete linkages to Engineering, 
Business and BSOS” and the award of an undergraduate citation rather than a certificate 
program. 
By contrast to these apparent concessions, he reiterated his support for the 
general idea of the program and that he “would love to see it continue and eventually 
housed in ARHU.”  Thus, this remark appeared to safeguard the program’s overall 
connection to its existing curricular bent and that of the philosophical orientation 
advocated by partisan proponents.  Most importantly to the program’s future, Dean 
Hampton requested continued funding at the same level for the following year in order 
to support the courses and “work to create a more coherent vision for the program” 
(Administrative memorandum, June 26, 1996).   
In addition to Dean Hampton’s memo, ARHU Dean Griffith submitted a memo 
to Interim Provost Markley as a way to educate him about campus certificate programs.  
Dean Griffith, in a move critical to the success of partisan proponent goals, suggested 
that the College [ARHU] would be “prepared to receive” a citation program in AAS “if 
you are prepared to move on the Asian American initiative.”  His letter also conveyed a 
couched administrative commitment to the program as “….this is a matter on which we 
have worked a good deal but will necessarily be low on [the new Dean’s] priority list in 
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the fall…although I am eager to have some closure before leaving office, I will leave 
this one to you” (Administrative memorandum, July 1, 1996).
  These two letters produced a precarious outcome for partisan proponents.  On 
one hand, Deans Hampton and Griffith’s communications pushed the AAS on to 
Interim Provost Markley’s agenda.  These communications, however, left partisan 
proponents with compromised goals—an apparent commitment to collaboration with 
the sciences and a scaled back program scope—and uncertain funding since decisions 
regarding the current program’s funding would be in Provost’s Markley’s decision 
making purview.  
Influence Dynamics III:  Calculated Strategies of Persistence and Persuasion
Proponents’  tactical pause and strategic deference to Dean Hampton ceased 
when it became clear that the second year of the AAS project appeared to be in 
jeopardy. AAS project coordinator Professor Kim forged ahead with persistence and 
returned to persuasive means to advocate on behalf of the program. Professor Kim 
called both Dean Hampton and Acting Provost Markley for a meeting with AAS project 
staff and students.  Attendees recalled the meeting as an “education” process for the 
Interim Provost, who was uninvolved with the project during his tenure as Assistant 
Vice Provost, and asked the Interim Provost an abundance of questions about the 
necessity for a program and activities beyond incremental course offerings (Informants 
03, 12, 08, 18).  Concerned about Interim Provost Markley’s intended actions, Professor 
Kim followed the meeting with an email to the Acting Provost as a means to express the 
urgency of funding of the program:
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…I want to remind you that our budget seems to have been overlooked in all the 
administrative changes that occurred over the summer. Our current budget has 
not been approved.  As you know, the semester starts in about a week and we 
would like to resolve this problem so that we can teach students rather than 
worry if we are funded. (Administrative email, August 24, 1996) 
Markley assured Dr. Kim that the funding was secure for the upcoming year, but 
it was clear that he was not the philosophical ally that proponents had in Provost Fallon. 
Markley hinted that this funding might be rescinded and that he had concerns with the 
“additional commitments” Provost Fallon made and would need more time to determine 
what allocation was appropriate in the future (Administrative email, August 25, 1996).  
In early September, Dean Hampton notified both Dr. Kim and new ARHU Dean James 
Harris that the 1996-1997 academic year funding for the AAS project had been 
authorized (Administrative letter, September 6, 1996). 
Looking back, the first year of the AAS project commenced with a noticeable 
increase in academic legitimacy with regard to the goals of partisan proponents. 
Proponent’s influence efforts were not without their missteps. Both as the substance and 
timing of the first academic proposal engendered critical administrative consternation 
over finances. In spite of these missteps, proponents gained an authoritative ally in 
Dean Hampton who demonstrated a willingness to advocate on behalf of the AAS 
Project with other academic administrators.  His intervention introduced the seeds for a 
contest over program scope and content, but his influence nonetheless proved to be 
essential in coordinating funding given Provost Fallon’s departure and the arrival of a 
new ARHU Dean.  The first year proved a learning experience for AAS Project staff, 
especially for Dr. Kim who demonstrated her commitment and perseverance when she 
risked confronting the Interim Provost and won.
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Influence Dynamics IV:  An Unflagging Commitment to an Uncompromised Goal 
Regardless of these gains, the AAS Project’s second academic year began under 
the auspices of administrative change and uncertainty regarding the sustainability of the 
project.  Soon after the AAS project funding came through, President Kirwan issued his 
much delayed action plan for the findings of the AHNA Task Force.  Kirwan’s plan 
included a provision that the Provost oversee committees or groups to develop courses 
in the areas of ethnic studies and to provide funding for academic advisors within 
OMSE for these student populations (Presidential memorandum, November 7, 1996).  
Whether or not these recommendations were connected to AAS Project efforts is 
unsubstantiated by study data, but at a minimum, informants reported that the ANHA 
Task Force plan provided another contextual element to lend credibility to the efforts of 
partisan proponents: 
..Kirwan’s response and his plan for AHNA, whatever would actually happen, 
well who really knew, but what it did was put another concrete, campus 
endorsed idea out there.  Specifically, it confirmed claims…that the climate for 
APA students was lacking and that there needed to be courses in Asian 
American Studies. (Informants 03)
…certainly didn’t hurt that President Kirwan’s office presented a written 
endorsement of things that were already happening….this gave some 
momentum. (Informant 06)
…The AHNA plan, I guess, if you call Kirwan’s memo a plan, it contained the 
same diversity language as usual….but it rang true…the sentiments about the 
campus climate and support for APA students…so this provided more of a 
rationale, and an indisputable one at that. (Informant 07)
Within the proponent coalition, WAASP maintained its strategies to promote 
public awareness about the need for an AAS program and to deepen its national APA 
network.  For example, WAASP leaders brought a second nationally based student 
142
conference to campus and sought the financial support of campus deans. WAASP 
student leaders also deployed more proximate and rational advocacy tactics.  The 
purpose of the Fall 1996 conference was to share ideas with other schools in the 
“Midwest and East Cost regions of the Association for Asian American Studies 
(AAAS) regarding the development and implementation of AAS curricula…this 
conference is important for we are presently at a crucial stage in the development of our 
own AAS program” (Letter to administrators, July 16, 1996).  UGST Dean Hampton in 
another demonstration of support, agreed to fund a portion of the conference, which like 
other WAASP events, received campus attention and positive press.  
Perhaps fearing a repeat of the prior academic year’s funding emergency, AAS 
Project Coordinator Professor Kim held multiple discussions with UGST Dean 
Hampton and new ARHU Dean Harris (Informants 03, 013, 018, 019).  Both Deans 
advised AAS project staff to submit a scaled-back proposal to Acting Provost Markley 
by the end of the semester. As a cost saving measure, the Deans suggested a reduction 
in the faculty lines, the substitution of post- doctoral appointments for these lines, and 
the award of a campus citation rather than certificate. Professor Kim was unrelenting, 
and indicated her intent to risk bypassing the Deans’ recommendations:
…after consulting other faculty, and students, I have decided not to submit a 
scaled down proposal.  I am going to write a letter to the Provost [Markley] 
directly letting him know our decision and resubmit the original budget for him 
to consider.  I wanted to let you know beforehand because we have discussed 
this matter and you need to know what we are planning to do.  (Administrative 
email, December 17, 1996)    
As forewarned, Dr. Kim submitted the December 1996 proposal which varied 
little from the 1995 AAS proposal. However, the proposal did attempt to demonstrate 
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that the practical demands (i.e., students enrolled versus students waitlisted) of current 
AAS courses had far outreached their capacity.  In this respect, Dr. Kim argued that 
enrollment alone could support the financial demands of the program she had outlined.  
In the cover letter to the Provost, Professor Kim expressed concern about the lack of 
serious attention the program has been given:
…I am concerned that the university’s expressed support for the AAS project is 
not being translated into action.  I was very disappointed with my discussions 
with the Dean  [Hampton] about our proposal, and do not feel that it has been 
given adequate consideration…The current proposal is a very modest one and 
simply lays out the structure for a very basic AAS program.  I the university is 
to institute such a program, the only area that seems open to scaling down is 
some matters of timing…I urge you to take another look at it and carefully 
weigh the university’s commitment to AAS. (Administrative letter, December 
1996)  
With this perspective now on record, Professor Kim submitted an unmodified 
proposal to Interim Provost Markley.  By doing so, Kim demonstrated her unflagging 
commitment to the content and scope of the AAS program.  At the same time, however, 
she jeopardized the positive relationship she had cultivated with Deans Hampton and 
Harris as she bypassed their advice.  
Influence Dynamics V:  Opponents’ Efforts to Persuade Formal Authorities  
In the midst of Dr. Kim’s ongoing push for a full-fledged AAS program, the 
dynamics of actor interactions experienced a subtle first shift.  Honors Program Director 
Sandy Mack submitted a letter to Dean Hampton regarding the most recent AAS 
proposal.  Professor Mack’s letter represents the first attempt by opponents to influence 
the direction of the AAS Program. And until this point in the process, the content had 
been shaped solely by partisan proponents and its future tied directly to authorities’ 
budgeting powers. This letter, however, marks a transition in the conflict over the future 
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of the AAS program, which shifted the nexus of the dispute to its philosophical leanings 
rather than its financial implausibility.
Professor Mack maintained a strong relationship with partisan proponents. 
Given his relationship with APA student leaders and AAS courses that were cross listed 
with honors program courses, he had easy access to AAS course faculty and UGST 
Dean Hampton.  He also had current information about the curricular direction of the 
AAS proposal.  He described his personal investment in the issue and his concerns 
about the proposal recently submitted to the Acting Provost in this a letter to Dean 
Hampton.  He also constructed the letter as a way to convey his rationale for a different 
type of AAS program:
...I am not really sure I have the “right” to do this, but since I have come to care 
so much about the outcome and hoping that a solution may be possible….the 
more I’ve watched the AAS movement over the past three year, the clearer 
things have come to me in terms of a goal…the course [AAS introductory 
course] won the students’ hearts and minds but not a broader vision of where 
Asian American might start at the end of the 20th century.  Increasingly it seems 
counterproductive for us to replicate the familiar model of AA “identity-“or 
“culture affirming” offerings.  At their worst, these become “victim studies.”  At 
their best, they enlighten AA students but fail to address what are many of the 
dynamic issues currently facing Asia, Asian Americans and Americans…  
The professor continued his appeal to the Dean by offering the following three 
reasons for steering the program content in a broader direction:
…I see three reasons why UMCP should try to start at a “higher” or at least 
more intellectually complex level than the familiar program:  (1) ….involving 
the sciences addresses the demographics of where most of our Asian and Asian 
American students and faculty are…(2) off campus money may well be 
available for Pacific Rim kind of programs…that will not be available for 
identity-affirming AAS programs…(3) I would argue that an academically 
future looking Pacific Rim program draws more deeply on the university’s 
commitment to the creation of knowledge than the reflective AA experience 
model…(Administrative letter, December 6, 1996)
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Most notably, he added that this type of program design was the only way that 
“UMCP could emerge as a national leader if she succeeds.”  The letter then concluded 
with a request to expand the current decision making structure governing the 
development of the program.  He argued that the current scheme was exclusionary in 
nature since so many Asian and Asian American faculty were not currently involved in 
the process and “they would be interested in having some voice in the process.”  This 
last remark is a suggestion to engage faculty from the sciences since the majority of 
campus APA faculty are in the sciences.
Professor Mack’s letter was significant for two reasons.  It expanded the 
potential scope of the conflict and targets of influence.  That is, the battle over the future 
of the AAS program now reached beyond administrators and their budget concerns.  
Professor Mack had introduced a content-related dispute with partisan proponents.  His 
letter, for the meantime, would remain unaddressed by administrators although it did 
foreshadow the nature of the conflict that lay ahead.       
Influence Dynamics VI:  Authoritative Mediation and Rational Persuasion at the Policy 
Crossroads
Upon acknowledging his receipt of the AAS proposal, Acting Provost Markley 
indicated that he would be considering the proposal in light of “overall campus 
commitments and goals” and copied Deans Hampton and Harris (Administrative 
memorandum, January 2, 1997).  Dean Hampton also shared the content of Professor 
Mack’s letter with Markley that same week, and expressed a general commitment to 
developing a program, but could not support the “big ticket ($430K over two years) that 
was being proposed.”  In addition, Dean Hampton’s correspondence to Markley 
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indicated potential siding with opponents as he stated his support for a “distinctive 
program” and “not just a copy of programs that exist on many other campuses.” Again, 
acting as an authoritative intermediary, now on the behalf of multiple parties, Dean 
Hampton requested a meeting with Professor Kim, students and other interested parties, 
including the Provost the following week. 
AAS Project staff believed that the university had stalled on its commitment to 
move forward with the AAS project. This perceived wavering was compounded by the 
change in the Provost position and Professor Kim’s upcoming sabbatical year.  As one 
informant recalled:
…[we had] a lot at stake at this point, the time invested, the commitment to the 
project, [we] didn’t know if things would continue and progress in the following 
year….the administration was supportive in some respects, but other faculty 
were beginning to put ideas out there that were not in line with a real ethnic 
studies program…not that students couldn’t push forward—because they were 
vocal and just as committed….but the real fear with all the administrative 
changes [was] that it would get lost in campus priorities…(Informant 018)
WAASP members, AAS project faculty and staff, UGST Dean Hampton, and 
Interim Provost Markley attended this meeting.  According to the meeting minutes, 
students charged that the university had not pledged the financial commitment outlined 
in the AAS proposal, and even had failed to commit to financing the project beyond the 
current year. In an strategy to diminish the rumblings made by Professor Mack, these 
students voiced additional concern that the faculty hired to teach AAS courses should 
be faculty trained in the field of AAS or a closely-tied discipline.  
Two distinct policy outcomes evolved from the meeting:  (a) Interim Provost 
Markley agreed to fund the project for the next two academic years at the current level; 
(b) those in attendance agreed that another ARHU faculty would assume the 
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coordinatorship in the following year in the absence of the current coordinator. 
(Administrative memorandum, January 31, 1997).  To this end, partisan proponent 
persistence and pressure won them two more years of administrative and financial 
commitment to the project.  Their efforts also secured the current connections and 
administrative continuity with ARHU in light of Dr. Kim’s upcoming sabbatical. 
Influence Dynamics VII: Making Public T hreats, Broadening Coalitions, and Staging 
Protests and Teach-ins
The somewhat stagnant conditions of the AAS project were nested in bigger 
issues of concern for the APA undergraduate community on campus.  Although faculty 
concern for the AAS project sustainability grew, WAASP student leaders viewed the 
outcome of the January meeting with Interim Provost Markley and UGST Dean 
Hampton as mere “lip service” not only to their immediate demands but also to the 
broader concerns of APA students.  Their frustration with administrative hesitation was 
exacerbated by deficiencies in student support such as delays on staff appointments to 
OMSE and a lack of staffing in OCP.  Students shared the general sentiment that the 
APA community was in short “being used” rhetorically by administrators for its 
reflection of student diversity on campus but not reciprocally supported in substance by 
administrative action (AASU press release, February 12, 1997).  Given these 
sentiments, the administrative delay regarding the future of the AAS triggered 
WAASP’s engagement in a spectrum of issues facing APA students on campus.
In a return to more visible and confrontational influence tactics, WAASP 
launched a strategic public campaign railing against the campus administration. Student 
dissatisfaction was described by WAASP and the AASU in a press release sent to 
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campus faculty, student group leaders, and academic administrators the second week of 
February 1997.  The authors launched allegations of administrative racism and 
negligence, and forewarned of student protests to come:
…For two years now, the AAS project has consistently met with administrators 
with a proposal for the establishment of a program, yet two years later, today, 
still no commitment has been made by the university.  Perhaps the most 
frequently used excuse to block [it] is that the university does not have adequate 
financial resources….this is not an excuse.  UMCP’s financial situation is not 
unique:  financial difficulties are plaguing universities across the country, 
including Brown and Penn, which have established and built their AAS 
programs in light of these conditions…without a commitment, there will never 
be a “good time” to develop AAS here….
...This [administrative refusal] ignores the legacy of racist and sexist curricular 
exclusion on this campus. Efforts to institutionalize the AAS program have been 
blocked time and again by various administrators…Moreover, the instability 
created by temporary administrators in essential positions, such as a the Provost 
and ARHU Dean has caused inconsistencies in response to the AAS 
imperative…
….Thus the question arises among the Asian American community, and among 
other “minority” communities on campus:  what is the institution’s commitment 
to issues of diversity?....Asian American Studies is an intellectual and communal 
imperative…
…During the course of this semester, the AASU will lead various student 
organizations and academic departments…in campaigns to establish programs 
of study which are reflective of and meet the needs of our diverse student body.
(AASU Press release, February 19, 1997)
In an effort to draw a broad base of student support, APA student leaders 
engaged leaders of other student groups and launched the first event of this “campaign” 
on February 19.  The AASU, along with other student groups of color, chose to boycott 
the annual “Take Another Look Fair” held in the Student Union.  The AASU also had 
the backing of the campus-wide Student Government Association (SGA), which had 
initially voted not to endorse the boycott.  The boycott consisted of a counter event 
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designed as teach in—“Take Another Look:  Is there really diversity here?”—held 
outside the Union.  WAASP students and members of other student groups distributed 
flyers with statistics about diversity on campus to students.  Some donned stereotypical 
ethnic costumes as a means to bring their plight to life (AASU Press Release, February 
20, 1997).  
As one participant recollected:
..We really worked hard on this, we were intent on creating a ‘visual spectacle’ 
around our boycott….We wanted the administration to know we could get the 
entire campus’s attention to a matter that was otherwise not moving because no 
one really knew much about all the stalling…So the teach in the next day was 
critical, although the events that came with it were spontaneous, somewhat 
so…and the press releases got picked up by local media, because I remember 
cameras around the Union at some point…(Informant 09)
The second day of boycotts began with another teach-in to educate students 
about the urgent need for AAS program  The teach-in began with a skit about diversity 
on campus devised by WAASP student leaders and the event ended with a rally 
accompanied by the chant “Asian American Studies Now!”  In the midst of this rally, 
one participant recalled the decision to move the boycott beyond the Union:
...We had been asking for a meeting with the President for so long, but with 
these other powerful student groups there at the moment, we really had a 
collective coalition of sorts and I think it was the BSU President who said:  
“Let’s go down and ask for a meeting right now.”  We were ready to do a sit in 
if needed at this point…this was a culmination of sorts of a lot of hard work, we 
were deliberate, very strategic in pursuing the goals… so the decision was 
spontaneous, but not out of our range..(Informant 027)  
That afternoon, about 20 student leaders marched down the hill to the Main 
Administration building to seek a meeting with President Kirwan.  Students 
encountered the President’s Chief of Staff, Vice President for Student Affairs Bud 
Thomas, and other members of the President’s staff.  Although the students did not 
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meet with the President that afternoon, as a result of their demand to see him, they were 
able to secure a meeting with him in the near future. 
Student protesters—although thrilled with the publicity and the outcome of the 
protests and demands for a meeting—were now faced with preparatory work for the 
meeting with the President. WAASP leaders’ next tactics were meant to demonstrate a 
legitimate and pressing gulf between campus rhetoric and their unmet demands.  In 
doing so, they put their knowledge and savvy about campus plans, diversity statements, 
and student demographics to good use.  
First, they sent a letter listing their demands to President Kirwan and Interim 
Provost Nelson Markley (WAASP correspondence, March 10, 1997).  Second, this 
correspondence included a “white paper” of sorts regarding the implementation of an 
AAS program as it related directly to the campus’s diversity goals.  In this paper, 
WAASP students noted three primary goals of the university’s 1996 Strategic Plan that 
remained unmet.  These goals included increasing the number of academically talented 
minority undergraduates, allocating resources and making changes in policies and 
practices that meet the needs of changing student populations, and giving “special 
advantage” in resource allocation decisions to those units and individuals that directly 
advance these strategic initiatives. WAASP argued that funding the establishment of an 
AAS certificate program, and later an AAS major course of study, would certainly help 
the campus meet these goals.  Most importantly, WAASP demanded that the AAS 
Project receive money from the $2 million in additional funds expected in FY97 in 
order to fully fund an AAS certificate program.  As one participant reflected:
151
…We got the meeting….and thought “well guess we need to come up with some 
demands” so we typed up a list and put all of them down…We decided to shoot 
for the moon and include the program eventually, we really didn’t know what 
we were doing, but we made a very good argument, we threw the words back in 
their face, we used their words in terms of the campus diversity statement and 
put our own responses to the campus talking points…And then we decided to 
chalk campus the day before the meeting to raise awareness, so we were really 
rolling at this point…(Informant 09) 
By contrast, administrative preparatory strategies sought to fend off any further 
negative publicity and disruption, and to create a more orderly mechanism for 
considering student demands. This work included brainstorming about potential 
questions and answers during the meeting.  Prior to the meeting, university public 
relations officer Roland King described the meeting as a “hearing….the issue will be 
debated, but nothing definitive will come out of the meeting,” and indicated that the 
likelihood of the campus creating a program would be “slim…because of number of 
issues that we need to factor in from the university’s standpoint” (Yip, February 28, 
1997).  These issues included budget constraints, as well as the limits of this type of 
program that “tends to talk within those groups and not across groups.”
King, with assistance from UGST Dean Hampton, prepared a response paper for 
President Kirwan, Acting Provost Markley, and Deans (Hampton and Harris) who were 
scheduled to attend the meeting.   This paper included responses to “potential 
questions” and claims that might be raised in the meeting such as:   “Will the university 
agree to the establishment of an AAS program?  Why are there African American and 
Women’s Studies programs in place, and no AAS program?  Aren’t the efforts for APA, 
Hispanic, and other minority students overlooked in comparison with their African-
American counterparts?”  In sum, this preparatory paper guided the administrators 
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against establishing a program in the immediate future and argued that those pushing 
for a program must pursue “legitimate academic decision making channels” in order to 
have their demands addressed (Administrative memorandum, March 10, 1997).  
Dean Hampton, again assuming the role of authoritative mediator, held several 
meetings and conversations with both partisan proponents and opponents prior to the 
meeting with President Kirwan. These meetings were a preemptive tactic in that he 
informed all involved that the President was not going to approve a program on the 
spot.  Dean Hampton, then employing his own persuasive powers and authority as the 
sole academic administrator with an in-depth knowledge of the program and its brief 
history, advised Acting Provost Markley regarding possible “good outcomes” of the 
meeting.  These outcomes included a recommendation that the President form a “blue 
ribbon” committee of some sort to work on the proposal for the coming academic year   
(Administrative memorandum, March 11, 1997).  In this respect, Dean Hampton’s 
recommendation to forma a committee would reign in the scope of the policy conflict 
and take it out of the very public arena where it presently resided. 
Influence Dynamics VIII:  Authorities Efforts to Contain the Policy Chaos 
Partial videotape of the March 12, 1997 meeting corroborates the confrontation 
described by those individuals present at the meeting and interviewed for this study 
(Informants 03, 010, 012, 013, 015, 018, 021, 027, 028; Videotape, March 12, 1997).  
This confrontation primarily involved adjunct faculty member, and national expert in 
the field of AAS, Phil Nash, and Vice President of Student Affairs Bud Thomas.  Nash 
intended to videotape the meeting. Vice President Thomas objected and asked Nash to 
leave.  Nash, a trained attorney, cited Maryland open meetings law.  Vice President 
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Thomas then sought the consultation of the campus general counsel.  When it was clear 
that Vice President Thomas was going to delay the meeting, Nash ceded and turned off 
the camera (Meeting Videotape, March 12, 1997; 028; 013).  
Following this confrontation, President Kirwan assumed the symbolic role of 
convener and sympathetic mediator as a means to get past the contention.  He 
welcomed faculty, staff and students.  He expressed his sympathy for their efforts, and 
thanked them for advancing the curriculum on campus. However, the President 
cautioned that he simply could not “anoint” a program.  He stated his desire to see the 
program vetted and adopted by the established academic channels as a means not only 
to abide by academic processes, but also to secure the long-term legitimacy of this sort 
of program.  Lastly, as Dean Hampton had suggested, President Kirwan recommended 
that an academic task force be established to create a proposal for consideration by the 
campus Senate and APAC (Meeting videotape; Informant 015). 
In spite of Dean Hampton’s forewarning that the Presidential-level meeting 
would not produce an AAS program, partisan proponents achieved two clear policy 
victories.  First, AAS academic matters were now on the radar screen of the President 
and the campus at large.  President Kirwan agreed that APA student issues needed to be 
addressed and recommended continued funding of the AAS project.  Second, he 
recommended an academic Task Force be created to develop and submit an AAS 
proposal to the campus decision-making bodies.  Task Force oversight fell to the Acting 
Provost’s office, and more specifically, to Dean Hampton. His oversight was critical for 
proponents because they had maintained a close relationship with the Dean, who 
through his actions until this point, appeared to be convinced that bringing the AAS 
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program to campus was a valuable pursuit.      
Although proponents in attendance agreed to this outcome, WAASP student 
leaders were not fully satisfied. Their post-meeting tactics shifted the conflict back to 
the public arena. Student attendees returned to the Stamp Student Union where other 
members of WAASP and the AASU had been publicizing the meeting and the AAS 
program to passers by.  This campaign activity concluded with a mega-phone rally of 
about 30 students chanting for “AAS NOW!” (AAS archival videotape, March 12, 
1997).  
But this brand of confrontational strategy again was short-lived.  The following 
day, WAASP and AASU leaders, reflecting on the significance of the Presidential-level 
meeting, the importance of Dean Hampton’s continued purview over the program and 
the Task Force creation, met to strategize about next steps (Informants 03, 05, 021, 
027).  The next influence strategy sought to gain proponent representation on the Task 
Force. Together, group leaders penned a letter to President Kirwan to register 
dissatisfaction with the outcome—no approved program—and to urge him to reconsider 
his recommendation of yet “another task force.”  In an effort to secure the work of the 
AAS project thus far, the authors included a suggestion that if a committee was going to 
move forward, individuals already affiliated with the AAS program must be included in 
the deliberations (WAASP/AASU letter, March 13, 1997).
 In the weeks following the meeting, UGST Dean Hampton once again assumed 
the helm as the principal academic officer overseeing the AAS program and new Task 
Force.  Although technically the Provost’s responsibility, the authority of appointing 
Task Force members fell to UGST Dean Hampton. Dean Hampton, as one informant 
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observed, “…astutely recognized the practical need at broadening the consideration 
process, getting more buy-in, especially if this thing was ever going to get off the 
ground with APAC and the senate, people needed to know about it and needed to agree 
on the details…”(Informant 012).  To the Dean, opening the consideration process 
meant carefully consulting campus academic leaders (e.g., deans, department heads, 
etc.) regarding the composition of the committee. This process resulted in the 
appointment of partisan proponents and opponents, as well as those who, according to 
the Dean, previously stood “outside” of the decision making circle (Administrative 
emails, March 13, 14, 24, 25, 1997).  As a result, partisan opponents secured a chance 
to discuss and potentially influence the direction of the AAS program content face to 
face with AAS program staff and WAASP student leaders.    
Interest Articulation, Cycle Three
The creation of the Asian American Studies Task Force and subsequent 
appointment of its members marked the conclusion of the second interest articulation
cycle. Thus, the third and final interest articulation cycle began with the first meeting of 
the Task Force on AAS.  Although shorter in duration than the prior two cycles, cycle 
three represents the most contentious phase of policy making.  This phase encompassed 
the six months of Task Force meeting and deliberations, which included heated back 
and forth challenges to prospective AAS program content by supporters and detractors 
of a traditional liberal arts curriculum.  This cycle culminated with an acrimoniously 
achieved Task Force Report that contained a few compromises on the side of its 
supporters and fundamental directional flaws according to its detractors.  The Task 
Force submitted the report to the new Provost Greg Geoffrey in November 1997.
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Influence Dynamics I: Laying Claim to Content E xpertise and Task Force “Work” 
The Task Force held its inaugural meeting in May 1997.  Not all Task Force 
members were present, but those who attended expressed their points of view on record 
(Meeting minutes, May 14, 1997).  The meeting included a discussion of the current 
state of the AAS project, its funding levels and proposals submitted to the Provost. For 
this part of the meeting, Physics Professor and Chair Chuan Liu deferred to AAS 
project coordinator Professor Kim to provide a brief overview of AAS, to discuss its
intellectual connections to the broader field of ethnic studies, and to describe its 
function as an academic program at UMCP.  In this regard, Professor Kim, as AAS 
project coordinator, appeared before the Task Force as the resident expert in the policy 
matter.
After this overview and discussion led by Dr. Kim, Entomology Professor 
Michael Ma interjected that although this [discussion led by Dr. Kim] was “all well and 
good….any program put forth needs to bridge departments across campus” (Task Force 
meeting minutes, May 14, 1997).  With these comments, Professor Ma, an APA male 
faculty member from the sciences, launched the first criticism of the current AAS 
curriculum.  In an effort to ground the budding conflict about the proposal direction and 
its intellectual ties, one committee member, Professor Sheri Parks, cautioned the entire 
Task Force that:
…what we are really dealing with here is two simultaneous tasks.  We need to 
be careful because we are being asked to add Asian American Studies to the 
institutional offerings, and at the same time, to define pedagogy….there are 
inherent risks to tackling these two tasks at one time. (Meeting minutes, May 14, 
1997)
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Partisan groups stood prepared to gain Task Force-relevant advantages as a 
result of this initial meeting, in addition to the introduction of emerging conflict over 
the policy content.  Partisan proponents garnered an advantage in two ways. The first 
outcome advantage was the establishment of a meeting schedule that included two dates 
during the summer—a notoriously quiet time on campus since faculty members tend to 
be away for the summer—and two dates in early fall—a notoriously busy time on 
campus. These times, however, could work in favor of AAS Project staff members who 
would be present and working over the summer on AAS course preparation and 
administrative transition with new project leadership, ENGL Professor Sangeeta Ray.  
Second, and perhaps more important, the Chair’s creation of three “sub-
committees” and his solicitation for volunteers to address the charges of each landed 
another advantage for partisan proponents.  The first subcommittee would review and 
assess existing courses and curriculum.  This subcommittee was chaired by Dr. Ray. 
The second committee would investigate the “shortcomings of old models” of AAS 
programs.  This group was chaired by the current AAS project coordinator Dr. Kim and 
included graduate assistant William Liu as a member.  By contrast, partisan opponents 
controlled the activities of only one subcommittee, which was charged with 
investigating links to other campus programs and chaired by faculty opponent Professor 
Ma.  These committees were responsible for reporting their findings at the next meeting 
(Meeting minutes, May 14, 1997). Overall, this initial meeting produced a political win 
for partisan proponents who appeared to be positioned as legitimate players who could 
keep up with the summer meeting schedule as well as lay claim to the bulk of the 
“work” of the Task Force.
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Influence Dynamics II: Creating Outside Communication Circles to Influence Task 
Force Deliberations
With the calendar set, Task Force members, specifically partisan opponents and 
proponents, shuttled their influence efforts back and forth between Task Force meetings 
and informal conversations with administrators regarding Task Force deliberations. 
These parallel streams of debate would continue for almost four months until the final 
report was submitted. 
According to informant interviews, discussions at the summer meetings were 
heated and entrenched (Informants 03, 010, 012, 013, 016, 018, 022, 025, 027).  As one 
informant candidly observed, “It was clear….lines were drawn in the sand…there was 
little room for compromise with those who believed the program should firmly maintain 
its ties to traditional AAS programs…” (Informant 07).
UGST Dean Hampton became the authoritative intermediary, and in some 
respects, the target of influence efforts, in this cycle of the policy process.  For example, 
prior to the July meeting, faculty from both camps contacted Dean Hampton about the 
tone of the Task Force meetings.  For faculty opponents, it was again Entomology 
Professor Michael Ma who expressed his grievances about policy direction and the tone 
of the meetings:  
….there is a lot of selective listening going on…Views are often taken out of 
context and taken as ammunition against others….I would like to discuss this 
with you if I could….(Faculty correspondence, July, 27, 1997)
Task Force documents and administrative records, however, do not demonstrate that 
this request was ever addressed by Dean Hampton.  Professor Kim operated from a 
position of strength and access as she used her administrative post as AAS Project 
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Coordinator to maintain free flowing communication with the Dean.  For example, she 
held weekly meetings with Dean Hampton to discuss substantive issues related to the 
project and her transition while on sabbatical.  Inevitably, however, discussions would 
include Task Force deliberations.  In this respect, partisan proponents were able to 
sustain a clear avenue of communication with the Dean (Informants 013, 018).
By summer’s end, partisan proponents’ and opponents’ competing desires for 
the content direction of the final Task Force proposal stood at loggerheads.   
Subcommittee reports varied little from prior views expressed (Meeting minutes, 
August 15, 1997). Partisan proponents remained steadfast in their belief that any AAS 
program at UMCP must reflect the programmatic content of established AAS programs 
across the country. According to informants, Professor Sangeeta Ray was at the 
forefront of these impassioned, persuasive efforts to sway opponents and other Task 
Force members:
…She…would fight tooth and nail about the content…She is terrific, articulate 
and was well armed with information. (Informant 010)
….Sangeeta was a very impressive individual, very well spoken. She could 
filibuster things, articulate the intellectual ties to the field stronger then some of 
the organizational issues, like getting a program with international 
connections…[she] clearly could work her way around the campus priorities and 
those statistics as well. (Informant 026) 
…At some point, it went back and forth between [Michael] Ma and Sangeeta, 
and she was quite an impressive individual, quite persuasive, very passionate 
and seemed to know a lot about the field, along with the students on the 
committee, they really knew their stuff, and I think these contributions were 
really valued by the committee members, especially those who believed they 
were on the Task Force maybe because they were just Asian faculty members.
(Informant 025)  
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Professor Ray’s impressive knowledge and demonstrated expertise at these 
meetings did not sway partisan opponents.  They remained in disagreement with the 
policy terms presented by partisan proponents.  Instead, opponents were pushing for an 
18 credit program without a language or internship requirement. Opponents argued that 
this program design would allow more students, specifically those in the sciences with 
little elective flexibility, to earn a certificate.  
In addition, opponents wanted a required course from the sciences as a 
component of the certificate.  This last component, the required science course, 
appeared to be a strong contention point, according to Task Force participants. Data 
suggest that opponent faculty failed to provide the Task Force with substantiation for 
the courses they suggested be incorporated in the program. Some observers recollected 
that opposing faculty made little to no effort to suggest or develop courses to support 
the requirement they were pushing, even when asked by other Task Force members 
(Meeting minutes, August 15, 1997; 09, 10, 012, 022). One informant recalled that:
…[Task Force members] had asked for suggested courses in those areas 
repeatedly, and all [we] ever received was hypothetical topics…We needed 
concrete materials at this point in the process….[we] got no syllabi, no readings, 
no content. (Informant 018) 
On the other side, partisan proponents offered no attempts at concession either.  
They remained convinced that the intellectual connection to other AAS programs and 
ethnic studies was critical to external credibility. They supported a certificate program 
that varied little from previous proposals written by the AAS project staff.  This 21 
credit program would require students to take courses from AAS studies and cross-
listed courses in other ARHU and BSOS departments, an internship at the upper level, 
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and a basic language requirement (Meeting minutes, August 15, 1997; Informants 03, 
09, 012, 013, 018).  
At summer’s end, this dispute had taken on a broader characterization of an 
argument between what one informant called “us and them” (Informant 027). As a 
result, the apparent heal-digging tactics by both opponent and proponent faculty had left 
Task Force deliberations hamstrung by boundaries of their own philosophical 
orientations and disciplinary backgrounds
 Influence Dynamics III:  Persuasive Appeals to Authorities and Publics 
In the fall of 1997, Professor Sangeeta Ray assumed the AAS project 
coordinator role while Professor Kim took a sabbatical, and Provost Geoffrey assumed 
his first full semester on campus. In the midst of these administrative changes, the 
semester commenced with two streams of conflict in full swing—the first being the 
clear divide at formal Task Force meetings, and the second being the back end 
conversations between partisan groups and administrators, primarily Dean Hampton.  
The appeals to Dean Hampton by partisan opponents attempted to engage him to 
intervene and alter the perceived hostile climate in the meetings.  As faculty opponent 
Professor Sandy Mack wrote in an appeal to UGST Dean Hampton:
…it has not been a happy experience so far [for me]. Supporters of the original 
proposal have been strident, unwilling to budge.  A strong quasi-Marxist 
vocabulary has been aimed at anyone who recommends expanding the range of 
any potential program.  The committee has been somewhat polarized with, alas, 
both students on the side of the traditional kind of program … (Faculty 
correspondence, September 20, 1997) 
Another informant concurred with this characterization of the tone of the Task 
Force Meetings:
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…It was mean spirited….It was very personal, people were negative. (Informant 
022) 
Still other Task Force members did not view Task Force meetings as a hostile 
environment marred by personal attacks on its members. Some participants attributed 
this strife not so much to bitterly personal disputes, but rather to conflict borne out of 
differing disciplinary and professional orientations:
…They [opponents] believed it was victim studies…they did not believe that 
AAS was a discipline in itself….but at a very pragmatic level, they did not share 
a professional orientation. They made no distinction between being Asian and 
being Asian American….[proponent] faculty presented papers at AAS 
conferences, published in journals, and they [opponents] had never even heard 
of this stuff….regardless of efforts to demonstrate the viability and credibility of 
the field….arguing with folks who had never participated in the academic or 
professional life of AA studies…They [opponents] were saying ‘this is what it 
[AAS] should be…and other faculty  were saying, “well this is what it [AAS]
is….we were not making it up.” (Informant 03)
…It was clear to me that [proponents] were arguing for a program that had 
external ties and professional connections, and the ‘other side’ if you will, just 
did not share this academic connection,….Some of their ideas could have an 
administrative appeal, particularly the international connections, but this type of 
program would not flourish for long if students were not interested in the 
classes. (Informant 018) 
Still other informant observations attributed the conflict to future professional 
opportunities. Programmatic ties to a traditional AAS curriculum would continue the 
administrative and professional opportunities in ARHU, namely for faculty proponents. 
Likewise, ties to the sciences would translate into opportunities for science faculty, 
namely for faculty opponents. A few informants reflected on the potential professional 
implications that rested in the outcome of the Task Force as well as the divide over the 
program’s philosophical underpinnings, 
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..it was pure politics, really, I think over the eventual director position for the 
program, and who would get the power to do it…and that was at 
stake…(Informant 03)
…felt like there was so much tension and did not see an end to this bitter, bitter 
clash of ideas and power play for what was eventually going to be a caché 
program on campus for administrators to promote as a part of ‘diversity’…So 
here we were, mostly Asians, and we could not figure this out…A lot at stake—
credibility, the external world of AAS, what the students wanted and fought so 
hard for, and not to mention the reputations and the future of the faculty who 
were already so vested in the courses …(Informant 027) 
During the six months of meetings, both partisan proponents and opponents 
sought counsel from, and in some instances intervention by UGST Dean Hampton.  But 
now that conditions had escalated to a point at which some faculty felt the future of any 
AAS program hung in the balance, both sides again pled their case to Dean Hampton 
and other neutral Task Force members who might be swayed by their persuasive efforts.   
Partisan opponents succeeded in convincing two members to support their program 
plan, and subsequently increasing by two the number of faculty challenging proponent 
efforts. 
Opponents, seizing quickly upon their bolstered ranks of supporters, presented a 
memo to Dean Hampton in late September (Informant 010, 012, 022).  This memo 
described the deadlocked state and the proposal components they supported and 
signaled the Dean that they may be forced to take more extreme measures if 
deliberations remained intractable:
…Six of us now have been arguing for more emphasis outside the humanities. 
We argued for a minimal language component…but were met with complete 
rigidity…Some felt a credit bearing internship had to be a part of any AAS 
program—others of us felt it was improper for a university to require 
internships.  That is the only sign of compromise we have seen so far:  they 
agreed the internship would be one option with independent study or research 
acceptable as well…We put together a proposal that we genuinely feel is a 
compromise and will present this to the Chair before the next meeting (in 
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October)…If supporters of the original proposal refuse to compromise at all, at 
least five of us, all alas, male, but not all Caucasian—are prepared to vote 
against the proposal and insist on a minority report…We hope it will not come 
to this, but if it does, we thought you and perhaps the Provost should be 
informed in advance. (Faculty memorandum, September 20, 1997)
Partisan proponents employed similar influence tactics at this juncture in the 
policy conflict.  Here, informant data suggest that proponents  reiterated their 
commitment to a traditional AAS program with Dean Hampton (Informants 03, 03, 013, 
018).  During this time period, however, proponents were unaware of opponent faculty 
influence tactics, specifically the conversations with neutral Task Force members and 
the September memorandum to Dean Hampton. As one Task Force member recalled,
…It was clear by October, that they [proponents] were playing their own 
political game…They had gone backdoor and sent this memo, which Provost 
Geoffrey knew about [through Hampton], and met with other, more neutral Task 
Force folks and did not tell us about it….When we went into meetings, we had 
to relearn and reeducate ourselves at breaking down their arguments, their 
backdoor politics held things up, so they played those cards and we had to play 
whatever we had….(Informant 03)
According to the informant data above, both members of partisan groups still 
believed that Task Force deliberations were being derailed by their respective 
opponents.  These data also reflect the tenuous personalized nature of these debates, and 
sensitivity by both parties to the gender and racial composition of the groups. That is, 
partisan proponents felt their ideas—coming from APA students and female ARHU 
faculty—stood in conflict with a group of disingenuous, established male faculty 
members who represented the biases of the institution.  As some observers recalled this 
clash:
…their [opposing faculty] tactics appeared to be ageist and sexist. (Informant 
03)
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…I think they [opposing faculty] had been around campus for a while...some 
appeared a bit “unimpressed” with the students’ knowledge of ethnic studies, 
their attitudes, and their activism…and some [students] might have perceived 
this to be smug. (Informant 023)
…I know faculty pushing the program believed they were up against some 
faculty who had a lot less to lose in the organization then they did…their 
affiliation with the sciences alone could provide enough security to take on the 
ideas presented by AAS project staff…That’s the campus nature; it’s really 
driven by the agenda down the “hill.” (Informant 025)  
…I had no interest in the outcome of the Task Force as a member, but I 
understood the importance of making it happen that is, for the APA community 
and [for] a female faculty member at Maryland.  So in some respects, the 
attitudes of the opposing faculty were familiar voices to me, or rather sitting at 
table and being challenged by the senior ranks of faculty.  That is a truism about 
this campus, as is in most professions I presume, men remain at the helm.
(Informant 026)   
Thus, by October, the Task Force faced an impasse.  Partisan proponents refused 
to compromise with regard to the intellectual ties of the AAS program.  Similarly, 
partisan opponents refused to sign off on a proposal that so closely aligned itself with 
the arts and humanities and threatened to issue a dissenting report.  As some observers 
recalled, the impact of a report without consensus would have a negative public effect 
on the program’s future because it would appear that “even Asian American student 
leaders and faculty couldn’t figure out how to construct a program” (Informant 018).  
More importantly, however, a divided Task Force report would stall the AAS proposal 
indefinitely in the Provost’s office and subsequent consideration by official campus 
bodies would not occur (Informant 016).  
At this point, partisan proponents drew from the deep resource base they had 
dutifully built over the past three years.  Proponent strategy returned to WAASP 
students, who worked the broadest audience possible as a means to call attention to the 
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future status of the AAS program.  Student leaders contacted Diamondback editorial 
staff to report what they perceived to be “delay tactics on the part of some faculty and 
administrators” to move the AAS proposal forward (Informant 017).  WAASP students 
successfully convinced the newspaper to convey its grievances in an editorial.  The 
newspaper took the side of students and wrote that “when the administration believes 
that the student or group is appeased for the moment, the bureaucratic delay sets 
in….and multi-ethnic studies programs are not unreasonable requests, especially those 
programs that have established and demonstrated ties to nationally recognized 
programs” (Diamondback Editorial, October 30, 1997 , p. 4).  
This editorial, along with a series of articles convergence of demands of the 
APA students on campus, forced a written response from the administration, which was 
published on November 2, 1997.  Although Provost Geoffrey officially authored the 
reply, UGST Dean Hampton wrote the piece, which was peppered with familiar 
language about the nature of academic decision making:
…The delay is a result of adhering to collegial oversight…We are not dragging 
our feet, but instead honoring the legitimate processes of academic decision 
making on campus…and the Task Force was in the midst of writing its final 
report for the Provost. (Administrative memorandum, November 3, 1997) 
 This published statement aimed to achieve two things.  First, it publicly recast 
the status of the AAS program as a product of legitimate academic processes.  Second, 
this declaration attempted to push the issue out of public scrutiny and back into Task 
Force deliberations. And as a result, Task Force members were now accountable for a 
policy outcome in the near future.  
Partisan groups returned to the Task Force shortly after this public confrontation 
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subsided.  Both sides were cognizant that a deadlock threatened the future trajectory of 
an AAS program at UMCP, and that a minority report issued in conjunction with the 
formal Task Force report would jeopardize the credibility of a proposal presented to 
academic oversight bodies.  According to both partisan proponents and opponents, the 
gravity of the situation was made clear at the second to last meeting of the Task Force.  
At this meeting, Professor Rhonda Williams, a neutral member and a senior faculty 
from the Afro-American Studies Department, came in, and according to one participant:  
…it seemed as if the clouds parted and [Rhonda] gave us all a bit clarity…I 
don’t even think she had attended earlier meetings, so she had little historical 
baggage so to speak and she just came in, chided both sides for the bickering 
and told us there was a lot at stake—the future of any program—if we didn’t 
agree on something soon, and so the Chair directed us to work with the 
compromise we had achieved and stake out ground for future courses in the 
sciences as a part of the proposal roll-out plan…So there we were….left with 
something, even if we were still a bit dissatisfied with the result…at least our 
work, and work it was…was for something… (Administrative email, November 
24, 1997)  
On November 10, 1997, Task Force Chair Chuan Liu submitted a final report to 
Provost Geoffrey.  The report varied little from proposals submitted by AAS project 
staff over the prior five years.  The AAS program would be governed by an oversight 
committee with two “outside” faculty representatives from the sciences—and the 
development of courses in the sciences would meet elective credit requirements for the 
certificate.  The proposed budget for the program—to be overseen by a tenured faculty 
member in either of the two “base” colleges—was $300K over the next 3-5 years. The 
proposal delineated a time schedule for formal review by campus committees.  This 
time frame outlined a proposal review by both APAC and the campus Senate by the 
academic year-end and the appointment of two assistant professors to serve as faculty 
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for the program (AAS Task Force Report, November 10, 1997, p. 6).  
In some ways, issuing the proposal represented a compromise by both sides.
Both groups recognized the potential peril of a divided report after the public 
confrontation that took place in October.  Thus, Task Force findings necessitated an 
appearance of consensus in order to secure its legitimacy with administrators and to 
ensure the future of any AAS program on campus. Below this veneer of consensus, 
however, the proposal reflected a few concessions by partisan proponents and small 
wins by opponents.  These measures include the extended timetable for implementation, 
incorporation of science faculty members in the steering committee and the addition of 
elective (but not required) courses in the sciences. Overall, however, partisan 
proponents unyieldingly worked their resources, including proximity and credibility 
with Dean Hampton as well as student members of their coalition, to secure the core 
goal of developing an AAS program with ties to traditional AAS curriculums.   
The Dynamics of the Policy Process:  Phase Two, Legislative Transformation
Legislative Transformation began after this period of partisan conflict. Central 
policy actors in this phase remained carryover players from interest articulation.  This 
next phase was notably shorter and dramatically less conflict ridden, although 
opponents did attempt last minute tactics to alter the proposal submitted to APAC and 
the campus Senate.  
Partisan proponents included Drs. Ray and Kim, graduate student Will Liu and 
undergraduate student leader Christina Lagdameo. These actors fully enjoyed a wealth 
of resources including administrative status and tenure, a student base that included 
hundreds of AAS enrollees, and broad recognition both publicly on campus and with 
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senior administrators.  Overall, proponents had gained resources through their almost 
four-year struggle to institute an AAS program aligned with their professional and 
personal beliefs. On the other hand, the Task Force struggle and the policy outcome had 
left faculty opponents at a disadvantage moving forward.  These faculty members (who 
also carryover to this next phase) traded on their contacts with administrators through 
persuasive means, securing minor changes to the proposal, but failed to alter its 
fundamental philosophical components.  
Again, the primary authority for shepherding the proposal fell to UGST Dean
Hampton.  In this phase, Dean Hampton received the counsel and advice of the Provost, 
the Vice Provost for Academic Planning Victor Korenman, and Steering Committee 
Chair Tim Ng.  Although these administrators participated in this phase of 
policymaking, they did not assume a proximate role in shaping the outcome.  As one 
steering committee member noted, “…the chair, and the Provost’s office pointed us to 
the right places, but it was really on us, working with the Dean, now to get this thing 
through all the hoops” (Informant 03).  
Legislative Transformation, Cycle One
The first cycle of legislative transformation began with Provost Geoffrey’s 
acceptance of the Task Force report in December 1997.  It continued with the formation 
of the Asian American Studies Program Steering Committee in March 1998 through fall 
1999.  The submission of the final proposal for an AAS Certificate Program to both 
APAC and the campus Senate occurred shortly thereafter.  The Provost charged the 
Steering Committee with the task of “operationalizing” the Task Force report so that it 
could be considered formally by the college- level PCCs, APAC and the campus Senate 
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(Appointment letter, March 17, 1998).  Document and informant data do not indicate a 
level of conflict experienced in the prior stages of policy development.  Informant and 
document data support the general notion that this phase consisted of “ironing” out 
details such as the administrative structure and related budget lines (Informants 03, 010, 
012, 013, 016, 018, 020, 022, 026, 027).   As one Steering Committee member recalled,
…At this point, it was apparent that everybody had something vested in seeing 
the program through, even if it was the value of their time…That said, I think 
we were all under the impression that the Provost, a scientist, but still a quick 
study of UMCP culture, figured out that this thing was on the “diversity radar”
so to speak, and it needed to get done…So it was going to happen, even though 
elements of the program were still fluid. (Informant 020) 
Influence Dynamics I:  Authorities Issue Couched Endorsement of Task Force Report
Academic administrators approved the AAS proposal with a few caveats for 
moving forward. First, ARHU and BSOS Deans Harris and Goldstein submitted their 
positions and advice regarding the Task Force report prior to convening the Steering 
Committee. Each administrator offered cautionary advice for serious consideration by 
official campus academic bodies including their own respective PCC committees. This 
advice suggested limiting the initial budget contributions by participating colleges and 
utilizing existing resources and faculty in the beginning stages of the program 
(Administrative letters, February 25, 1998).  Dean Goldstein also noted the potentially 
burdensome financial cost of an internship program, even one that was optional.  
Provost Geoffrey included the Deans’ letters with his letter to Steering Committee 
members explaining the charge of the committee.  In this letter, he advised the 
committee to design an administrative and budgetary structure that reflected these 
comments.  In essence, the Provost was authorizing a conditional endorsement of the 
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AAS proposal designed by the Task Force.  It was the Steering committee’s task, then, 
to see that the AAS Proposal was modified to meet the changes specified by the Provost 
and the Deans.
Influence Dynamics II:  Enlisting External Contacts
The Steering Committee convened on a more frequent, but less formal basis 
than the preceding Task Force.  Chair Tim Ng convened meetings throughout the fall 
1998 academic semester.  During this time period, Steering Committee members began 
to work out details of an academic structure based on the suggestions of the Provost’s 
staff and administrators.  This new structure proposed participation by both ARHU and 
BSOS, provided a minimal contribution of administrative funding from each college 
and UGST, as well as half of one new junior faculty line from a related department in 
each college.  The program would be supported technically by UGST and overseen by a 
steering committee composed of faculty from ARHU, BSOS, and staff from the Office 
of the Provost.  Informant data collected from Steering Committee members supports 
the notion that the above details required minimal compromise to assemble.  Informants 
recalled the comparative ease of crafting this dimension of the proposal:
…We really just got to the point. There was little time or energy left for the 
bickering that happened in the Task Force. (Informant 03)
…I think administrators really knew how this thing was going to be structured, 
or rather needed to be structured to make it happen financially within the 
broader college budgets, so there was little for us to do…Really, all we could do 
was affirm that structure in the document. (Informant 024)
Partisan proponents tactics in this phase centered on sealing up their prior policy 
victories.  For example, proponents sensed that the internship component was on the 
chopping block because of its fiscal implications.  This threat required a return to tactics 
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of public appeal that had proven effective in past efforts.  In December 1998, these 
faculty and students activated their external networks to lobby the Chair and Provost on 
their behalf.  This campaign involved calls and letters by government officials at 
potential student internship sites, including the Office of Asian Pacific Affairs of the 
Smithsonian, the Office of Asian Pacific Affairs of the Mayor of Washington, DC, and 
the Governor of Maryland (Letters to Asian American Studies Steering Committee 
Chair, December 17, 18, 28, 1998).   
These proponent grassroots tactics—deploying their external contacts to lobby 
on for them—was met with success. Noting this significant outside interest in the AAS 
program, the Committee decided to maintain the internship as an option in the projected 
program structure in early February 1998 (Informant 005, 016, 018,027). 
Influence Dynamics III:  Opponents Lob One Last Persuasive Pitch to Dean Hampton
By February 1999, the Steering Committee was completing its work and 
administrators began to prepare a nuanced proposal, which included budget estimates 
for deliberation by the various campus academic bodies.  Only a small group of actors 
remained involved in this phase.  This group consisted of Dean Hampton, working with 
Assistant Vice Provost Victor Korenman, Steering Committee chair Tim Ng, and the 
AAS project staff (Administrative emails, February 12 and 19, 1999).  
During this time, however, faculty opponents again circumvented committee 
meetings and contacted Dean Hampton to express their lingering reservations with the 
proposal.  These concerns included the lack of financial support for any courses in the 
sciences, technology and public policy; the absence of language requiring the 
prospective AAS director be committed to an interdisciplinary approach for the 
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program; and the program steering committee’s emphasis on this interdisciplinary 
approach (Administrative email, February 22, 1999).  The group crafting the final 
proposal responded to these concerns.  Some language addressing these concerns was 
included in the final proposal; but according to one informant, it was “vague at best, but 
accepted by faculty.”  As the informant explained:
….It did urge the consideration of these things—the interdisciplinary approach, 
the allocation of “adequate resources” for faculty to develop courses in these 
other areas—but there was no ‘meat’ attached to it, no requirement or mandate 
for it, so it was just a suggestion of sorts, and now it was dependent on who 
would become the director…That is where the real future direction of the 
program would go. (Informant 07) 
By the end of the spring 1998 semester, a draft proposal was ready for 
preliminary consideration by college-level PCCs, APAC and the campus Senate. A 
budget, although initially smaller than the $300K initially sought, accompanied this 
proposal.  This new budget timeline called for an initial investment of $228K and two 
fulltime faculty.  The budget projected a growth over five years to $337K and three 
additional faculty members (Asian American Studies proposal, January 2000, p. 16). 
Legislative Transformation, Cycle Two
In fall 1999, AVP Korenman and Dean Hampton took the proposal refined by 
the Steering Committee and set a schedule for its consideration by formal academic 
decision making bodies.  These various groups include college level PCCs, APAC and 
the campus Senate.  Unlike prior phases of the policy process, this phase did not reflect 
specific influence interaction events.  Instead, this phase is marked by careful 
administrative planning—academic calendar management, and discrete, but tactical 
safeguarding measures by partisan proponents—to push the proposal through a more 
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technical, less conflict ridden cycle of policy making.  And in some ways, the nature of 
campus decision making at this level dictated that these conflicts be hammered out prior 
to reaching the university Senate.   
In the fall 1999 semester, these administrators set a calendar for consideration of 
the AAS proposal by college-level PCCs, APAC, and by the Senate.  This calendar 
projected college-level approval in early winter 2000, Senate PCC approval in early 
spring, APAC approval and final full Senate approval by semester’s end.  Partisan 
opponents were made aware of this schedule through email and phone communication 
(Proposed Timeline for Approval, November 11, 1999).  
Likewise, partisan proponents were readying themselves for a year long 
endeavor.  During the summer, AAS graduate student Chris Liang sought committee 
membership on the Senate PCC in order to ensure a swift and uncontested adoption of 
the proposal.  As one informant put it, “…this [committee appointment] was really just 
to make sure that someone was at the meetings to speak for the program and be 
available to answer questions if there were any” (Informant 02).  
Data support the claim that PCC approvals came swiftly by mid-March 
(Informants 01, 02, 03, 03, 016, 018, 019; Campus Senate PCC Log, BSS003-99067, 
Filed May 2, 2000).  At this point, according to one informant, “…APAC was already 
planning for the program in its budget, and we were given approval to announce a 
search for a director by the end of March, so it was not just a race against the clock to 
get it passed by the Senate and out the door to MHEC by mid-May…” (Informant 016).  
In fact, Dean Hampton sent a search announcement letter out during this final stage of 
consideration (Search letter, March 2, 2000).  
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A few AAS project staff attended the PCC approval meeting.  But there was 
little fanfare.  Without debate or discussion, the Senate PCC considered and 
unanimously approved the AAS proposal in April 2000 (Meeting minutes, April 23, 
2000).  On the day of the full Senate consideration, over 20 faculty members, staff and 
students attended the Senate meeting as a demonstration of support for the proposal.  
Again, there was little fanfare except for the cheers of applause when the AAS proposal 
was approved unanimously by voice acclamation of the full Senate on May 11, 2000 
(Meeting minutes, May 11, 2000).   The President and Provost endorsed the proposal 
and submitted it to MHEC on May 18, 2000.  MHEC approved the program 
unanimously in June 2000.
Gauging a Policy Win:  Summary of Policy Outcomes, and an Analysis of Relevant 
Resources and Influence Strategies
This chapter arrayed case findings according to the constructs of the conceptual 
framework guiding the study. Thus far, actors’ influence attempts, authorities’ 
responses, and the policy outcomes have been assessed at specific decision making 
points in the policy process. This final section aggregates the data in an attempt to draw 
conclusions about the final policy content, relevant actor resources, effective strategies 
and tactics, and to explain the overall influence patterns that contributed to this final 
outcome.  
As Chapter Two makes clear, an overall analytic interpretation of actor 
influence is developed by taking into account:  ( a) the content of the policy outcome 
with respect to actors’ goals; (b) the attributional data regarding actor influence; and (c) 
the descriptive data about actors’ actual influence attempts.  This information allows the 
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analyst to gauge whether or not the content of the policy outcome and data regarding 
general attributes of actors influence are plausible explanations of the outcome (Dahl, 
1984, Gamson, 1968; Geary, 1992; Malen, 1985;). Given this analytic task, this 
chapter is divided into the following sections:  (a) a summary review of the actors’ 
goals in light of policy outcomes across the phases the policy process; (b) an analytic 
conclusion regarding partisan proponent’s policy victory in relation to the attributional 
data regarding who was particularly influential; and ( c) an analytic conclusion regarding 
relevant actor resources and successful influence strategies. 
Summary of Outcome(s):  Policy Content as a Cumulative Design
Partisan proponents initiated and steadfastly fought for an AAS program that 
fostered ties to the liberal arts in both its administrative oversight and its academic 
curriculum. With regard to this policy goal, study data support the claim that partisan 
proponents attained their goal in spite of a five year battle that required overcoming the 
multiple roadblocks set by organizational and administrative changes and challenging 
vocal opposition from established faculty members. The following informant comments 
illustrate this judgment:
…It was a victory for the APA community and a lasting impact on the campus.
(Informant 017)
..The program result, in spite of the tweaks to it along the way, was a big win for 
APA students…it was a long, hard fought battle. (Informant 09)
…In the end, the content was driven by their [proponent] agenda and ideas.
(Informant 012) 
…There were some hoops and hurdles, but the net result was positive for the 
APA community at Maryland. (Informant 011)
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…Sure hindsight is 20/20, but I think …The AAS program when it was adopted 
represented a win for the APA community, especially given the nature of the 
battle and the confrontation that ensued. (Informant 05)
But to attribute this perceived win to the relative power of key actors requires an 
assessment of how actors’ achieved this outcome across the various cycles of the policy 
phases.  Put simply:  In light of these policy goals, who acted when and how, and what 
was the policy result?  The following chart arrays influence attempts by partisan 
proponents and opponents and in some instances authorities, and the resulting changes 
to the policy content:
Table 5.1 Summary of Policy Content Changes across Phases of Policy Process 
Policy Phase Actors Influence 
Attempt
Policy Response and 
Content Outcome










Berlin, Goldstein, and 
Griffith agreed to fund 
lectures but, declined 












Hampton, Griffith and 
Goldstein agree to 





petition for AAS 
courses and 
programs
Campus media coverage, 






at Town Hall 
Meeting
Extensive media 
attention; Provost Fallon 






Provost Fallon agrees to 
fund the “AAS Project” 
with $40K seed money; 
appointment of ARHU 
faculty as project 
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Policy Phase Actors Influence 
Attempt









Proposal for an 
undergraduate 
curriculum
Conceptual support for 
idea of AAS Program; 
administrative objection 








Hampton and Interim 
Provost Markley agree to
level funding for the AAS 









Hampton, Harris and 
Goldstein decline to 
endorse a program of this 






















UMCP President Kirwan, 









creation of an 
AAS program
Authorities agree to 
creation of the AAS Task 







Initial Task Force 
Meeting
Task Force Chair Chuan 
Liu assigns bulk of 
proposal development to 
current AAS staff.
Partisan Task Force Dean Hampton 
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Policy Phase Actors Influence 
Attempt










acknowledges Task Force 
factions; Task Force 
submits Proposal to 




by proponents, including 
two science faculty 
members on steering 













adheres to Deans’ 
suggestions to modify 
AAS proposed budget by 
utilizing some existing 








agrees to maintain the 
option internship








Dean Hampton and 
Steering Committee Chair 
Tim Ng acknowledge 
concern; Steering 
Committee agrees to 
incorporate related 










AAS Project Graduate 
Assistant Chris Liang 
serves as Senate PCC 
Committee member.
Authorities Direct and guide 
campus academic 
bodies in the 
approval of AAS 
Program
Adoption of AAS 
Program as modified by 
the Steering Committee 
in May 2000. 
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As Table 5.1 illustrates, the AAS program adopted by official UMCP academic 
bodies and approved by MHEC differed with the earliest drafts submitted by partisan 
proponents. In this regard, the final program content demonstrates a limit to proponent 
influence on the policy outcome. Proponents were not absolute policy victors. Their 
“win” involved compromise with, and concessions to the policy stances of other 
powerful players, the constraints of tight institutional resources, and the competing 
demands for such institutional resources. Informant data and document data support the 
conclusion that authorities, especially those key administrative allies, persuaded 
partisan proponents to compromise with regard to the original programmatic size and 
scope.  This compromise included the number of faculty lines and related budget. The 
following informant remarks highlight this assessment:
…They [supporting faculty] had to realize that some of their ideas were a “pipe 
dream,” really…Hampton told them that the whole department idea would never 
happen, way too costly and highly unrealistic…”  (Informant 007)
…A program this novel, this untested by campus’s standards was not going to 
get those kinds of dollars from administrators.  I am sure the deans said this 
outright. (Informant 017)
…[It is] hard to get new faculty lines for existing departments. There was no 
way the Provost’s office would buy into the number of faculty lines proposed by 
them [proponents].  Administrators kept replying to the proposals that the off-
line dollars existed, but it was not an unlimited pool of money…the fiscal 
implications of their ideas were just too expensive. (Informant 016)
…There were budget constraints and too much competition for existing 
resources, as well as the Provost’s “new” diversity money. (Informant 023)
…[Proponents] anticipated some scaling back on the proposal…I think 
advocates knew from the initial stages of this debate that they would have to 
give, especially if they wanted to see this thing through on principle. (Informant 
026)
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The second policy outcome variance demonstrating the limit of proponent 
influence relates to provisions in the academic content. Partisan opponents sought an 
equal treatment of science, business, and technology courses.  Document and informant 
data confirm that these actors were able to sway both the Task Force and Steering 
Committee members to include electives in the sciences, business and technology. 
Partisan opponents also were successful in securing language that required the 
appointment of science faculty members to the steering committee and the future 
director to take an interdisciplinary approach in curricular development. As informants
expressed it:
…[Opponents] they managed to get a bit of their needs addressed in that final 
document. (Informant 03)
…Their arguments were not wholly unmerited. There is a point to building a 
program that can attract outside dollars.  I think some folks saw the rational 
connection in this aspect of what they were saying. (Informant 025)  
  ...[Proponents] could not just dismiss all of their [opponents’] arguments 
outright...we are a sciences campus first, whether or not ARHU or BSOS or 
whomever wants to acknowledge it publicly, but these guys had a valid point for 
wanting some link to the sciences. (Informant 026)
Informant and document data also attribute these concessions to the ability of 
opponents to create a Task Force impasse. This impasse ultimately prompted 
proponents to agree that the stalemate threatened both the institutional legitimacy and 
the formal consideration of the AAS proposal (Task Force Meeting minutes, November 
1997, Task Force Report, cover letter, November 21, 1997; AAS Program Proposal, 
2000).  Proponents had to compromise or risk losing all for which they had worked.  
While these compromises were not sizeable, they were consequential.  These 
concessions reflected the limits of proponents’ power in a setting that favored the 
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sciences and tenured faculty from the sciences with a level of credibility that could not 
be ignored.  Informants characterized the final terms of the Task Force report in the 
following manner:
…I think we knew what was at risk overall if this stalemate went on.  These 
were small compromises.  The overall [proponent] vision remained in tact.
(Informant 018)  
…In some respect, these small compromises were the only way out.  There had 
to be movement somewhere to get this thing out of the Task Force and into the 
Provost’s hands. (Informant 07)
…Task Force members were tired of bickering...These little additions and 
changes seemed like the best route to ensuring that the AAS went forward to the 
Provost’s office. (Informant 027)      
Partisan proponents’ willingness to make concessions reflected the limits of 
their influence as well as a political strategy to ensure future policy consideration by the 
Provost.  And, as the above data indicate, these concessions came at little cost to 
partisan proponents because the compromises did not damage the philosophical heart of 
the AAS program that proponents fought so hard to safeguard.   
Partisan Proponents: Amassing a Relative Power Advantage 
Identifying winners in a policy dispute marks the beginning of the analysis of 
the political process. Next, analysts must demonstrate how these victories were secured.  
In other words, analysts must address how these victors secured the relative power 
advantage required to procure and protect an important, if not an “absolute” policy win.   
This analysis is done by unbundling the influence process. 
In this case study, partisan proponents were not experts in campus academic 
processes. Proponent faculty members were untenured, female professors in liberal arts 
disciplines.  Students, as a result of their impermanent status on campus, possessed little 
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experience in navigating the terrain of APAC, PCCs, and the campus Senate.  This 
inexperience translated into political risk, especially for faculty. They advocated 
without the security afforded by tenure, on behalf of a curriculum outside of the 
disciplinary bounds of the established campus culture; criticized the organization’s 
neglect of APA students; and threatened that the organization’s neglect of the needs of 
the APA community would no longer be tolerated. 
In spite of their inexperience, apparent professional risk for faculty, and overall 
challenge to the campus status quo, proponent group members forged ahead in their 
attempts to wield influence over the direction of the AAS program. Given their apparent 
disadvantages and risks, proponent success would hinge on their ability to amass 
politically potent resources and to skillfully deploy them during the multiple cycles of 
the policy conflict. Document and informant data attribute their success to the key 
proponent resources and related influence strategies analyzed below. 
The Convergence of Contextual Factors and the Framing APA Issues at UMCP
Contextual and informant data findings revealed an absence of administrative 
attention to, and support for APA issues.  This absence, when juxtaposed against both 
the campus legacy of discrimination and its recent rhetorical commitment to diversity 
matters, presented a contextual resource and political opportunity for proponents.  
Partisan proponents astutely recognized the opportune contextual landscape for 
considering APA issues on campus as well as the organizational significance of 
administrative inaction.  Thus, this combination of conditions presented proponents 
with not only a chance to draw attention to their issues, but also as an opportunity to 
frame the discussion and influence administrative response. 
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In the early 1990s, proponents utilized several strategies to influence campus 
constituencies. First, partisan proponents organized themselves and set clear, broad 
goals of raising the campus profile for the APA community and working toward an 
AAS program.  A small group of faculty and staff formed AFSGA.  This group sought 
redress by maneuvering the channels of academic authority on campus as best they 
knew how. These tactics included a series of memos citing the above climate forces as a 
justification for administrative support for campus APA lectures and a possible AAS 
course. Faculty and staff, relying on their only administrative contact UGST Assistant 
Dean Bonnie Oh, successfully gained attention and financial support by administrators 
for these lectures.  Although they did not receive support for the course, the attention 
from administrators and the lecture funding provided momentum for their goals.
Students, too, seized upon the potential political currency offered by contextual 
factors such as the surge in APA student demographics, a professed institutional 
commitment to diversity, and a lack of academic support for APA students as their 
opportunity to frame and justify claims of administrative negligence. With the 
assistance of APA faculty and graduate students, APA students formed the AASU as a 
venue for organizing and energizing their ranks. Through this AASU, students launched 
a public awareness campaign to frame APA issues and air their grievances.  These 
tactics included writing letters to and getting articles in The Diamondback, and utilizing
student affairs staff and services for financial support of their endeavors.  
Student leaders also called a meeting with President Kirwan as a means to 
“introduce the group, our purpose, and mission to wipe out Asian stereotypes on 
campus” (“History of AASU,” May 2001). These tactics enabled proponents to define
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APA student demands and frame the nature of the debate with campus administrators. 
Students defined the issues as the need to dismantle of APA student stereotypes, and the 
need to provide the APA community with academic and student support services.  This 
ability to frame the policy problem gave proponents a political advantage. The issue’s 
scope accurately and adeptly dramatized the campus’s inadequacies with regard to the 
APA student population, and left administrators and opponents with little ability to 
counter their arguments.  
Control of the Issue Definition and the Locus of Policy Conflict
Study data indicate that partisan proponents’ overarching success was gained, in 
part, by their unified commitment to enact an AAS program on campus.  This unity and 
commitment also fueled their gains made in prior issue defining tactics, their
professional knowledge of the field of AAS, and their willingness to monitor and 
publicize the plight of APA students on campus. These information resources helped 
proponents control the definition of the issue.  As one participant recalled, “nobody else 
appeared to know much about the field of AAS, or statistics about APA students, etc.” 
(Informant 025).  
APA faculty members and students functioned as a unified coalition that
exhibited political expertise in its ability to harness these potent resources in a strategic 
manner not only to control the issue definition, but also to control the locus of the 
policy contest.  For students, these influence attempts included tactics of demonstration 
and disruption.  Students drew expertise from their time organizing the ASU, taking 
initial AAS courses, attending national conferences, and summer leadership retreats.  As 
one informant concluded:
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…They knew their stuff; they were armed with stats about the course, the 
program needs, where the administration was failing, and they knew how to 
galvanize their members, and get the ball rolling in almost a professional, 
grassroots way…(Informant 028)
For example, students were well prepared and organized when they disrupted 
the Governor’s 1995 town hall meeting on campus.  This tactic won them a meeting 
with the Provost and funding for the AAS Project.  They launched a series of similar, 
successful public displays in 1997 as means to protest administrative stalls over the 
program and later, as a means to protest Task Force delays.    
Once the Task Force convened, partisan proponent faculty, too, relied on their 
expertise to define and control the issue.  Faculty took on subcommittee positions 
addressing the AAS proposal structure and content (Meeting minutes, May 14, 1997; 
Informants 03, 018, 027). Likewise, Dr. Kim assumed the informal role of the AAS 
expert on the Task Force by providing the group with facts and statistics about the field 
of AAS and existing academic programs.  Informant data uphold the conviction that 
these partisan proponents, armed with a wealth of information about traditional AAS 
programs, provided persuasive and passionate arguments to multiple audiences and 
most especially to the entire Task Force.  The following informant accounts support this 
notion:
…We turned to AAS faculty for the information during these meetings, in fact 
the Chair, Professor Liu, turned the whole thing over to Dr. Kim at one point.
(Informant 024)
…They were smart….They brought all these documents to that first meeting.  
They were professional and prepared.  I could tell they were serious and 
legitimate. (Informant 25)
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…I think we [Task Force members] each knew a little about Asian American 
studies, maybe just because some of were in related fields, or maybe because we 
were Asian…But these faculty knew the field, knew the experts, the 
associations, the journals…They had all the information for us. (Informant 22) 
Thus, study data indicate that partisan proponents operated in a unified and 
informed manner that afforded them the skill and tactical repertoire to shift back and 
forth between influence efforts in different conflict arenas.  They were able to 
demonstrate a respect for the “rules of the game” within the confines of the Task Force 
deliberations where their substantive expertise proved effective.  At differing times and 
at critical policy junctures, proponents also were able to engage in disruptive tactics in 
the public arena as a means to challenge the system that had neglected the concerns of 
the APA community. 
Partisan proponents moved forward into the Steering Committee process in a 
unified, politically skilled manner.  The Committee used the existing AAS proposal 
endorsed by the Provost as its template.  Partisan proponents again took this opportunity 
to ensure that their work to secure a traditional AAS program would continue to move 
forward.  They took on the task of writing and revising the proposal based on the 
suggestions raised by administrators and the Steering Committee (Administrative email, 
November 4, 1999).  Proponents maintained control over the issue definition, this time 
with the discretion over the proposal text.  Informants remarked:
..By this point, Sangeeta was doing the writing and posting it up for comments 
on our group website. (Informant 07)  
…We were not meeting in any formal fashion like the Task Force did, so the 
work, like so many committee things, fell to those who volunteered.  In this 
case, I think it was Sangeeta who was in charge of the actual document.
(Informant 015)
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…by the end it seemed more technical, the proposal part, and I think Sangeeta 
and Dr. Kim were working on getting this part together.  No different than 
before really, they had all the information and the need to talk to administrators 
because of the existing project. (Informant 07) 
By remaining united in their aims and focused on their goals, by using their expertise 
and by volunteering their time and talents, partisan proponents guaranteed that the AAS 
proposal literally remained in their hands during the critical deliberations that occurred 
in the final phase before the formal consideration of the AAS proposal by campus 
academic bodies. 
Accumulating Procedural Expertise and Administrative Allies
Although partisan proponents had their issue expertise and grassroots political 
savvy, they did not have a strong command of campus policy making or dependable 
connections with academic authorities. Early on, they lost a key administrative ally.  
They were confronted by faculty who possessed decades of expertise in dealing with 
campus academic bodies. These professors held administrative positions, connections to 
well-regarded science departments, and close working relationships with a number of 
key academic administrators.    
By comparison, study data attribute partisan proponents’ success in overcoming 
this administrative resource deficit to:  (a) their willingness to challenge administrators 
with disruptive protest tactics; (b) their ability to integrate their issue expertise as they 
developed an understanding of campus policy making; and (c) their ability to assemble 
and maintain key administrative contacts, and to some degree, administrative allies, 
especially during periods of administrative transition.  The following informant remarks 
support this claim:
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…They [students] did not possess any apparent understanding of the campus 
academic process.  This did not seem to prevent them from successfully taking 
on administrators when they believed they had been aggrieved or when they 
believed that administrators were not moving quickly enough for them.
(Informant 023)
…In some ways their early lack of knowledge of procedure didn’t matter…I 
mean, they took on the role of expert in the meetings, and they were the ones 
doing all the work. (Informant 015)
…By the end…[proponents] knew where to turn, what was coming next....there 
were no surprises in terms of all right “dances” for approval. (Informant 013) 
Document and informant data also attribute their success to their ongoing 
strategies of communicating and cultivating relationships with Dean Hampton, a 
mainstay administrator in the policy process, and the Provost.  As two observers
concluded:
…In some ways, going ahead without a college was the smartest move…This 
put them squarely in the campus wide academic agenda, in front of Dean 
Hampton and the Provost’s shop, not lost in some college that may or may not 
care about it…Especially with the Deans’ transitions in ARHU in the 1990s…
And in this case, they worked it well and they figured out fairly fast who was 
going to be making the final decisions. (Informant 023)
…Some of those early missteps eventually paid off…allowed [them] time to 
figure out who made the decisions, or at least who was around to make them, 
and [they] continued to press the Provost on the matter. (Informant 018)  
This ongoing communication by proponents forced the AAS proposal to remain an 
academic priority for authorities as well as provide some deference in academic 
decision making back to proponents. 
It was, then, proponents’ unified, committed approach and blend of influence 
tactics that offset their original administrative resource deficits in light of the relevant 
organizational resources held by partisan opponent faculty members.  This range of 
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successful influence tactics included the critical deployment of both confrontational 
protests and collegial persuasion as a means to build and to maintain relationships with 
and influence key administrators throughout the policy process. 
Chapter Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to array case study findings according to the 
categories of the conceptual framework.  Data collected were vetted into the categories 
of policy actors, their goals, resources, influence attempts and effect on the policy 
outcome through the various phases of the policy process.  These findings revealed how 
these actors utilized these resources as means to influence the policy process and obtain 
a policy outcome largely, if not fully, in accordance with their stated goals.  The 
attributional data contained in documents and informant interviews support the 
conclusion that partisan proponents secured a policy victory with the adoption of the 
AAS in 2000.  Partisan proponents acquired this victory in light of initially possessing 
an insignificant resource base and advocating a policy that posed an attack on the 
administration and the broader institutional status quo.  
Partisan proponents, however, operated in a unified manner to capitalize on 
contextual forces aligned in their favor and to wield control over the definition of the 
policy issues and the locus of the conflict. This unified approach afforded proponents 
the ability to overcome their resource disadvantages, to demonstrate adept political skill 
at controlling and maneuvering between the various conflict arenas, to build and to 
maintain relationships with and influence key authorities, and to eventually resolve 
conflict with opposing faculty members.  Their policy win reflected a few content 
concessions—all that were necessary to move the policy forward—and none that 
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threatened the core philosophical connections advocated by proponents.  Taken 
together, these case study findings illustrate how a challenging group overcame steep 
odds and achieved its major policy goals.   
192
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter serves four purposes. First, it reviews the nature of the policy 
problem, the study purpose, and the conceptual framework.  Second, it summarizes the 
research method and the study results.  Third, it offers conclusions regarding the study 
in light of the orienting conceptual framework and relevant literature. Last, it offers five 
analytic conclusions, recommends areas of potential refinement to Baldridge’s (1971) 
model, and presents recommendations for further research.  
Summary of the Policy Problem, Study Purpose, and Conceptual 
Framework
In the last decade, higher education scholars have produced a remarkable body 
of research which confirms the value and place diversity has in the institutional mission, 
academic curriculum, and student life on campus (Bowen & Bok, 1999; Chang, Witt, 
Jones, & Hakuta, 2001; Chang, 1999; Hurtado, Milem, Clayton-Pedersen, & Allen, 
1999). This research has arrived at an opportune moment as the debate over political 
correctness lingering from the late 1980s and early 1990s has mushroomed into a 
contest over the meaning, value, and prominence diversity is given in academic and 
student life on campus.  
Campus diversity debates now include heated deliberations (and external legal 
mandates) over what constitutes a diverse student body and academic curriculum, and 
are often compounded with questions about the equitable distribution of scarce 
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institutional resources.  Given this backdrop, research that demonstrates the value of 
campus diversity is even more timely because it lends tremendous credibility not only 
to the professoriate in support of innovative academic curriculum and to the viability of 
new student populations on campus, but also to administrators as they scramble to meet 
the external challenges to institutional programs and policies.   
The field of higher education diversity research is relatively nascent, and as a 
result, has yet to develop a stream that applies theoretical constructs to examine the 
process by which institutions craft new policies and programs.  As Chapter Two of this 
study showed, diversity policy research remains largely in an atheoretical holding 
pattern and provides primarily chronological and historical accounts of these protracted 
and contentious processes (Altbach, Lomotey, & Kyle, 1999; Levine & Cureton, 1998; 
Pratt, 1992; Wilson, 1999).   The noted exception to this literature is Pusser’s (2003) 
recent case study of the University of California System’s affirmative action policy, 
which utilized Baldridge’s (1971) political model as its theoretical anchor.
And, more generally, as McClendon (2003) noted in his call to the higher 
education research community, little is known about “where higher education policy 
ideas come from, how they circulate on the policy agenda…what sets of dynamics lead 
to their adoption, and how political factors shape their implementation” (pp. 171, 172).  
This lack of theoretically driven research on policy processes presents a prime 
opportunity for higher education scholars to test existing models of policy processes and 
to add a new, critical dimension to the growing body of significant diversity research.  
Given the contested nature of diversity policy issues and the absence of 
theoretical research on these issues, this study utilized Baldridge’s (1971) model of the 
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politics of campus decision making as a point of departure.  The study sought to 
contribute to both the conceptual and empirical literature on higher education policy 
making by examining the degree to which Baldridge’s theoretical ideas regarding the 
politics of campus decision making held true for one campus’s policy making process.  
Specifically, this study examined the process by which the University of Maryland, 
College Park (UMCP) developed and enacted its Asian American Studies (AAS)
program in 2000.     
Summary of Research Method and Design
Case studies by Stam and Baldridge (1971) and Baldridge (1971),  Pfeffer 
(1974, 1978), Pfeffer and Salancik (1981) and more recently, Pusser (2003) revealed 
how students, administrators, and other campus members came to influence the policy 
process to reach a policy outcome. Following these precedents, this research also 
employed the case study method primarily as a means to “assemble a holistic picture of 
the institution,” particularly those dynamics which can only be revealed through 
multiple data sources such as documents and interviews with policy actors (Baldridge, 
1971, p. 32).  Data sources for the study included:  secondary sources such as 
periodicals; primary documents from official campus policy statements and 
administrative correspondence; a video recording of a pivotal meeting with campus 
academic leaders; and informant interviews.  Interview data from 28 informants and 
information elicited from primary and secondary documents combined to create the rich 
data base for this case study.  
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Summary of Study Findings
This study examined the process by which the AAS program at UMCP was 
created and adopted.  Study findings illuminated a highly charged policy process that 
reflected a protracted struggle by a small group of predominantly female Asian Pacific 
American (APA) faculty, staff and students who advocated for the creation of an AAS 
program.  With few relevant organizational resources on their side, these partisan 
proponents effectively pushed forward to focus campus wide and administrative 
attention to the needs of the APA student community.  This policy contest unfolded 
over several years, yielded multiple policy iterations, and included partisan proponents’ 
intense conflict with a group of tenured male faculty members, all of whom had 
affiliations with well-known campus departments and experience dealing with senior 
academic officials.  In the end, however, partisan proponents overcame their initially 
stark resource disadvantages and achieved their policy goals of enacting an AAS 
program that reflected only a few minor concessions to the desires of partisan 
opponents.  This next section, then, summarizes and explains how this small group 
secured a policy victory. 
Case Antecedents and Issue Background
A number of contextual factors shaped the policy process.  These factors 
encompassed structural and issue-specific features of the organization.  The first 
contextual factor was the set of cultural norms and formal channels of campus academic
decision making, including the authoritative actors who held administrative purview 
over policy and programmatic decisions.  The second contextual factor was the set of 
financial constraints and related shifts in organizational planning and purpose.  The 
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final contextual factor includes the historical antecedents of diversity and APA issues 
on campus.  In combination, then, these contextual factors created both the structural 
and issue landscape for consideration of the AAS program. 
Most broadly, study findings pointed to an academic policy making process at 
UMCP that followed organizationally-specific cultural norms.  These norms included 
the need for broad support and backing of new multidisciplinary programs, the 
consensual oriented, conflict adverse nature of the Senate, and the rubber-stamp 
approval process by external bodies like the Maryland Higher Education Commission 
(MHEC).  Formal bodies such as Academic Planning Advisory Committee (APAC ), 
college Programs and Curriculum Committees (PCCs), and the campus Senate also 
maintain discretion over the path of academic decision making, and set the formal 
“rules of the game.”   In this case, however, these regularized action channels were not 
significant or deliberative arenas for development and consideration of the AAS policy.  
Instead, case study findings highlighted the significance of academic authorities within 
the Office of the Provost, who held jurisdiction over programmatic decisions and hence, 
were targets of partisan influence and arenas of accommodation. 
Bleak budget conditions, which created an overall campus climate of restraint 
and scrutiny around funding for academic programs, were another contextual factor 
shaping the AAS policy process. This fiscal climate gave way to the 1996 Strategic 
Plan, which served as the guiding document for tying academic priorities and program 
decisions to controlled budgets.  This plan provided opportunities for funding new 
academic programs on an “off line” basis and ceded authority to then Provost Fallon—
an early ally in the development of the AAS program.  In sum, the stark fiscal picture 
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could have shut down the development of the AAS program, but the diversity 
provisions of the 1996 Strategic Plan lent legitimacy to partisan proponents’ 
programmatic demands.
Finally, UMCP possessed a complex history and climate when it came to 
matters of diversity.  Issue-specific contextual findings revealed a legacy of 
discrimination on campus, an evolution in administrative attention to, and formal 
policies regarding diversity as a stated value not only in institutional mission, but also in 
public rhetoric and campus-wide programmatic efforts.  These contextual antecedents, 
when situated in combination with the increases in APA student demographics and the 
absence of support for these new students of color, created an issue-related contextual 
readiness for partisan proponents to push for an AAS program.   
Actors, Goals, and Resources
Study data supported the conclusion that three central groups of actors played 
critical roles in the development and adoption of the AAS at UMCP. Partisan 
proponents consisted of APA faculty members, staff, graduate and undergraduate 
students.  Group goals evolved over time.  Initially, the group agreed that public 
attention to APA issues was a paramount goal.  Later on, as the group secured a more 
sophisticated understanding of campus processes and administrative contacts, 
proponents worked toward the creation of an AAS academic program.  
Partisan proponents held an array of contextual and member-based political 
resources.  The issue-related contextual currencies included the surge in APA student 
numbers, the shifts in academic priorities and decision making parameters, and the 
public proclamations of administrative commitment to diversity.  Proponent resources 
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also included an external network of activists in the field of AAS, professional expertise 
in the field of AAS, prior experience in AAS grassroots organizing, administrative 
capacities derived from oversight of the AAS project, and the hard-earned trust and 
respect of key authoritative decision-makers.  Arguably one of the most important 
resources for proponents was their unified and steadfast commitment to creating the 
AAS at UMCP in spite of the apparent organizational obstacles and lengthy policy 
process.  
Partisan opponents included four tenured, male faculty members. These faculty 
members did not oppose the creation of the AAS program.  Rather, they stood opposed 
to the AAS program content and structure advocated by partisan proponents.  More 
specifically, this small group of actors took a vocal stance against the proposed 
programmatic tie to the liberal arts with claims that such a program reflected nothing 
more than ‘victims’ studies,’ and contained content far too narrow and parochial for the 
College Park campus.  
Partisan opponents held a number of key positional and administrative 
resources.  All four held tenure and possessed a vast knowledge of campus procedures, 
culture, and administrative habits.  All four faculty members were male on a campus 
dominated by male leadership. Two of the four faculty members were APA professors 
in the sciences on a campus traditionally rooted in the sciences.  All group members 
held campus leadership positions at some point in their respective careers, whether 
these posts were academic or administrative. Given these resources, this group 
approximated the administrative and professorial culture on campus and stood well-
versed in campus processes, procedures, and priorities. 
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Only a few key authorities played a central role in the creation of the AAS. 
This group included academic administrators in the Provost’s office, most notably 
African American UGST Dean Robert Hampton, and the Provost himself. UGST Dean
Hampton was the only authority to express support of an AAS program throughout the 
policy process. Other administrators expressed similar sentiments, but did not assume a 
proximate role in the policy process during the lengthy four-year interest articulation 
stage.  Administrators such as the Provost and college Deans assumed a consultative 
role and consistently worked to ensure the financial feasibility any new academic 
program enacted.
Authorities possessed a number of positional powers and personal resources.  
From his position, the Provost retained the power to establish and to fund AAS courses 
and related activities, as well as to consider, to endorse, and to reject AAS proposals
submitted by AAS project staff. Day-to-day operational oversight of such activities, like 
the AAS project, fell to UGST Dean Robert Hampton. Neither the Provost nor the 
Dean, however, was responsible for the content development of an AAS program. This 
responsibility fell to the partisan groups, and later to the Task Force, as academic 
content development resided in the authoritative purview of the campus faculty. 
Personal resources varied with the individual administrators who were part of 
the prolonged policy process.  Three different White male Provosts considered the AAS
program. Provost Daniel Fallon (1993-1996) held a background in the liberal arts, 
understood the field of ethnic studies, and much like President Kirwan at the time, 
maintained a strong desire to implement the campus’s diversity agenda.  Interim 
appointee Nelson Markley (1996-1997) did not have this background or share these 
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priorities.  Provost Gregory Geoffrey (1997-2001), although a scientist by training, 
understood the organizational commitment to matters of campus diversity and offered 
general support for the creation of the program.
Administrative turnover, particularly in the Provost’s office (three new Provosts 
in four years) and college Deans (Arts and Humanities, ARHU, and Behavioral and 
Social Sciences, BSOS), contributed to limited and routine involvement by authorities. 
Given this administrative instability, UGST Dean Hampton served as proponents’ only 
key ally throughout each phase of the policy process. Dean Hampton had purview over 
the AAS project, but also possessed essential personal resources.  These resources 
included his background as an African American who advocated for ethnic studies 
programs on other college campuses, an understanding and respect for the official 
academic channels, and a desire to assist partisan proponents develop a clearer 
understanding of this process.  
Dean Hampton proved to be a pivotal player on behalf of partisan proponents, 
especially in light of the administrative changes in key decision making posts. This dean 
possessed the ability to communicate directly with the Provost, APAC, college deans, 
and the campus Senate.  More significantly, Dean Hampton served as the sole 
authoritative expert on the AAS program within administrative decision making circles.  
In this regard, Dean Hampton possessed the power and demonstrated the willingness to 
keep the AAS proposal on the agenda of the new Provost(s).
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Summary of Policy Outcomes, and an Analysis of Relevant Resources and
Influence Strategies
Study findings suggested that partisan proponents attained their goal of enacting 
an AAS program in spite of a long battle that included multiple obstacles created by 
organizational and administrative changes, and by tenacious vocal opposition from 
established faculty members. This partisan proponent victory represented a policy 
compromise because it contained two policy variances that differed from the original
goals espoused by partisan proponents.  
First, opponent authorities indicated that the size and scope of the 1995 original 
program would not receive approval because it was not budget-neutral.  The financial 
scope of this proposal would have required authorities to engage in the redistribution of 
already scarce academic resources. Over time, partisan proponents, especially faculty 
members, realized the long-term consequences that pushing a program of this size 
would have on their ability to secure serious consideration by the Provost’s office and 
APAC.  In this respect, proponents agreed to an administrative-directed compromise 
that reduced the number of faculty lines and budget allocations, and thereby avoided 
battles that a larger AAS program might have triggered because of its affect on the 
funding of other campus programs.
Second, the AAS academic content and structure were a source of partisan 
contention during Task Force deliberations.  Partisan proponents vehemently contested 
the philosophical content perspectives espoused by opponent faculty.  Specifically, 
proponents protested provisions to include electives in the sciences, language to require
the appointment of science faculty members to the steering committee, and effort to 
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require the future director to take an interdisciplinary approach in curricular 
development.  In the end, however, opponent faculties’ threat of a Task Force dissenting 
report and Professor Rhonda William’s remarks regarding the nature of the division
among Task Force members, convinced partisan proponents that their intractability had 
serious implications for the future of the AAS program.  Thus, the Task Force report 
reflects partisan proponent concessions to opponent faculty members, although the 
provisions did not undermine proponents’ overall philosophical direction for the 
program.  
Several specific factors enabled partisan proponents to secure this victory.  First, 
relevant issue-specific social conditions bolstered proponents’ advocacy.  Since the 
campus possessed a stormy history with respect to student diversity, the newly adopted 
administrative rhetoric and programmatic efforts sought to improve the academic and 
social conditions for students of color.  Although student demographics reflected a 
surge in APA student enrollments by the early 1990s, administrative attention to and 
support for APA issues remained modest during this time.  This discrepancy between 
administrative rhetoric and campus realities, especially in the APA student community,
presented itself as a potent contextual resource.  These conditions provided APA 
student groups a mechanism for drawing public attention to their claims as well as a 
legitimacy regarding these claims with administrators as they argued for more campus 
support for their needs.  
Second, partisan proponents’ persistence and unity fueled their ability to 
successfully control the definition of the issue and the locus of the policy contest. As 
mentioned earlier, proponents skillfully saw the absence of substantive attention to their 
203
growing presence as an opportunity to draw attention to and to shape both the 
administrative and the public campus narrative regarding the needs of the APA student 
community. Both students and faculty engaged in these early issue-defining tactics.  
Students acted through coalescing measures like creating the A sian American Student 
Union (AASU) , establishing contacts with, and gaining publicity from campus media,
organizing public protests, and dramatizing demands for administrative action.  For 
faculty, these early issue-defining strategies included efforts to highlight the stark 
absence of academic courses to support APA communities, to introduce academic 
administrators to the field of AAS, and to describe its orientation and roots in the liberal 
arts, all through memo requests for AAS lecture and course funding. 
Later, proponents’ expertise in the area of AAS studies and related ability to 
make political meaning of the conditions of the campus’s APA population afforded 
them a critical level of political control. Drawing on their issue expertise, partisan 
proponents’ operated in a skilled and unified manner to direct and influence the policy 
outcome as it shifted to and from various arenas.  For example, students, armed with 
campus statistics about APA student enrollments, current AAS course offerings, and 
lack of administrative follow-through on strategic planning and AHNA Task Force 
recommendations, successfully engaged in disruptive demand tactics. In similar acts of 
astute politicking, proponent faculty and staff relied on their issue expertise to take 
control of the policy definition and related content contests during the Task Force 
deliberations and Steering Committee process.   
Third, partisan proponents’ accumulated administrative expertise and ability to 
cultivate an internal, authoritative “policy champion” afforded them the access and 
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proximity to successfully influence higher-level decision makers.  Partisan proponents 
began their advocacy efforts constrained by a lack of administrative contacts and 
procedural knowledge.  Along the way, however, proponents overcame this deficit by
accumulating an understanding of campus academic processes, which was derived 
chiefly from the three years of running the AAS project.  Proponents also astutely 
recognized the instability produced by turnover in key decision making posts like the 
Provost, and the resulting need to secure the support of UGST Dean Hampton who 
could act as their lobbyist within the administrative ranks on campus.  
And finally, in the face of administrative hesitation, proponents demonstrated 
the willingness and the skill to engage in disruptive tactics in order to reignite the policy 
process. In this respect, proponents’ skillfully shuttled their tactical efforts between the 
public and administrative arenas of influence as a tool for advancing the consideration 
of the AAS policy,  
Study Conclusions 
In the field of higher education research, Baldridge’s (1971) model is the only 
empirically grounded and research-derived theory available to explain campus decision 
making in political terms. In this study, Baldridge’s model appears to be a durable 
theoretical tool.  This studied tested its tenets against a new set of issues—campus 
diversity policies—in a new setting—a large, public research university and illuminated
the model’s overall utility as a means to broaden understanding of diversity policy 
processes on college campuses.  
Just as Pusser’s (2003) application of Baldridge’s (1971) original model and 
study findings suggested conceptual adjustments, the findings from this case study also 
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highlight components of the model that appear suited for theoretical refinement.  These 
areas include the nuances of the interest articulation phase, the significance of the policy 
context, the significance of actor resources in protracted policy conflicts, and the 
importance of actors’ political skill and will. This section, then, offers five analytic 
conclusions in light of Baldridge’s original theory and proposes areas for potential 
refinement. 
1. Baldridge’s political model is a valid, problem appropriate tool for 
researching diversity policy making on campus.
2. Interest articulation may serve as the primary phase of conflict when 
challenging groups seek to impose new demands on the institution. 
3. Contextual forces may be viewed as critical political resources for 
challenging groups.
4. The influence capacity of a challenging group may be contingent on its 
ability to develop and sustain a diverse resource portfolio; and
5. The influence capacity of a challenging group may be contingent on actors’ 
entrepreneurial skill and will in the political arena. 
Conclusion One: Baldridge’s Political Model is a valid, problem appropriate 
tool for researching diversity policy making on campus. 
Baldridge’s case study research from the late 1960s and 1970s marked a 
departure from conventional collegial and bureaucratic theories about the nature of 
campus policy making.  Baldridge’s application of political theory proved to be a rich 
new lens for generating data and propositions about campus policy making.  In his 
research, Baldridge adapted two prevailing political perspectives—systems and 
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behavioral—to conceptualize and capture the dynamics of political struggles on college 
campuses. From these studies, Baldridge derived five fundamental assumptions about 
the nature of campus policy making: (a) inactivity prevails; that is, policy is made by 
the few and the active; (b) policy actors participate in decisions in a fluid manner by 
moving in and out the process; (c) fragmented interested groups align according to their 
policy goals and clash in competition for organizational resources; (d) formal authority 
is limited by interest group pressures; and (e) external groups attempt to influence 
policy decisions.  These overarching assumptions withstood the test of time in this case 
study.
The first assumption—that inactivity is the prevailing norm for organizational 
members and that decisions are made by a small group of active members—is reflected 
in the case of the AAS.  Document and informant data demonstrated that the AAS 
program came about because of ongoing advocacy efforts of a very small group of 
dedicated faculty, staff, and students.  This tenet held true throughout the various phases 
of the policy process, and even endured through formal academic decision making 
arenas, where this small group of partisan proponents, together with key authoritative 
allies, directed the formal adoption of the AAS program.  
For example, the same APA faculty members, Seung-kyung Kim and Sangeeta 
Ray, graduate student William Liu, and until her graduation in 1998, undergraduate 
Christina Lagdameo, operated as the core advocacy group for partisan proponents.  This 
group outlasted multiple cycles of interest articulation including: (a) earliest faculty 
advocacy efforts in 1993; (b) student demands to the Provost for action and subsequent 
creation of the AAS Project in 1995; (c) student challenges to President Kirwan in 1997 
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and subsequent creation of the Provost’s AAS Task Force; and (d) proponent challenges 
during Task Force deliberations.  Likewise, the partisan opponent group was comprised 
four core faculty members throughout the majority of policy process. These faculty 
members, Honors Program Director Sandy Mack, Entomology Professor Michael Ma, 
Department of Asian and East European Languages and Cultures Chair Robert Ramsey, 
and Microbiology Professor Robert Yuan, participated in meetings prior to, and during 
Task Force deliberations.  
The second assumption—that policy actors must persist in order to prevail—
describes another attribute of the policy process.  That is, since not all policy actors 
remain constant through the phases of decision making, decisions are usually made by 
those actors who invest in and stay with the process. This assumption held true for 
actors involved in the creation of the AAS program. Even partisan proponents, who 
operated successfully with a unified core, had members move in and out of their 
coalition. For example, proponents lost an administrative ally early on when Bonnie Oh 
left the university.  Students also reflect the impermanent nature of actors in the policy 
process because they come and go upon graduation, as was the case with WAASP 
student leaders Wendy Wang and Christina Lagdameo, who graduated in 1996 and 
1998, respectively.  
Partisan opponents, too, operated with a small, consistent core as they 
challenged the content direction advocated by proponents.  But these core opponent 
faculty members were not present and persistent over time like their counterparts, and 
in the end, these actors faced “advocacy extinction,” as time for influencing the policy 
outcome ran out. Opponents were successful in obtaining a few concessions during
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Task Force deliberations, but by the time the proposal reached the Steering Committee, 
its philosophical orientation remained loyal to the goals of partisan proponents. Thus, 
opponents’ entrance into the policy process came too late to undo the philosophical 
direction originally enacted with the project’s creation in 1995.  
The third assumption—that interest groups are fragmented—captures Dahl’s 
(1984) notion that power is distributed throughout the organization and that various 
groups align according to their goals and clash as they compete for scarce 
organizational resources. In this case, APA faculty, staff and students organized into 
formal interest groups based on their positions and roles within the academy. Through 
these new alliances, group leaders worked together to direct broad public attention to 
administrative and academic inadequacies in the APA community on campus.  Partisan 
proponent faculty also directly pushed for AAS course funding from administrators.  
Later, students exerted pressure on campus administrators by making their claims and 
demands public. In 1995, they aired their grievances about the inadequate distribution 
of campus resources when they issued a direct challenge to the Provost to fund APA 
programs and AAS courses.  Administrators created and funded the AAS Project in 
response to this student pressure.  In 1997, students issued a public threat to President 
Kirwan regarding the stall on delivery of the AAS program expansion. Again, 
administrators responded to student pressure with a new vehicle for dispute resolution 
in the form of the AAS Task Force.     
The policy process became further fragmented and conflict-ridden as it 
incorporated multiple groups partisan proponents and opponents. Partisan proponents 
battled opponent faculty members who advocated an AAS program aligned not only to 
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some members’ disciplinary ties to the sciences but also aligned with the science 
leanings of the majority culture on campus.  This conflict also reflected partisan group 
competition over the future distribution of program resources, which would be tied 
directly to whichever philosophical orientation won the day.  
The fourth assumption—that formal authority is limited—recognizes the policy 
making boundaries of academic officials. While changes in academic planning and 
policy making concentrated a great deal of financial discretion in the Provost’s office
and APAC, UMCP’s academic officers still did not possess the ability to create the 
AAS program by “fiat.”  UMCP’s organizational habits, traditions, and formal rules 
delegated this responsibility (and dispersed power) to campus faculty members.  More 
important, partisan groups’ influence tactics could pressure authorities and shape the 
content of policy outcomes.  In the case of the AAS, this pressure resulted in three 
significant negotiation points for partisan proponents:  the creation of the AAS Project; 
the creation of the Provost’s Task Force; and the report of the Task Force.   
The creation of the AAS Project and the Provost’s Task force demonstrated the 
ability of partisan groups to exert pressure on authorities, and thereby, limit authorities’ 
control and scope of the distribution of organizational resources.  In both instances, 
student pressure forced an administrative response to demands regarding the AAS 
program.  The creation of the AAS Project reflects an authoritative allocation in order to 
meet the demands of an interest group.  Likewise, the creation of the Provost’s Task 
Force reflects a subsequent attempt by authorities to house policy negotiations. During 
these Task Force deliberations, both partisan proponents and opponents exerted 
pressure on authorities to intervene in order to mediate policy differences.  Authorities 
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did not intervene directly.  Instead, both groups, recognizing the potentially disastrous 
implication of their impasse, negotiated a few compromises—albeit conciliatory by 
opponent’s stances—in order to issue Task Force findings.        
The fifth and final assumption—that pressure also comes from external 
groups—reflects the susceptibility of campus to outside forces as well as human agents.  
The AAS Program was the result of external forces on many levels.  Contextually, both 
the external and internal policy landscape shifted tremendously in the late 1980s and 
1990s with regard to the issue of diversity.  External financial and legal mandates 
forced the campus to retool its overall planning constructs.  In doing so, campus 
academic planning embraced the ideas of a diverse student body and an academic 
curriculum to support the intellectual engagement of these students.  This profound 
value shift influenced the campus’s readiness for considering and creating new policies 
and programs to address the interests of students of color.  
On some level, the broader campus provided an “external context” for micro 
considerations of the AAS policy conflict.  Agents in this more macro arena, 
particularly campus media, attempted to shape the outcome of the Task Force 
deliberations when they publicly sided with the philosophical stance of partisan 
proponents and chided the stall tactics of some opponents and administrators.  In part, 
this public declaration forced partisan groups to return to the bargaining table in order to 
reach a compromise and move this policy forward again.   
Given these conceptual congruencies, this study clearly demonstrates that the 
political model is an appropriate lens for capturing and analyzing the dynamics of the 
academic policy making process.  Study findings aptly demonstrated that the AAS 
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program was the resultant of multiple groups advocating differing policy goals; and that 
these groups clashed as they attempted to influence and bring pressure to bear on 
authorities, who in turn helped negotiate and broker issues in order to obtain a policy 
outcome. 
Conclusion Two: Interest articulation may serve as the primary phase of policy 
conflict when challenging groups seek to impose new demands on the institution.  
Baldridge (1971) conceptualized the policy process as one that unfolds in 
various phases. In the interest articulation phase, actors align according to their values 
and goals, and engage in strategic attempts to influence the policy outcome through 
“formal channels of the system” (Stam & Baldridge, 1977, p. 564). Baldridge’s (1971) 
model, however, does not treat the occurrence of policy conflict as the primary attribute 
of this phase. Rather, he argued that the legislative transformation phase is usually 
characterized by intense conflicts that require resolution. In this particular case, 
however, the heart of the policy conflict occurred during multiple cycles of a protracted 
period of interest articulation, not in the legislative phase when proposals enter the 
formal channels discussed by Baldridge.   
The AAS policy conflict began as a partisan proponent-authority dispute.  APA 
faculty and staff began their push for the AAS program in the early 1990s when they 
solicited administrators for course funding.  This initial effort was met with 
administrative caution and no immediate course funding.  In the broader policy setting, 
APA issues were brewing on campus and students were organizing and readying their 
campaign for campus attention to their demands.  In 1995, AASU student leaders led 
protests against perceived administrative inaction.  Administrators responded to student 
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demands with the creation of the AAS project.  
With the administrative and financial resources of the AAS project on their side, 
partisan proponents moved forward with their efforts to lobby for an AAS program 
sanctioned by the university.  AAS Project staff filed a written program proposal with 
the Provost in 1995 and 1996.  Both proposals were met with administrative hesitation; 
and in 1996, turnover in the Provost’s position appeared to threaten the long term 
viability of the project.  AAS project coordinator, Dr. Seung-Kyung Kim, fearing the 
loss of program funding with this transition, circumvented the UGST Dean’s office and 
petitioned the Interim Provost directly for assurances that the program would continue.  
Administrators responded with funding for two academic years.  
Still, the locus of the policy conflict remained largely outside the traditional and 
formal venues of academic program approval on campus.  By early 1997, students were 
mobilizing again to challenge what they believed was the lack of progress of the AAS 
project.  Students launched a public campaign against the campus administration 
because officials were hesitant to fund a program so large in scope.  Administrators 
called a presidential-level meeting in response to student protests and teach-ins.  The 
outcome of this meeting with then President Brit Kirwan was the creation of the first 
AAS Task Force.  
This Task Force marked two significant changes in the policy conflict.  First, it 
reflected the shift in the nature of the conflict relationship from partisan-authority to 
proponent-opponent-authority.  Second, it represented a shift in the nature of the 
conflict dispute from that of a policy demand to that of a full-fledged policy contest.  
That is, the dispute erupted over what would constitute the AAS policy content as 
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opposed to whether or not there would be an AAS program at all.  
Given these findings, the multiple cycles of interest articulation in this 
particular case study do reflect Baldridge’s (1971) overarching notion that the policy 
outcome is a result of a series of interrelated decision making events, not just a single, 
cataclysmic policy “epiphany” arrived at by policy actors.   But findings also illustrate 
that the heart of the conflict occurred primarily in the interest articulation phase, not in 
the legislative transformation phase as Baldridge posited.  
Baldridge derived the various policy phases not only from his studies of campus 
politics, but also from Gamson’s (1968) studies of community politics in the 1960s.  In 
doing so, Baldridge stood on the frontier of conceptualization of the political dynamics 
of academic policy making.   However, conceptualizations of political processes have 
gained intellectual ground since the advent of Baldridge’s studies.  Constructs 
developed after Baldridge’s seminal studies may assist in unbundling the multiple 
iterations of policy events and the locus of policy conflict prior to official legislative 
action. 
For example, Kingdon’s (1995) research of governmental policymaking directs 
analytic attention to the fluid concept of the policy agenda, which captures the issues or 
problems that political actors may be paying attention to, especially prior to legislative 
consideration.  Kingdon’s construct requires a determination of:  (a) the setting of the 
policy agenda: and (b) the specification of alternatives from which a choice is made.  
These analytic benchmarks attempt to address the overarching question:  why do some 
subjects become more prominent on the policy agenda and others do not?  Given these 
parameters, the construct of the policy agenda may provide more specificity as a means 
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to capture and illuminate the nuances of conflict that may occur during the interest 
articulation phase.  
Turning analytic attention to Kingdon’s (1995) idea of the policy agenda could 
provide an important enhancement for examining diversity issues and academic policy 
making under the political lens originally laid out by Baldridge (1971). In this case, 
partisan proponents advocated an academic program that challenged the organizational 
norms on many fronts.  This study demonstrated that given the nature and goals of the 
policy advocated by partisan proponents, the agenda setting process, not the legislative 
process, housed the protracted policy battle.
In sum, this study’s findings about the level of policy conflict in pre-decisional 
phases of the policy process suggest e nhancing Baldridge’s original notion of the 
interest articulation phase by incorporating Kingdon’s constructs as a means to analyze 
these influence dynamics.  The construct of “agenda setting” offers an analytic frame to 
explain how issues and ideas reach the policy agenda within a given social structure by 
examining contextual developments and by analyzing the resources and strategies actors 
utilize to manipulate and shape the nature and scope of the policy issue prior to formal 
consideration by legislative bodies. 
Conclusion Three: Contextual forces may be critical political resources for 
challenging groups.
Baldridge (1971) advised researches to cast a large net when assessing the first 
category of the policy process, the decision making context. This analytic scan allows 
the researcher to connect and situate organizational dynamics with internal and external 
factors that may contribute to the policy making dynamics. Like Baldridge posited, 
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context played an important role in shaping the landscape of the AAS program 
initiatives at UMCP.  Document and informant data revealed a number of important 
contextual forces that anchored the path of the AAS program.  These forces included
the structure of formal policy making, the campus transformation with regard to 
academic planning and mission, the campus’s history with diversity issues, changes in 
student demographics and related issues of insufficient institutional support. 
In accordance with Baldridge’s (1971) recommendations, analysis of the policy 
context revealed the formal procedures and norms of academic policy making at UMCP
and provided contextual grounding for understanding the policy path of the AAS 
program.  For instance, study findings revealed that the formal arenas of policy 
consideration—the campus Senate and academic policy committees—uphold a norm of 
attending to policy details (and debate) prior to consideration of program initiatives by 
formal bodies.  It indicated a likeliness that conflict over the AAS would occur outside 
these decision arenas.  In addition, this set of contextual findings pointed to the 
Provost’s increased discretionary budgeting authority and in turn, pinpointed a potential 
target of partisan influence. 
The next stream of contextual findings illuminated important issue–specific
organizational factors, which created a policy “readiness” for considering the AAS 
program. UMCP’s recent transformations in academic planning highlighted the 
campus’s formal commitment to attend to diversity not only in its enrollment of 
students of color, but also in its attention to academic programs to support a diverse 
student body.  Specifically, new campus strategic plans aligned diversity related 
academic programs with the Provost’s ability to fund these new programs and provided 
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proponents with a rationale they could use to press administrators for a program.
Study findings also presented a portrait of stormy race relations on the campus
and historical legacies of discrimination.  External legal challenges and mandates forced 
the campus to rethink not only its enrollment practices, but also its entire approach to 
educating a diverse student body.  In this respect, study findings revealed an 
organizational imperative and an administrative willingness to address the interests and 
demands of students of color.   
The final and most important contextual finding to support the demands 
expressed by partisan proponents related directly to the dramatic surge in APA 
enrollments during the early 1990s. This population shift and the absence of substantial 
institutional support for these new students—situated in combination with other 
diversity elements like the organization’s tenuous racial history and new found 
organizational commitment to diversity—contributed to proponents’ ability to 
dramatize and expose discrepancies between administrative rhetorical commitments and 
real-time inadequacies with regard to APA issues on campus.    
Although the policy context is an important component of Baldridge’s (1971)
model, this construct may have greater utility.  In this case, the policy context served as 
a political resource for partisan proponents.  For example, study findings suggested that 
partisan proponents successfully harnessed the persuasive appeal of contextual elements 
such as the campus’s weak organizational history with diversity issues and surges in 
APA student demographics to underscore the urgency and legitimacy of the demand for 
an AAS program.  
Faculty proponents cited these contextual factors in their first letters to academic 
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administrators.  Students, too, repeatedly called on these contextual factors when they 
publicly and vehemently demanded redress for prior administrative neglect and current 
student grievances.  In this regard, these contextual conditions served as a crucial 
resource: (a) to bolster partisan proponent’s rationale for and appeal of the program 
with administrators; and (b) to draw public attention to the legitimacy of student-voiced 
grievances with administrators.       
This additional analytical finding—that social conditions may be potent political 
resources—extends Baldridge’s (1971) model and brings it closer to the more refined 
construct of the “political opportunity structure” (Gamson & Meyer, 1996).  As 
scholars have discussed, the social policy context does not lie inert; rather it contains 
potential political currencies for “human agents” (Gamson & Meyer, p. 276).  The 
resulting “political opportunity structure” reflects a set of intertwined social and 
structural conditions that “open and close political space” for social action by mobilized 
political actors.  In this case, it was partisan proponents who adeptly recognized the 
political significance of contextual factors and seized them as a means to create the 
political space to justify and advance the AAS program through the policy process. 
 In this regard, the original social context construct outlined by Baldridge (1971)
might be recast as a bifurcated construct. As Baldridge posited, the social context may 
serve as an analytic frame to assess the factors that predetermine what Allison (1971) 
termed “the playing field” of the policy process   Second, the social context also may 
serve as an analytic tool to capture Gamson and Meyer’s (1996) notion of the political 
opportunity structure, which views social conditions as a source of currencies to support 
the collective efforts of partisans in their influence attempts. 
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Conclusion Four:  The influence capacity of a challenging group may be 
contingent on its ability to develop and sustain a diverse resource portfolio
Stam and Baldridge (1977) defined resources as the “weapons that a group may 
use to pressure authorities on an issue” (p. 563).  The potency of such resources may be 
dependent on the substance and context of the policy matter under consideration.  In 
this particular case, partisan proponents began their advocacy efforts with a dearth of 
relevant and potent organizational resources.  Faculty members were female, untenured, 
and employed in fields of study aligned with the liberal arts, which in large part did not 
carry the same organizational cache as more highly regarded departments in the 
sciences.  Staff held mid-level administrative posts.  APA administrative contacts were 
virtually nonexistent.  APA student organizations were dispersed.  
By contrast, policy opponents were male, possessed tenure, and were employed 
in departments that had high status on the UMCP campus. All partisan opponents had 
held faculty positions at UMCP for a minimum of ten years.  Two of these faculty 
members held posts in the sciences.  Opponents would be credible within the campus 
context in part because their resources were congruent with the cultural and academic 
norms of the campus.  This resource comparison suggests that in order to secure a 
policy victory, partisan proponents would need to call upon a wide ranging resource 
arsenal that could:  (a) equal and eventually neutralize the organizational resource 
advantage possessed by opposing faculty; and (b) endure multiple cycles of a 
potentially protracted policy conflict given the nature of the policy advocated. 
Proponents possessed a few resources that they could use to could assist in their 
initial influence efforts as well as utilize to spark acquisition of additional 
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organizationally significant means of influence.  These early resources included: (a) 
irrefutable statistics regarding surging APA student enrollments and findings in official 
campus reports highlighting the scant academic and support services for this 
community; (b) recognized expertise in the field of Asian American studies and 
connections to other university campuses and activist faculty; (c) a unified core 
coalition comprised of faculty, students and staff capable of activating other allies 
through their linkages to faculty and student associations such as AFSGA and AASU; 
and (d) a short list of administrators including Dean Hampton, who could lobby on 
behalf of partisan proponents in administrative circles.
The first significant resource windfall for proponents occurred in 1995 after 
students confronted the Provost.  Students demanded that administrators improve the 
quality of education for APA undergraduates and establish an AAS curriculum on 
campus.  These demands were substantiated with information regarding the change in 
APA student demographics, the campus commitment to diversity, and the absence of 
support mechanisms for APA student populations. Administrators rewarded these 
demands with numerous new, relevant resources including: (a) positive campus media 
attention to the issue; (b) $40K seed money to establish a project office and to offer 
classes; and (c) an administrative oversight structure and planning capacity.  This 
administrative capacity was critical not only for cultivating the nascent program 
courses, but also for carving out a nexus for sharing information, building campus 
networks, securing administrative allies and developing procedural expertise.  This 
capacity also allowed proponents to engage AASU and Working for an Asian American 
Studies Program (WAASP) members in the discussion of student-led mobilization 
220
efforts and related political action required as the issue evolved. 
Study findings suggest that two years later, partisan proponents stood well 
equipped to tackle the heated policy debate during AAS Task Force deliberations.  
Proponent Task Force members drew upon both their expertise in the field of AAS 
studies and their expertise gained from administrative and curricular oversight of the 
AAS project as a means to control the flow of information and frame Task Force 
discussions.  Here, partisan proponents led Task Force discussions regarding the 
philosophical origins of the AAS curriculum, the curricular desires of students, and the
structure for a future program.  Study findings also revealed that proponents sought 
outside counsel from their administrative contacts, derived primarily from time spent 
running the AAS project.   
Students, too, stood equipped for and committed to the cause during Task Force 
deliberations. After the three years of engagement in the policy process, students were 
not fragmented, exhausted, or alienated.  Rather, students now were unified, energized, 
and activated.  When Task Force meetings appeared deadlocked, students called upon 
their accumulated network of campus media contacts as a means to dramatize the 
dispute and to sway public opinion in favor of partisan proponents.  This public 
attention elicited a laissez-faire response from administrators.  Recognizing the peril it 
posed to the future of the AAS program if they did not issue a consensual Task Force 
report, partisans returned to meetings to hammer out a negotiated report.  The Task 
Force report acknowledged the views expressed by opposing faculty members, but did 
not contain significant compromises if viewed: (a) in context of the overall 
philosophical direction advocated by proponents; and (b) in light of the resource 
221
advantage originally possessed by faculty opponents.      
This study suggests that partisan proponents who advocate policies that 
challenge the academic and organizational status quo may need to build and to sustain a 
rich resource arsenal in order to successfully effect a policy change. This finding is 
reinforced by research in the politics of agenda setting and the pre-decision making 
phases of the policy process.  For example, Cobb and Ross (1993) concur that a deep 
reservoir of potent resources is necessary for at least two reasons:  (a) partisans who 
“express grievance” present a challenge to the institutional order and therefore, may 
encounter oppositional groups with significant resources; and (b) partisans who 
advocate challenging policies must possess political resources that can endure the 
multiple cycles of conflict likely embedded in the policy process (pp. 3, 4). 
Based on Cobb and Ross’s (1993) above propositions about the resource 
requirements of successful challenging groups, Baldridge’s (1971) original 
conceptualization of political resources might be refined by posing a specific set of 
analytic questions to help determine: (a) the range of resources controlled by partisan 
proponent and opponent resources at the outset of the policy contest ; (b) an assessment 
of the organizational significance of these resources; and (c) the changes to partisan 
groups’ resources over time.  A resource assessment directing analysis to answering 
these specific questions may provide insight regarding the resources necessary for 
challenging groups to compensate for resource deficits, and to compete successfully in 
prolonged policy contests. 
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Conclusion Five:  The influence capacity of a challenging group may be contingent on 
actors’ entrepreneurial skill and will in the political arena
Baldridge (1971) and Stam and Baldridge’s (1977) provide some guidance 
regarding analysis of actors’ political skill, which is contained in propositions about the 
conditions under which actors select influence strategies.  Within this set of analytic 
propositions about actor influence strategies, Stam and Baldridge (1977) assert ed that if 
partisan groups possess a high level of trust and access to authorities, they will be more
likely to use influence tactics such as persuasion. 
Study findings affirm this proposition to some degree as proponent faculty and 
staff routinely utilized persuasive tactics as their means to influence academic 
administrators.  For example, although faculty initially failed to gain administrative 
funding for courses, they did persuade administrators that the idea of AAS courses 
might eventually be a worthwhile academic endeavor. Later, during Task Force 
deliberations, partisan proponents demonstrated their effective persuasive skills by 
wielding their disciplinary expertise, by drawing on their ad ministrative capacities from 
the AAS project, and by communicating their displeasures with UGST Dean Hampton, 
a trusted authoritative ally.
Stam and Baldridge (1977) also theorized that if partisans feel alienated from 
decision making channels, they will engage in constraint strategies, or high risk tactics 
of disruption and demand.  This condition of alienation, however, did not apply to APA 
students, who employed such influence tactics.  By contrast, students were unified with 
APA faculty and staff and remained fully engaged in the political process. Students 
organized themselves through the AASU and WAASP to guide the APA student 
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community.  They maintained ready access to information and strategic guidance about 
influence tactics.  In fact, student unification with, and membership in  the larger 
partisan proponent coalition may have help to offset any risk of using highly-charged
political tactics because: (a) coalition members had built a deep and varied resource 
arsenal; and (b) coalition members possessed the ability to deploy tactics from this
potent resource arsenal if student-led efforts had failed.
This study’s findings about partisan influence tactics, especially those regarding 
student tactics, highlight a limit of the analytic capacity of Baldridge (1971) and Stam 
and Baldridge’s (1977) original proposition regarding actor influence tactics.  To this 
end, these original conditional statements do not assist in explaining how partisan 
proponents’ utilized astute political skill in deploying their resources, and how their 
unity and will to preserve through the lengthy policy process fueled their policy victory. 
I turn, then, to Kindgon (1995), Mazzoni (1991), and Allison (1971) to help 
unpack partisan proponents’ political skill and will in this particular case. First, 
Kindgon (1995) remarks about the overall inherent skill of political actors, or “policy 
entrepreneurs” who:
…like a surfer….are ready to paddle, and their readiness combined with a sense 
for riding the wave and using the forces beyond their control contributes to this 
success. (p. 181)  
According to Kingdon, then, successful policy entrepreneurs possess a keen 
sense of the political climate surrounding an issue, the potential targets of influence, and 
the appropriate means of influence for policy success.  Kindgon also noted that actors 
who possess this adept political sense may also be able to speak for others or a group as 
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well as employ a combination of technical expertise and political savvy (pp. 180, 181).  
In this particular study, partisan proponents’ political skills enabled them: (a) to agree to 
and maintain a commitment to a single-focused policy goal ; (b) to harness their 
understanding of the context around APA issues on campus; and (c) to build and to rely 
on multiple actors and resources within their advocacy coalition as a means to endure 
the protracted policy process. 
Specifically, partisan proponents tried in accordance with what Kingdon (1995) 
terms “softening up” the system, by educating and working an issue at multiple targets 
of influence even prior to the policy deliberation.  In the beginning, proponents adeptly 
seized upon a “window,” or in this instance, the political opportunity provided by the 
intersection of contextual conditions—a historical legacy of discrimination, a new 
found institutional commitment to diversity, a surge in APA student demographics, and 
a lack of support for these students—to draw the attention of the campus and authorities
to their demands.  In this regard, proponents successfully demonstrated the skillful 
execution of politically appropriate tactics for specific political conditions.  
Proponents again exhibited this political competency in the deployment of 
influence tactics in multiple, and sometimes simultaneous, arenas of deliberation.  For 
example, after administrative turnover in the Provost’s office, partisan faculty continued 
to press UGST Dean Hampton for consideration of a formal AAS program through 
proposals, memorandum, and personal communication.  When this request was denied 
for the second time, students again turned their influence efforts to the public arena—
expanding the scope of the conflict—and successfully forcing the matter on the agenda 
of President Kirwan. Later, when Task Force deliberations appeared to be at a standstill 
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with opponent faculty threatening to dissent, students again pushed out the scope of 
conflict into the public eye when they successfully persuaded The Diamondback to 
publish an editorial on their behalf. 
Thus, in this case, partisan proponents successfully utilized dual streams of 
influence channels, which reflects what Mazzoni (1991) terms the skill of political 
actors to work both the “inside and outside” dimensions of the policy conflict.  Through 
the outside game, actors may utilize “campaigns employing urgent, motivating, and 
evocative symbols” as a means to garner broader support for a policy cause. In the 
inside game, actors return to the proximity of political conflict and are likely to engage 
in pragmatic negotiating as a means to achieve a resolution (pp. 116, 117).  
Finally, and just as important as the notion of political skill and perhaps 
connected to it, is an actor’s political will as defined by Allison’s (1971) in his 
groundbreaking study of the Cuban Missile crisis.  According to Allison, the concept of 
political will is the ability of an actor to endure through the cycles of the political 
process.  Kindgon (1995) remarks that political actors are by no means “superhuman” 
political actors, who possess the ability to control and execute influence without 
consequence, be it set backs or failures (1995, p. 183).  Instead, Kingdon aptly notes 
that while political skill is central to the victory equation, perhaps the key variable is 
actors’ “sheer persistency” in the face of political opportunity and conflict that serves as 
their most valuable attribute (p. 181). Likewise in this study, APA faculty, staff, and 
student success was attributed to their overall steadfast commitment to their end goal in 
the policy process.  And in the final policy outcome, it was their unity and tenacity that 
rendered faculty opponents conflict weary and resource depleted by the time the AAS 
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proposal reached the Provost’s office in 1998.
Study Recommendations
From a theoretical vantage point, this study may serve as a solid departure point 
for future research regarding the politics of diversity policy making.  Baldridge’s  (1971) 
original constructs offer higher education researchers a valid tool for conceptualizing 
and organizing what is an understudied, complex, and often obfuscated process. Most 
broadly, using a political framework provides answers to the key pertinent questions
Lasswell (1936) articulated in his classic definition of politics as the study of who gets 
what, when, and how?  By asking these questions, we shine the light on organizational 
and administrative practices, and provide the foundation for more informed judgments 
regarding the distribution of benefits and burdens on college campuses. 
The purpose of this study and single site case study research more generally is to 
explore and determine the applicability of prevailing theories to specific case study 
findings.  The findings of this study although instructive in this regard, should be 
subject to insights generated by more extensive, comparative case studies at a range of 
institutions encompassing other diversity-related policy and program processes.  To this 
end, additional studies could test the analytic conclusions of this study and the related 
suggestions for conceptual refinement to Baldridge’s (1971) model of campus decision 
making. 
Specific studies to investigate actor cohesion and unification could provide 
another particularly fruitful avenue for future research.  For example, partisan 
proponents in this study were able to reach across Asian ethnic groups, unite around a 
single policy goal of enacting an AAS program at UMCP, and remain committed to this 
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goal throughout the multiple phases of the policy process.  This cohesion afforded 
proponents political latitude and in turn, perhaps allowed them to develop an effective 
repertoire of influence tactics. Future studies might focus exclusively or perhaps more 
specifically on how actors procure and sustain this type of cohesion as a means to 
increase their odds of influencing the policy outcome. Findings from such studies hold 
the potential to enhance conceptual understanding of successful political coalitions, 
especially challenging groups, and to increase empirical data in the area of higher 
education diversity policy research.
Lastly, this study’s findings firmly reinforce the notion that campus diversity 
policies are the end-products of highly-charged, sensitive decision making processes.  
Yet these policy processes have not been the subject of extensive, theoretically 
anchored research.  This absence may be closely tied to the assertion by noted political 
scientist and former Duke University President Nan Keohane (1994) that the academy’s 
internal conflict around race, ethnicity, and gender has generated much “heat” but shed 
little “light” on the actual process by which institutions make these policy decisions.  
This process attribute—the policy “heat”—that Keohane remarked about was 
readily apparent in the development of the AAS program at UMCP.  Study data, 
particularly around the dynamics of student-led protests and the Task Force 
deliberations, revealed a policy process in which: (a) students believed and repeatedly 
publicly categorized the administration’s inattention to matters of support for APA 
communities on campus as racist neglect; and (b) untenured female professors of color 
took on the dominant institutional culture and the arguments advocated by a small, but 
vocal group of tenured male faculty who all but wrote off the disciplinary orientation of 
228
these women as not institutionally “worthy” and akin to “victims’ studies.”        
Given the sensitive and intense dynamics surround diversity policy processes, 
future research might benefit from examining these processes in progress.  Studies of 
this kind could try to capture the highly charged nature of diversity policy processes and 
bypass the apparent limits of retrospective case studies through anthropological means 
such as observation. That is, in spite of study informants’ willingness to provide candid 
and complete answers to the questions posed, interviews were characterized by hours of 
“off the record” data on aspects of the policy contest.  These comments obviously were 
not reported in the study findings or used to substantiate study conclusions. In light of 
this constraint, future studies utilizing data collected through observation of an ongoing 
policy process may hold the potential to unravel if and how actor race, ethnicity, and 
gender contribute to the policy dynamics, which otherwise might again remain “off the 
record.”
Chapter Summary
This chapter reviewed the nature of the policy problem, the study purpose, the 
conceptual framework, the methods used, and the findings.  This chapter also presented 
study conclusions, recommendations regarding the utility of Baldridge’s political 
model, offered preliminary propositions about the political capacity of challenging 
groups, and presented recommendations for future research.  
Overall, this chapter sheds light on the importance of the political perspective in 
higher education policy research. It adds to the small, but growing body of literature on 
the politics of higher education, which according to McClendon (2003) still “suffers 
from acute underdevelopment” (p. 165). This study also undertook a fresh approach by 
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analyzing diversity policy making from an organizational perspective. By utilizing this 
approach, this study’s findings enhance theoretical understanding of the politics of 
equity and change on campus and generate insights regarding what it may take for 




A Test of Baldridge’s Political Model:  A Case Study of the Creation of the Asian 
American Studies Program at the University of Maryland, College Park
Statement of Age of Subject
I state that I am over 18 years of age, in good physical health, and wish to participate in 
a program of research being conducted by Sally A. McCarthy in the Department of 
Education Policy and Leadership (EDPL) at the University of Maryland, College Park. 
Study Purpose
The purpose of this research is to explore and analyze the decision-making d ynamics 
that resulted in the adoption of the Asian American Studies program at UMCP.  The 
end-goal of this study is to test Baldridge’s (1971) model and generate preliminary 
propositions about the political nature of campus policy making around diversity 
initiatives and academic programs
Procedures
Each informant will receive a copy of this consent form and an explanation of this 
study.  Informant participation is voluntary and an informant may withdraw from the 
study at any time.  Informant identification will be held confidential if he or she decides
to participate.  
Informal and semi-structured interviews will be the primary mode of data collection. 
These interviews will be conducted with willing informants who were involved in the 
development of the Asian American Studies program at UMCP.  Participants will be 
asked a series of questions like the following:  Who were the central participants in the 
AAS program development?  How did these individuals or groups influence the 
decision making process?  Names of potential participants will come from documents 
sources, both secondary and primary to the case.  Interviews are expected to last one to 
two hours.  Informants may decline to answer any questions that he or she does not feel 
comfortable answering.  All interviews will be audio-recorded for the purposes of 
transcription unless the informant does not agree to this procedure.  Investigator notes 
will supplement all informant interviews.
Confidentiality and Risks
All informant identities will be kept confidential at all times.  Potential informant risks 
include an invasion of privacy if he or she were identified. Research findings and 
conclusions will safeguard against informant identity with the use of a numerical coding 
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system for interview participants.  This code will be attached to audio recordings, 
written documents, draft and final study reports. 
Benefits, Freedom to Withdraw, & Ability to Ask Questions
There are no personal benefits to participation.  Participants reserve the right to 
withdraw from this study at any point in the research study.  Participants also maintain 
the right to review interview transcripts, notes, and responses.  Participants have the 
right to delete any portion of their interview responses. 
Investigator Contact Information
Investigator Name:  Sally A. McCarthy
Investigator Address:  
Investigator Phone:   








Description of the Case Study
(Read to Study Informant Prior to Beginning Interview)
This case study is a research project conducted in partial fulfillment of 
my pursuit of a doctorate in the Department of Education, Policy and Leadership 
here at Maryland.  The purpose of this study is to investigate the dynamics 
surrounding campus policy making related to diversity issues, including the 
development of new academic programs.  
This study is anchored in conceptual ideas that liken university policy 
making to political processes. Higher education researchers have compared
university decision making processes to that of a small city or state in which 
organizational members have differing interests and goals.  This theory surmises
that policy decisions, and in this instance, a new academic program, is the result 
of these parties reaching a negotiated compromise on the outcome given their 
varying interests and goals. 
This research will employ a qualitative case study method.  I am drawing 
on documents and interviews as a means to explore and analyze the process that 
led to the development of the Asian American Studies program at the University 
of Maryland, College Park.  By doing so, I expect this study to add to the 
empirical and theoretical research on university decision making and the salient 
issue of diversity on campus.  
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Appendix C  
Case Chronology
Sources:  Asian American Student Union, Asian American Studies 
Program history timeline document, and The Diamondback
Date Asian American Studies Program Development
Prior to 1995 • Asian American experience course offered under UMCP general 
studies and/or honors program.
Spring 1995 • Students in Dr. Sangeeta Ray’s Asian American Experiences course 
form WAASP—Working for Asian American Studies Program. 
• Founders include Christy Lagdameo, Wendy Wang, and Alvin
Alvarez.
April 1995 • WAASP calls for a meeting with Provost Dan Fallon, faculty, staff, 
and other administrators.  Goal is to present student concerns.
June 1995 • Provost’s office allots “seed” money for AAS “project” overseen by 
Dr. Seung-Kyung Kim and grad student Will Liu.
December 1995 • AAS project submits Proposal for an Asian American Studies 
Program at Maryland to the Dean of Undergraduate Studies (UGST) 
and the College of Arts and Humanities (ARHU).  
• Project staff holds a workshop for faculty with Professor Gary 
Okihiro, Director of the AAS at Cornell University. 
June 1996 • AAS Project sponsors workshop to develop the curriculum for a 
proposed AAS Certificate.
November 1996 • AAS Project hosts EASCU.
• Conference goal is to facilitate discussion of the development of 
AAS programs across U.S. campuses. 
Early Spring 
1997
• AASU leads protest at Main Administration building (February 20, 
1997). 
• AASU and WAASP form “coalitions” with the Latino Student 
Union and the Black Student Union.
• President Kirwan agrees to meeting with AAS Project staff to 
discuss concerns (Meeting held March, 12, 1997).  
• Outcome is the creation of the Task Force on Asian American 
Studies (TFAAS).
December 1997 • TFAAS submits report to Provost Greg Geoffroy. 
March 1998 • Provost Geoffroy endorses TFAAS report.
Fall 1998 • AAS Project faculty solicits support of AAS national figures, 
including the Smithsonian, local and state politicians. 
January 2000 • Revised AAS curriculum proposal submitted to UGST and ARHU 
deans.
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Date Asian American Studies Program Development
May 2000 • University Senate approves Asian American Studies Program 
curriculum proposal.





Informant Code: Interview Date and Time:
Researcher to the Informant
Thank you for agreeing to be a part of this study and taking the time to discuss the 
development and adoption of the Asian American Studies program here at Maryland.  
As you know from reading both the study description and my preliminary chronology 
of the program, the purpose of the research is to understand the process which led to the 
development of the AAS program.  These questions serve merely as an orienting device 
for our conversation.  Please feel free to add or correct information at anytime if you 
believe it will be useful to this study and its purpose.  
Context and /Background
1. Are you aware of historical, external, or environmental factors affecting 
matters of diversity or the APA community on campus? 
2. What would you say were the key events leading to the development of the 
Asian American Studies program?
3.  How would you describe the nature of these events? 
[**The purpose of this interview guide is to spur open-ended conversation about the 
AAS.  The following questions may be asked repeatedly to separate events that are 
identified by the informant.]
AAS Program Development—Who Participated?
1. Who would you identify as the central administrators, students and staff
involved in the creation of the AAS at UMCP? 
2. What were they seeking to do?
3. Why were they pushing or opposing this program?
4. What do you perceive to be the challenges or advantages for those 
pushing for this program as well as those administrators who would 
eventually make decisions regarding the program?
How did the Program evolve?
5. How would you characterize the process that gave way to the adoption of 
the AAS?
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6. In your assessment, who shaped the process and the eventual adoption of 
the program by the University Senate?  Can you name these individuals 
or groups? 
Summary and Closing
1. Is there anything I have left out or details that you think are useful to 
understanding the development of the AAS?
2. Are there any documents you think I should read or review?  
3. Are there any individuals you think I should speak with to help me 
understand the AAS?
Thank you for your time.  As I mentioned, feel free to contact me if you think our 
conversation has not been complete or if you care to clarify information you have 




Informant Code: Interview Date and Time:
Researcher to the Informant
Thank you for agreeing to be a part of this study and taking the time to discuss the 
development and adoption of the Asian American Studies program here at Maryland.  
As you know from reading both the study description and my preliminary chronology 
of the program, the purpose of the research is to understand the process which led to the 
development of the AAS program.  These questions serve merely as an orienting device 
for our conversation.  Please feel free to add or correct information at anytime if you 
believe it will be useful to this study and its purpose.  
Context and Background: 1 990-1994
1. What event or action(s) do you think led to the first discussions about an 
Asian American Studies program at Maryland?
Probes:
a. Can you recall any historical, state or national events that may have 
shaped or spurred these discussions?
b. What was the campus culture like for diversity issues and those 
matters affecting Asian American Students during this time?
c. Are you familiar with the campus structures that oversee and 
facilitate the development of new academic programs?  If so, could 
you describe these structures?  Are there written policies that 
govern this process?
2. Who participated in these discussions?
3. What were the original intentions of these individuals and/or groups
(reference names or groups if given in question 2)?
4. Based on your observation [OR] knowledge, what do you think these 
individuals and/or groups wanted to get done?
5. Did these people share ideas or write plans about how to achieve this 
during this early stage of the process? 
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Probes:
a. How did these individuals go about influencing and shaping the 
direction of this process?  
b. Why do you think they were successful and/or unsuccessful?
c. Can you recall any potential roadblocks or resistance in these early 
stages?  If so, please describe.
Interest Articulation—Academic Year 1995:
In 1995, the Vice President of Student Affairs created the Asian Hispanic Native 
American Task Force.  Around the same time, the group, Working for an Asian 
American Studies Program (WAASP) formed to address matters germane to the 
creation of this program.  WAASP first met with the Provost’s office in April 1995. 
1. What do you think led to the creation of WAASP?
2. What do you think the WAASP wanted to achieve?
3. What types of challenges lay ahead for WAASP? 
Probes:
a. Did they possess anything that be could used to advance their goal 
of bringing AAS to campus?
b. If so, what do you think that was? 
4. Who called for the meeting with the Provost?
5. Who attended this meeting? 
6. Did you attend this meeting?  If you did, what do you think the participants 
wanted to get out the meeting?  What were they seeking as an outcome? 
7. What did those working toward the AAS have going in their favor?  How 
did they present their ideas at the meeting?  In general, what was the tone of 
the meeting?  
8. What was the outcome of this meeting?  Were any attendees opposed to the 
meeting’s outcome? Did this change during the meeting?  If so, please 
describe.
9. Who do think was most responsible for the outcome?  
Probes:
a. How did these individuals help influence the direction and 
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outcome of the meeting?
b. What specifically do you think they did in order to achieve this 
outcome?
10. Were there any written documents from the meeting? If so, do you know 
how I could obtain a copy of the meeting notes or minutes?
Interest Articulation-Spring 1996 to March 1997
The Asian American Studies Project submitted the first proposal for an AAS to the 
UGST and ARHU Deans in December 1995. In the spring 1997 semester, President Brit 
Kirwan created the Task Force on Asian American Studies (TFAAS).
1. What was going on that precipitated the March 12, 1997 meeting with 
UMCP President Brit Kirwan?
2. Who initiated these events? Were they students, staff, and/or 
administrators?  
3. What did they want to get out of the meeting with President Kirwan?
4. What do you think they had working their favor?  
Probes:
a. What, if anything, might have been a roadblock or resistance in
advancing the AAS?
b. How might this have been overcome?
5. Are you familiar with the action they took to advance their end-goals?  
If so, please describe the steps taken to advance the AAS during this 
time?
6. What was the end-result?  Do you think these individuals OR groups 
were satisfied with this outcome in relationship to what they were 
seeking to change? If so, please describe. 
7. Did these events change the goals of those involved in the creation of 
the AAS?  If so, please describe how.
Legislative Transformation—spring 1997 to spring 2000
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1. Who was on the TSAAFF?  Please name and identify members of the Task 
Force if possible.   
2. Were you a member of the Task Force?
3. What was the Task Force charged with? 
4. Do you think all Task Force members shared similar goals for the 
committee?  If so, how?  If not, how did their purposes and intentions and 
goals differ? 
5. How often did the Task Force meet?  Who attended?
6. How would you characterize the nature of the Task Force Meetings?  
7. Who influenced and shaped the content of the final Task Force Report?
Probes:
a. Were there particular members who gave greater input or say into 
shaping the committee work? 
b. If so, can you identify these individuals?
c. What did they contribute to the meetings? 
d. Was there opposition expressed in these meetings?  If so, by whom 
and what was the nature of this opposition?
8. Did the Task Force issue a printed report?  If so, who wrote this report?
9. Do you think the people you identified were chiefly responsible for the 
content of the end product? How so?  
Legislative Transformation—spring 1998-January 2000
By March 1998, TFAAS had submitted, and Provost Geoffrey had approved its report 
calling for the official creation of an AAS at Maryland.  A revised AAS curriculum 
proposal was submitted to the ARHU and UGST Deans in January 2000.
1. Who were drafted the revised AAS curriculum? Could you identify these 
individuals?
2. Did this group differ from the Task Force membership?  If so, please 
identify key members of the Task Force who helped write the curriculum.
3. What were the intentions of those who wrote the new curriculum proposal?
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4. Do you think their ideas about the AAS change d after the Task Force report?  
If so, how?  
Final Legislative Transformation and Policy Outcome:  Spring Semester 2000
1. Please describe any campus events on that are important to consider during 
the semester the AAS received final approval?  What was the nature of these 
events?   
2. How do you think these events shape the content and/or ultimate approval of 
the AAS in May 2000?  
3. Who were the key individuals or groups who pushed for the final approval 
of the AAS?
4. What did they do to see that the AAS made its way to the University Senate? 
5. Was there any opposition to the final AAS proposal?  If so, please describe?
6. Who do you believe was ultimately responsible for the creation of the AAS?  
Summary and Closing
4. Is there anything I have left out or details that you think are useful to 
understanding the development of the AAS?
5. Are there any documents you think I should read or review?  
6. Are there any individuals you think I should speak with to help me 
understand the AAS?
Thank you for your time.  As I mentioned, feel free to contact me if you think our 
conversation has not been complete or if you care to clarify information you have 
shared with me today. 
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Appendix F
Summary of UMCP Commission, Committee and Task Force Reports
related to Campus Diversity
Year Title Relevant Policy Findings 
and Recommendations
1987 Promises to Keep:  The 
College Park Plan for 
Undergraduate Education 
(the Pease Report)
-Commissioned by an Ad 
Hoc Committee of the 
University Senate.
-Central recommendation 
was a CORE diversity 
course for all 
undergraduates.  
1988 Making a Difference for 
Women:  Report of the 
Committee on 
Undergraduate Women’s 
Education (report of the 
Greer Committee)
-Second iteration of a 
subcommittee of the 
President’s Commission on 
Women’s Affairs. 
-Called for the inclusion of 
women and minorities in 
undergraduate curriculum.
1989 Enhancing the College Park 
Campus: An Action Plan
-Official plan for the 
Flagship campus called for 
the increase in enrollment 
of African American and 
other underrepresented 
student populations. 
1989 Access is Not Enough:  A 
Report to the President 
Concerning Opportunities 
for Blacks at College Park
-Report commissioned by 
the Office of the President.
-Report found that the 
campus failed to provide a 
hospitable environment 
leading to successful 
graduation of African 
American students.
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Year Title Relevant Policy Findings 
and Recommendations
1992 Progress in Equity and 
Diversity in the Periodic 
Review to the Middle 
States
-Report resulted from sub-
committee work of the 
Middle States Review 
process. 
-Report highlighted the 
fragile relationship among 
the budget constraints, 
campus climate, program 
supports for racial diversity 
on campus. 
1992 The Report on Excellence 
through Diversity:  
Providing Opportunities for 
Black Americans at 
College Park
-Report commissioned by 
the University Senate.
-Report again found 
campus climate issues for 
African Americans and re-
emphasized the lack of 
support for students once 
enrolled at UMCP. 
1995 Asian, Hispanic, and 
Native American Task 
Force Report
-Report commissioned by 
the Office of the President 
in 1993.
-Report found similar 
climate and academic 
conditions for these student 
groups as their African 
American Peers. 
-Specifically recommended 
the expansion of academic 
support and courses 
covering issues of 
importance to the Asian 
American community.
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Year Title Relevant Policy Findings 
and Recommendations
1996 Charting a Path to 
Excellence:  The Strategic 
Plan for the University of 
Maryland College Park
-Report issued by the
Office of the Provost.
-Report established 
decision-making priorities 
for the campus including 
those policies and programs 
that support inclusive 
learning and increase the 
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